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In conclusion, because of a recognition of the somewhat
unfamiliar nature of this topic and in answer to questions
raised by various individuals, a brief explanation is offered
as to what motivated the author's interest in such a study.
It may be said that the writer's interest in methodology was
the outgrowth of studies in the related fields of economic
theory and general semantics.

From the economists an appre

ciation of the virtures of methodological discussion was
obtained and from the general semantists a means of analyzing
and conducting such discussions was discovered.

This study,

growing from personal interests in related fields, is an
attempt to apply to management and organizations certain
fundamental issues relating to the methods of social science.
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ABSTRACT
Little attention has been directed toward the method
ological problems of management and organization theory.
It is likely that this neglect has resulted more from the
scientific immaturity of the discipline than from academic
unconcern.

However, the sophistication of the subject has

advanced to the point where immaturity is no longer a valid
excuse.

As a result, this study is an attempt to examine

selected methodological issues with the objective of gaining
some insight into the future of management science.
Initially, the opposing epistemological perspectives of
empiricism and rationalism were analyzed through the use of
secondary research.

Utilizing the tenets of general seman

tics, it was argued that neither perspective by itself is
capable.of providing the answers that management and organi
zation theorists seek.

Only an elaborate deductive-inductive

system making use of man-to-man understanding can provide such
information.
Consideration was also given to the value-centric predica
ment faced by all the social sciences.

Bnphasis was placed on

the necessity of explicit separation of judgments of value from
statements of scientific fact.

This proposition was advanced

because of the abstract nature of value judgments which

xiv

disqualifies them from entry into the confines of science.
In the final chapter an attempt was made to empirically
determine why research in the area of management exhibits
such a diversity of methodological approaches.

It was hypoth

esized that past and present environmental influences of the
researcher account for these diversities.
test this proposition,

In an effort to

a mail questionnaire was sent to 380

management professors in 255 colleges and universities through
out the United States.
It was determined, on the basis of the sample information,
that geographical factors constitute the primary influences
upon methodological convictions.

Factors such as the area

where the respondent's highest degree was received, area
where he was reared and place of present residence seemed to
be especially important.

On the other hand, fac-tors such as

age, teaching experience and religious preference appeared
relatively unimportant in determining differences in method
ological beliefs.
One particularly interesting result was noted relative
to the epistemological perspective of management academia.
In general, differences of opinion with respect to epistemological issues were deviations of magnitude, not direction.
In other words, on the average, the respondents exhibited a
uniform favorable connotation relative to empiricism.

XV

On the subject of a positive as opposed to a normative
approach to management and organizations,
so evident.

Although no groups

agreement was not

thought of either approach

as entirely satisfactory in and of itself,

there were obvi

ous differences relative to the single most preferred alter
native.
The implications of these findings to the future of
management and organization theory are considerable.

If

one accepts the notion of self-projection, he would likely
agree that today's academia,

through their research and

teaching, will influence the theoretical labors of tomorrow's
scholars.

Therefore, management research in the future will

probably continue to exhibit a great deal of empirical con
tent.
With respect to the value-centric predicament, projec
tions are more difficult to make.

The fact that some groups

favored one approach and others favored another complicates
the problem considerably.

In view of this, methodological

controversy seems sure to continue in this area.

Although

academic controversy is refreshing, it can also be destruc
tive unless it is based on systematic analysis.

For this

reason, it is hoped that the future will witness more inter
est in methodology than has the past.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION:

REFLECTIONS ON SCIENTIFIC,

PHILOSOPHICAL AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
If any problem in the social sciences is important
enough to study, it should be studied with methods
that will yield accurate and unbiased results.
--Rensis Likert
It is with some degree of anticipation that a student
of management enters the domain of philosophy to seek to
interrelate the two areas so that both may be better under
stood.

This anticipation is, to some extent, the result of

the "paradox of methodological investigation"-'- which is no
less apparent in management than in any other discipline.
If there is apprehension, however, it is overshadowed by a
sense of challenge when one recognizes that the only route
to understanding the substantive problems of any subject
area is by way of an examination of the philosophical issues
that provide the foundation for all knowledge.

Undoubtedly,

■'■The "paradox of methodological investigation" exists
because philosophers trained in methodology rarely possess
a knowledge of management and managers generally lack the
training necessary to philosophically examine their methods.
See Sherman R. Krupp, editor, The Structure of Economic
Science: Essays on Methodology. Prentice-HalT, Inc.,
Elnglewood Cliffs,- tTew Jersey, 1966, p. iii.

every student, either consciously or unconsciously, seeks
the answer to such questions; but when he formally examines
this area, a unique vocabulary must be mastered before much
progress can be made.
Definition of Terms
Throughout the study an effort will be made to define
any unfamiliar term at its point of usage.

Some terms, how

ever, are so basic to an understanding of the subject that
they warrant special attention.

The remainder of this section

is devoted to the clarification of such words and phrases.
Philosophy
Philosophy, as it relates to an area of academic inquiry,
involves an attunement with the ultimate nature of things--a
speculative enterprise which penetrates for no practical purpose the structure of ultimate reality.

p

In this context it

assumes its literal meaning "love for knowledge."

So defined,

philosophy is the summation of at least four sub-areas of inquiry

^William Litzinger and Thomas E. Schaefer, "Perspective:
Management Philosophy Engima," Academy of Management Journal,
Vol. IX, No. ^ (Dec., 1966), pp. 3ij.0-3ij.T7
3This particular scheme was obtained from J. Donald
Butler, Four Philosophies and Their Practice in Education and
Religion. Revised e d . , Harper and Row Publishers, New ifork,
1^577 various pages.

3
Figure 1 offers an illustration of how these acadenic sub
cultures combine to develop a general field of study.

Moving

clockwise from the top, one first encounters metaphysics or
the theory of reality, which concerns itself with the cosmos
and the nature of causality.

Next is axiology,

the general

theory of value, which examines the sumroun bonum or "highest
good" and naturally incorporates ethics and aesthetics.

At

the base of the diagram is epistemology, which relates to the
theory of knowledge and is associated with questions regarding
the possibility of knowledge,
instruments of knowledge.

the kinds of knowledge and the

The final subclassification in

this particular scheme is logic and is perhaps
familiar of all the categories mentioned.

the most

Logic is the

science of exact thought and as such includes methodology
which is related to epistemology via its concern with valid
knowledge.

This then is a brief description of philosophy

in its "purely classical" sense.
The preceding definition was formulated in an age of
idealism when knowledge for the sake of knowledge was of
paramount importance.

In the present age of pragmatism or

American vocationalism, it is not surprising that some
writers have taken issue, either implicitly or explicitly,

k

METAPHYSICS
Reality
Causal! ty

LOGIC
Thought
Methodology

PHILOSOPHY

EPISTEMOLOGY
Knowledge
Empiricism &
Rationalism

FIGURE I
THE SUBCULTURES OF PHILOSOPHY

AXIOLOGY
Ethics
Aesthetics

with the traditional meaning of the term.

Today,

"philos

ophy" seems to describe the highest type of practical knowl
edge, the knowledge to order other knowledge for human
purpose.

c

According to this interpretation, a philosophy

of management must be a philosophy of business that will
provide the techniques and value guidelines necessary for
"effective" and lawful managerial action.

Such a proposi

tion raises doubt as to any relationship between the modern
and traditional usage of the term.

In fact, the pragmatic

definition seems to be more closely related to science,
ethics and jurisprudence than to classical philosophy thus
creating a serious semantic confusion and raising the
necessity for additional definitions.

Science
The objective of science is to describe, explain and
predict.

The first of these aims is basic and indispensable

while the second and third are the most fruitful results of

^For example, R. C. Davis, "Philosophy of Management,"
Advanced Management. Vol. XXXIV, No.
(Aprl, 1959), pp. 5-6
and Oliver Sheldon, The Philosophy of Management, PrenticeH a l l , Inc., 1923, p p 7 “Z 7 ^ 3 ^
^Litzinger and Schaefer, l o c . c i t .

scientific

labor.^

and science;

Description is common to both philosophy

only the plane upon which this description takes

place is different.

The objective of description in science

is prediction; but scientific prediction has no counterpart
in pure philosophy.

The "scientific mentality" is the pro

pensity to suspend belief until evidence of the appropriate
kind is produced and believed only to the degree warranted
by available evidence without excluding the possibility of
future disconfirmation.^

The "philosophic mentality" on the

other hand, seeks the cosmic nature of a perceived event and
structures it within the philosophical framework one possesses.
Therefore, philosophy and science are not and can never be the
same.

Management science has made significant progress in

recent years, but the discipline seems no closer to developing
a"true philosophy" than it was fifty years ago.
It is not unreasonable to speculate that atleast

one

cause of the present state of retarded management philosophy
is the confusion between the functions of philosophy and

^Herbert Feigl, "The Scientific Outlook:
Naturalism and
Humanism," in Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck, editors, Readings
in the Philosophy of S c i e n c e . Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.,
New York, 1953, PP* 10-11.
Also see Richard B. Braithwaite,
Scientific Explanation, Cambridge University Press, London,
1953, P. 1.
^Arthur Pap, An Introduction to the Philosophy of S cie nce .
The Free Press of Glencoe, itew YorIF7 1962, p. 3.

7
science.

Frederick Taylor himself drew a rather sophisticated

distinction between the two by stating that "the mechanism of
management must not be mistaken for its essense or underlying
philosophy" and concluded with a warning:
The very mechanism which will produce the finest
results when made to serve the underlying prin
ciples of scientific management will lead to
disaster if accompanied by the wrong spirit in
those who are using it.8
Thus, there is only one sense in which philosophy and science
are similar; they both seek knowledge even though it is a
fundamentally different type.
Philosophy of Science
Philosophy of science, as it is viewed today, is a part
of analytical philosophy in that it rejects the implicit
assumption that the sole task of the philosopher is the suprascientific description of reality.

In fact, It expands the

philosopher's traditional task to include the logical analysis
of concepts, laws and theories of a given science.

9

Therefore,

philosophy of science endeavors to analyze the validity of

Frederick W. Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Manage
ment . Harper and Brothers Publishers, New York, 1917, pp. 12o129.
Here it seems the "mechanism of management" is used
synonymously with applied science and is contrasted to philos
ophy.
9
May Brodbeck, "The Nature and Function of the Philosophy
of Science," in Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck, Readings in
the Philosophy of Science. Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc .,~iTew
York, 19^3, p. 5T

scientific inquiry and in doing so makes science, like any
other activity of man, subject to examination on philosophical
grounds.
Prom this standpoint, philosophy is both the forerunner
and successor of science.

Scientists are required to accept

many concepts such as truth, time and space which they cannot
stop to examine;

yet, these are the very issues the philoso

phers seek to e x p l a i n . ^
initiated,

Once scientific investigations

are

the logic of the methods employed also requires

examination;

for until their validity is confirmed,

any con

clusions 30 obtained remain subject to extreme uncertainty.
Thus, methodology is an important and integral part of the
philosophy of science.
Methodology
Methodology is the logic of methods and as such its
function is to judge the numerious

variations of inductive

and deductive systems as to their scientific validity.

The

objective of this type of inquiry is to standardize or at
lea3t define the methods used in order to reduce or isolate
that portion of total variation in scientific findings

•^C o l l i e r 'a En cyclopedia. P. F. Collier and Son
Corporation, New York, 1966, Vol. 15, PP* 312-313*

resulting from "methodological variance."
matical (i.e. functional)

A simple mathe

formulation is perhaps the most

concise way to illustrate the p o i n t . ^

Suppose there exists

the following relationship:
6q

— ^ ( A q * M,

Op)

where,
60 = the data observed
A0 = actual acts of the observee
M

= methods of measurement--i.e . methodology

Op ~ perception of the observer
If it is possible to isolate and hold constant "methodological
variation" ( ,
60 and A 0 .

a more direct relationship will exist between

Although this would be extremely helpful, an

additional source of variance is exposed by this functional
formulation that is possibly more troublesome than "pure
methodological variation" and might be labeled "perceptual
variation" (°0p)*

Idealistically, one would hope that the

sum of methodological and perceptual variation would equal
zero (oj^ + oq

= 0 ), but realistically speaking this would be
r

^ T h e basic idea of a mathematical formulation was
obtained from Stuart C. Dodd, "Scient-Scales for Measuring
Methodology," The American Behavioral S c i e nt ist , Vol. IX,
No. 10 (June, 1956), p p . 38 although this formulation bears
little resemblance to his treatment of the subject.

10

highly improbable.

If, however, these sources of variation

could be minimized so that the relationship between the data
observed (60 ) and the action of the observee (Aq ) approaches
unity, scientific investigation would have surely been
accomplished.

As will be noted later, this proposition

forms the basic purpose of the study--to expose some of the
causes of methodological variation and to better understand
perceptual variation by making use of the tenets of general
semantics and communication theory.
Purpose of the Study
This study proposes to examine the methodology of manage
ment and organizations and to illustrate the contribution
that at least one related field of study can make toward the
resolution of management's methodological difficulties.

The

need for such an analysis is evident in the cries of manage
ment writers for a systematic theory upon which they may
unify their efforts.
Ques t for Management Theory
Many scholars have voiced the need for a theory of
management and organizations, but few have made the point
with the force of Henri Fayol when he stated "without theory
no teaching is p o s s i b l e . I f

12

this is true, and to some

Henri F a y o l , General and Industrial Administration,
translated by Constance Storrs, Sir Isaac Pitman and Son,
Ltd., London, 19^9, pp. 11+-15-

11

e x t e n t it m u s t s u r e l y be, m a n a g e m e n t faces

a tr eme ndou s

c h a l l e n g e for a true p h i l o s o p h y to p r o v i d e

the n e c e s s a r y

c o n d i t i o n fo r a c o mp le te an d s y s t e m a t i c a l l y d e v e l o p e d science.
Such a science

cannot be l o n g in c o m i n g b e c a u s e no er a has

ever p r o d u c e d the n e e d nor
combinations

of p r o d u c t i v e f a ct or s

No greater waste
technological

the u r g e n c y fo r c o o r d i n a t i n g vast
as the c u rr en t period.

can be i m a g i n e d than the i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s

di s c o v e r i e s

b e c au se of

c i e n t l y u t i l i z e m o d e r n in nova ti on s.
n i z a t i o n theor y can not so lv e

be s u p p l i e d f r o m w i t h o u t
methodology presents
and c o n ta in s

all

the i n a b i l i t y to e f f i 
But m a n a g e m e n t and o r g a 

its m e t h o d o l o g i c a l pr obl ems

a completely esoteric manner.

of

Yet,

in

to think the answers wil l

is e q u a l l y errone ou s.

The re fo re,

itsel f as an i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y p r o b l e m

the c o m p l i c a t i o n s

of s u c h a dis ci pl ine.

T o w a r d An I n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y A p p r o a c h to M e t h o d o l o g y
M e t h o d o l o g y is first of all a p r o b l e m of p h i l o s o p h y ,
unlike metaphysics
of o t h e r fields.
of its s t ud en ts
th ems e l v e s

it is r e a d i l y c o m p r e h e n d i b l e
Management,

by its

to stu dents

v e r y natu re,

requires

a k n o w l e d g e of r e l a t e d d i s c i p l i n e s

that l e n d

quite e a s i l y to the e x a m i n a t i o n of m e t h o d o l o g y .

The s t u d y at h a n d wi l l m a k e use of s e v e r a l ideas
s em a n t i c s

but

in an e f f o r t to a n al yz e

methodological difficulties

f r o m g e nera l

and c l a r i f y c e r t a i n

that p r e s e n t l y ex i s t in the
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study of management and organizations.

A further objective

of this investigation is to survey the attitudes of man age 
ment professors with respect to these issues and project
what affects, if any, such attitudes will have on the future
development of the discipline.

In spite of the ambition

with which this subject is approached, certain limitations
must be conceded.
Limitations of the Analysis
The first limitation is the scope of the study itself
for although answers dealing with the questions of m ana ge
ment metaphysics and axiology would be a most significant
contribution, such subjects must, by necessity, be left to
the philosophers.

Therefore,

the present study will pursue

a less ambitious, although it is hoped equally important,
task by limiting its scope to the methodology and epistemology of management and organizations.

In addition to this

limitation, one other should be noted.
The study at hand is directed toward the more philo
sophical questions of management and as such faces a con
straint relative to universal interest.

Managers are doers--

they are accustomed to dealing with the realities of the shop
and market place and in this capacity are not inclined to

13
appreciate nor be extremely interested in philosophizing.
Their essence is to exist, to decide and to act.-^

13

They may

be compared to the fireman who is too busy fighting the fire
to worry about the chemistry of ignition or the physics of
his mechanical tools.

Therefore, any contribution this study

might make will be to academia who must shoulder the joint
responsibility of seeking both a philosophy and science of
management and organizations.
C om m e n t s

on R e s e a r c h D e s i g n and A.

Preview of the Presentation
The research design used in this study is a combination
of secondary and primary research.

Chapters one through

three make exclusive use of secondary research and provide
the foundation for the survey of management professors which
constitutes

the final chapter.

APPENDIX A contains a repro

duction of the questionnaire sent to 3^0 randomly selected
management professors at 255 colleges and universities.

^ 0 . A. Ohmann, "Search for a Managerial Philosophy,"
Harvard Business Review, Vol. XXXV, No. 5 (Sept.-Oct., 1957)
P. ^1.
^ G e o r g e S. Odiorne. "The Management Theory Jungle and
the Existential Manager," Academy of Management Journal,
Vol. IX, No. 2 (June, 1966),“ p. 110.
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H o wev er ,
befo re

since

the firs t three

the results

of the e m p i r i c a l

further elab

analysis will be

c h ap ter four.

In v i e w of the fa c t that this
treatise o n m e t h o d o l o g y ,
two m e t h o d o l o g i c a l
Ch a p t e r

will be d e v e l o p e d

of the s u r v e y are re po r t e d ,

o r a t i o n on the analy tic s
p o s t p o n e d until

chapters

two deals

s t u d y p r opose s

to be a

it w i l l b e g i n by a n a l y z i n g in det ail

issues

c o m m o n to all s o c i a l d is ci pl ines.

e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h the e p i s t e m o l o g y of m a n a g e 

m e n t and o r g a n i z a t i o n theory.

P r i m a r y e m phasi s

is g i v e n to

the a l t e r n a t i v e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e s m o s t e v i d e n t in
the stu dy of m a n a g e m e n t

and o r g a n i z a t i o n s .

r e s u l t i n g in & p o s t e r i o r i
t r a s t e d to _a priori
methodological

i n f o r m a t i o n is e v a l u a t e d

i n f o r m a t i o n as a basis

c o nce pt

for science.

c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h e o r y to m e t h o d o l o g y

t h r o u g h an e x a m i n a t i o n of the l a n g u a g e

and s e m a n t i c s of science.

a b s t r a c t i o n a n al ysis m a k i n g use of K o r z y b s k i ' s

structural differential

is a p p l i e d to the issue of value

judg

in t e ac hi ng and r e s e a r c h i n g the ar e a of ma n a g e m e n t .

The e n t i r e analysis

is

then c o m b i n e d into a d i s c u s s i o n of

the p s y c h o l o g y o f s e l f - p r o j e c t i o n w h i c h pr o v i d e s
for

This

science of h u m a n behavior.

C h a p t e r three relates

m e nts

and c o n 

is d i s c u s s e d w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k of

the logi c of a u n i v e r s a l

In addition,

Empiricism

the h y p o t h e s e s

a foundation

to be i n v e s t i g a t e d em piri ca ll y.

Basically, the idea of self-projection states that
environmental factors are influential in the formation of
one's system of values and beliefs.

This value and belief

system in return influences interpersonal communication via
man's tendency to assume that his beliefs are typical of all
humans.

Therefore, in a sense, one always communicates

and about himself.

to

The empirical study will attempt to

determine the extent to which various environmental factors
influence the formation of methodological convictions.

Then,

applying the results of the analysis, a speculation as to how
contemporary attitudes will affect future management and
organization theory through the self-projection of faculty
to student will be offered.

But, before continuing further,

the methodological issues themselves must first be examined
and explained.

CHAPTER II
EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MANAGEMENT
AND ORGANIZATION THEORY
Human society is not merely a fact or an event in
the external world to be studied by an observer
like a natural phenomenon.
Though it has exter
nality as one of its important components, it is
as a whole a little world, a cosmion, illuminated
with meaning from within by the human beings who
continuously create and bear it as the mode and
condition of their self-realization.
--Eric Voegelin
Sciences are concerned with knowledge, and by virtue of
this concern, epistemology emerges as the most basic of the
scientist’s interests.

The scientist qua epistemologist

concentrates his analysis on the relationship between the
perceptual images one constructs and the objective reality
1
to which these images refer.
From this it can be seen that
epistemological and metaphysical conceptualizations of reality
are fundamentally different.

Within the theory of knowledge

the "ways of knowing" refer to cognitive procedures for sub
stantiating a belief which are justified on the grounds that
they are more productive of objective knowledge than any

-1-William P. McEwen, The Problem of Social-Scientific
Knowledge, The Bedminster Press, Totowa, New Jersey, 1963,
p. 6 .
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alternative cognitive procedure.

2

In the field of organiza

tions, individual members and their actions become the
"knowable;" science is designated as the process of "knowing"
and the causal relationships developed become "knowledge."
Through the activity of knowing, the knowable becomes
3
knowledge.
Metaphysics, on the other hand, attempts to explain the
nature of reality itself--what it actually is and how it came
to be.

Thus, the distinction becomes explicit; metaphysics

takes cosmic reality as its subject matter, whereas reality
relative to perception is the concern of epistemology.

There

fore, the primary questions of science are epistemological,
not metaphysical, thereby placing upon the present chapter
the responsibility of examining the epistemological founda
tions of organization theory and analyzing the subject matter
which it is designed to exrplain.
Logic of A Universal Science of
Human Behavior
Perhaps it is too obvious to mention that management
and organization theorists have voiced "scientific" concern

2 Ibid., P. 6 3 .
^James K. Feibleman, "The Scientific Philosophy,"
Philosophy of S c i e n c e . Vol. XXVIII, No. 3 (July, 1961), p. 250.
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about their subject for decades.

Attempts have been made to

derive "principles of organization" from Biblical contexts
and from the Kameralwissenschaft^- or Cameralistic science
which developed in Germany around the doctrine of administra
tion by the territorial prince.

However,

voiced concern and

constructive action are often completely independent.
nizing this,

Recog

the time has come for theorists of organizations

to cease their lamentations and take time from their compila
tion of data and theoretical labors in order that they may
reexamine the nature of their subject and the logic of their
methods.
Management and organization theory, like any other area
of inquiry, assumes

the responsibility of formulating g enerali

zations from whi ch consequences may be deducted and predictions
£
made.
Needless to say, no single theory thus far developed
can boast that it has accomplished such a worthy objective
with a high degree of accuracy.

Nevertheless,

the sum total

of all efforts has led the study of organizations far from
the r eig n of the once dominant "rule of thumb."

Influential

theories have evolved using a variety of approaches and

^-Joseph Schumpeter, Economic Doctrine and M e t h o d . George
Allen and Unwin, Ltd. , London,
I+’j pT 33.
^John G. Kememy, A^ Philosopher Looks at S c i e n c e . D. Van
Nostrand Company, Princeton,
pp"I ^ 7 - ^ 5 ^
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making necessary complex classification schemes.
£
scheme is noted below:

One such

1.

Classification -according to the sources of data.
This category ranges from a purely empirical
classification to a completely mystical one.
Such a continuum might be called an "epistemological scale."

2.

Classification according to the purpose of the
researcher.
Those theories which propose to
describe what actually "is" in organizations
occupy one extreme and those attempting to
prescribe how organizations "should be" occupy
the other.

3„

Classification on the basis of the phenomenon
studied.
Macro theories observing or analyzing
organizations in toto are distinguished from
micro theories concentrating on the individuals
who make up the whole.
This continuum might be
called a "macro-micro scale."

Since this scheme appears to the writer as the most
productive available, it will be used to provide a structure
for the analysis of the logic of organization theory.

How

ever, the items will be discussed in reverse order beginning
with the purpose of a science of management and organizations
and an examination of the phenomenon under study.

Albert Rubenstein and Chadwick J. Haberstroh, editors,
Some Theories of Organization. Revised e d . , Richard D.
Irwin, Inc., Homewood, 111. , 1966, pp. 22-21;.

Purpose of a_ Science of Management and Organizations
Any science,

if it is to worthy of the name, accepts

as its basic problem the discovery of invariant elements with
respect to environmental conditions and differences in the
sensory organization of different persons.

Knowledge of such

elements permits prediction of the sense phenomena that will
most likely appear under a set of given conditions.

There

fore, the goal of science is the discovery of universal
7
invariants and principles of covariation.
Examples of
attempts

to accomplish this scientific objective are evident

in every stage of the development of management theory.
Scientific management and the traditional school found little
objection to calling their concepts of covariation "principles
while the advocates of the human relations approach, although
less explicit, sought the same type of universal invariants.
Other scholars interested in the science of society have made
some most interesting observations such as Chase's
patterns of mankind."

Thus,

"33 common

science appears as an effort to

*^Felix Kaufmann, Methodology of the Social Sciences, The
Humanities Press, New York, 195°, P* 8.
®Henri F a y o l , General and Industrial M a n a g e m e n t . trans
lated by Constance S t o r r s , Sir Isaac Pittman and Son, L t d . ,
London, 191+9, pp. 19-1+0.
^Stuart Chase, pie Proper Study of M a n k i n d . Revised e d . ,
Harper and Brothers Publishing Co., New York, 19$6, pp. 81+93.
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add some type of structure to dynamic reality.
Management and organization theory, however, cannot be
content with the unrestricted quest for universal invariants
since the search must take place according to rigorous rules
if the enterprise is to be characterized as scientific.

These

standards or criteria may best be formulated in terms of ideals
to be approximated but perhaps never fully attained.

The more

important of these are as follows:10
1.

Intersubjective testability or simple objectivity.
Knowledge claims must be subject to examination by
the properly equipped individual.
Cognitive
meanings are sought, not just claims accessible
to selected mystics.

2.

Reliability of confirmation.
Discernment between
chance and law is an absolute necessity of science.

3.

Coherence and systematic structure.
Mere collec
tion of data is not science.
A well connected
account of facts is the ultimate end of science.

L|..

Comprehensiveness of knowledge.
Science acquires
a reach far beyond unaided senses and requires
that any unifying hypothesis remain open to
revision.
The ability to live with an unfinished
world is a sign of the maturity of science since
the concepts of science are confirmed but never
verified.11

10Herbert Feigl, "The Scientific Outlook:
Naturalism
and Humanism," in Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck, editors,
Readings in the Philosophy of Science, Appleton-CenturyCr o f t s , Inc., New York. 1953T PP* 8-20.
Also Olaf Helmer
and Nicholas Rescher, "On the Epistemology of the Inexact
Sciences," Management Sc i e n c e , Vol. VI, No. 1 (Oct., 1959),
pp. 25-2711Robert J. House and Alan C. Filley, "Science, Theory,
Philosophy and the Practice of Management," Management
International R e v i e w . 6 (1956), pp. 97-107.
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It is unadvisable to speak of the science of organiza
tions in the same sense as the science of physics.

Prediction

of events one might expect at a given moment is impossible
within the organizational framework where only probabilistic
and limited range conclusions are possible.

12

However, as

Scott points out, the usefulness of such predictions may be
great in the long run even though they provide no real basis
for short run decisions.

13

In addition,

theories developed

with this limited utility may eliminate the practical possi
bility of certain events and thereby narrow the range of
alternatives to be considered.
for physics.

But this is not sufficient

This inconsistency between the socio-behavioral

and natural sciences has troubled philosopher and scientist
alike for centuries.

What unique characteristics exist with

in the "inexact sciences" and create the "penumbra of uncer
tainty" that makes them so different from the natural disci
plines .

12F. A. Hayek, Degrees of Explanation," British Journal
of the Philosophy of Science. Vol. VI. No. 23 INov. . 195*3) .
pT 255.
^ W i l l i a m G. Scott, Organization T heo ry. Richard D.
Irwin, Inc., Homewood, 111.7 1967, p. 13.
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On Unique Problems and "Obligations of Faitfri"
The question has been raised as to whether explanations
of social phenomena require a logic different from those of
the natural e v e n t s . B e f o r e
troversy,

becoming involved in this con

the effects of which will be evident throughout the

forthcoming discussion of epi s t e m o l o g y , it might be helpful
to briefly itemize and illustrate some of the unique problems
of management and o r g a n i z a t i o n s .
Object of S t u d y .

Objection has been raised to Mill's

dictum that "men are not, when brought together,
into another kind of substance."

converted

In fact, Roethlisberger

has quite adequately raised the question as to what is the
proper unit of analysis in organization theory; man, organizations or m a n - i n organizations.

19

There is no denying that

the macro-micro-macro cycle has been evident in organizations
just as in m a n y other sciences.

X6

Scientific management

^ E r n e s t Nagel, "Problems of Concept and Theory Formation
in the Social Sciences," in Maurice Natanson, editor, Philos ophy of the Social Sciences, Random House, N e w York, 1963,
pT203.
19
Fritz J. R o e t h l i s b e r g e r , "Contributions of the Behav
ioral Sciences to a General Theory of Management," in Harold
Koontz, editor, Toward & Unified Theory of M a n a g e m e n t , McGraw
Hill Book Company, Inc. , 1^61^, p . 1^2.
^•^William G. Scott, "Organization Theory:
An Overview
and An Appraisal," Academy of Management Journal, Vol. IV,
No. 1 (April, 1961), p. 23.
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attempted a macro approach in pursuit of the efficient whole.
Human relations ushered in a micro orientation which concen
trated its analysis on the smallest unit comprising the organi
zation- -man.

Macro concepts are once again emerging with

consideration being given to the 3ocial, political and tech
nical systems within w hic h both m a n and organizations exist.
Micro propositions are formulated around reductive principles
which assert the notion that things are as they are because
of the elements

that compose them.

Macro concepts rest on

holistic principles which require an account of the subject
matter in terms of the combinations of qualities which, when
organized, distinguish that subject matter from all others.
With economy being a desirable characteristic of science
the ability to explain m u c h with little),
appears

17

(i.e.

the micro approach

to the writer to be the m ost capable of producing

significant results.

The reason for this position is that

knowledge of and ability to predict individual action can
enable one to project,
zations.

to some extent,

the behavior of org a n i 

Imputation of individual characteristics

zations is essentially the basis for numerous
cerning the "organizational s o c i e t y .

into o rgani

theories c o n 

The reverse of this

^ J o s e p h j, Schwab. "What Do Scientists Do," Behavioral
S c i e n c e . Vol. V, No. 1 ( j a n . , I960) pp. 3-13*

1ft

For an example see Robert Presthus,
S o c i e t y . Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1962.

The Organizational
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proposition, however,

is not true.

It is extremely doubtful

that knowledge of organizational behavior alone would provide
the equipment necessary to predict individual action.

It can

be seen that a detailed analysis of the platform and perfor
mance of the Republican party since its inception would reveal
little about Mr. R e p u b l i c a n s ^ .
Therefore,

this study will take the position that

methodological individualism is the most productive course
for management and organization theory.

In the words of

Alexander Pope (Essays on M a n ) , "Know then thyself, presume
not God to scan;

the proper study of mankind is man."

Testing and Selecting Multiple Hypothes es.

Social .

theories face a special problem in that several hypotheses
may be available for explaining a given event.
obvious

cases

The most

that come to mind are the motivational theories

advanced by Herzberg, Maslow, McGregor, e_t. &1.
situation develops,

When such a

the choice among alternative hypotheses

(or theories), which are equally consistent with existing
information,

is admittedly somewhat arbitrary.

However,

there is general agreement that the criteria of "simplicity"
and "fruitfulness" are helpful in making the choice.

19

A

!9c. West; Churchman and Russell L. A c k o f f , Methods of
Inquiry. Educational Publishers. Inc.. St. Louis. 1950. p.

10.

theory is simplier the less additional knowledge needed to
m a k e a prediction,
the prediction,

and it is mo re fruitful the more precise

the greater its applicat ion and the greater

its future usefulness.
me asu re simplicity,

A l t h o u g h it is o fte n p ossible to

the test of fruitfulness is a different

ma t t e r and i mmediately confronts

complications.

Perhaps

the most often encounte red di ffi cul ty is the ina bil ity to
e s ta bli sh contr oll ed experiments.

Part of the p r o b l e m is

that the exercise of power to m o d i f y social conditions for
experimental purposes

is itself a social variable.

result of this difficulty, Nagel suggests
trolled investigation,"
experimentation,

21
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As a

the use of "con-

w h i c h does not require,

as does

either rep r o d u c t i o n at will of the event

or overt m a n i p u l a t i o n of variables.

It does, however,

r e quire a deliberate se arc h for contrasting occasions

in

w h i c h phe no men a are either u n i f o r m l y m a n i f e s t e d or m a n i 
fested in some cases but not in others.

It also n e c e s s i 

tates subsequent inv est iga tio n in order to determine what
factors
events.

are r ela ted to the differences

in the various

C ont rol led inv est iga tio n is no t h i n g more than the

scientific attitude and is the absolute m i n i m u m requirement
for any systematic scientific analysis.

20

Ernest Nagel, The St ruc tur e of S c i e n c e . Harcourt,
Brace and World, I n c . , N e w Y o r k , T 9 5 T , P • i+^1.
2 1 I b i d . , p. 2 5 2 .

Other problems distinguishing the social sciences include
the fact that it is not uncommon to find assumptions about the
subject matter (i.e., Theory X and Theory Y) resulting in a
"self-fulfilling prophecy" whereby the assumptions become at
least a partial cause of the resulting situation.

The oppo-

site may also be true in which case a "suicidal prediction"
results.

??

For example, a prediction of pending labor pro b

lems may influence both labor and management to reexamine
their positions in order to avoid prolonged loss of work,
thus averting a strike and rendering the prediction false.
No such problems of unintended causation exist in the physi
cal realm.
Social Causation.

A causal law in the physical sciences

is usually stated in precise mathematical terms.

Such an

unambiguous law presents quite a contrast to a commonly
known "fundamental psychological law" which states:
. . . m e n are disposed, as a rule and on the aver
age, to increase their consumption as their income
increases, but not as much as the increase in their
income.
The ambiquity of such a formulation illustrates
facts are 1 ) more complex,

that social

2 ) less repeatable, 3 ) often only

^ I b i d . , pp. I4.6 8 -I4.6 9 .
^3john Maynard K e y n e s , The General Theory of E m p l oym ent ,
Interes t and M o n e y , Harcourt, Brace and W o r l d , TTew York, 1^3°,
p. % .
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indirectly observable,

) exhibit greater variability,

£) are extremely difficult to i s o l a t e . ^

and

Thus, an extremely

interesting idea appears that is far from obvious.

Laws are

ex post conceptualizations that report historical fact.
Physical events are simply more regular and have fewer
exceptions than social events.

As a result,

their ex post

laws are more exact.
These problems,

along with associated difficulties such

as the value-oriented bias to be discussed in chapter three,
make exact predictions impossible in the social sciences.
Therefore, management and organization theory must define
its criteria for accurate prediction allowing for a wider
range of error than physics.

This argument may be hypothet

ically illustrated by allowing X^. + ^ to be the actual value
of variable X in time period t + l.

Then, the prediction of

X t + i will be considered correct if
Xt - e < Xt +

Xt + e

where X^ is the prediction made at time t and e is an arbi
trary variable chosen by the predictor to indicate the

^ M o r r i s Cohen, "Reason in Social Science," in Feigl
and Brodbeck,
c i t . . pp. 663-6614.,

29
maximum allowable error.
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In a "closed" physical system the

magnitude of the variation between X t and
quite small.

Unfortunately,

+ ^ is usually

the same statement cannot be

applied to essentially "open" social systems.
Thus, the unique nature of the social, and therefore
management, sciences requires that the arbitrarily small
maximum allowable error (e) be somewhat larger than in the
natural sciences.

Nevertheless, there is nothing inherently

ascientiflc about the subject matter of management and organi
zations.

As Gulick h a 3 noted, such an assertion involves cer

tain "obligations of faith."

If the social sciences are to

be considered scientifically structured fields, obligations
are heaped upon them to mark the boundaries of their appli
cation, define their terms, gather and organize relevant
facts and elaborate fundamental and subordinate theories subject to the tests of fact and logic.

Because of these

"obligations," the theorists of organizations have sought

2^Emile Grunberg, "The Meaning of the Scope and External
Boundaries of Economics," in Sherman Roy Krupp, editor, The
Structure of Economi c Science t Prentice-Hall, I n c . , Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey, I960, p. llj.9 and Morris Cohen, "Reason in
Social Science," in Piegl and Brodbeck, o£. c i t . . p. 669.
Luther Gulick, "Management Is A Science." Academy of
Management Journal. Vol. VIII, No. 1 (March, 1965}, P . 13•
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assistance via physical and biological analogies to social
phenomenon.

27

The following section will discuss one of the

most influential attempts at analogy and point out the prom
ises and dangers of such measures.
Behaviorism and Scientism
Modern interest in the "behavioral sciences" has created
a serious semantic problem for the student of management and
organizations.

Lest there be any such confusion in the present

study, it is necessary to make clear initially how the term
"behaviorism" is used in this paper.
psychological,

Behaviorism is not the

sociological and anthropological acts of man.

Instead it is a methodological reaction against traditional
introspection.

Emile Durkheim summarizes the behaviorist.'s

position as follows:
The social realm is a natural realm which differs
from others only by a greater complexity.
Now
it is impossible that nature should differ radi
cally from itself in one case and the other in
regard to which is most essential.
The funda
mental relations that exist between things . . .
cannot be essentially dissimilar in the differ
ent realms.

^?For an interesting biological analogy see Waino W.
Soujanen, "Management Theory:
Functional or Evolutionary,"
Academy of Management Journal. Vol. VI, No. 1 (March, 1963),
pp. 7-17.
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In other w o r d s , behaviorism contends that sense experi
ence, which conveys to man information about physical events,
provides all the necessary data concerning the behavior of
one's fellow man.

Analysis of the way one's fellows react

to various stimuli does not differ essentially from the way
inanimate objects react to stimuli.

28

Therefore, stimulus-

response and behaviorism are synonymous.

Behaviorism is a

natural science that takes the whole field of human adjustment as its own.

29

Certainly this formulation bears little

similarity to the contemporary usage of the term "behavioral
s cience."
Although the major influential thrust of behaviorism
came in psychology in the early 1 9 0 0 's, the basic concepts
of scientism, from which behaviorism evolved, is a rather
old methodological problem of the social sciences.

Scientism

may be regarded as the dogmatic application of the scientific
method.

Ironically, scientism is not necessarily inclusive

of all that is scientific.

In other words, the scientistic,

as opposed to the scientific viewpoint, is very prejudiced

^°Ludwig Von Mises, Theory and Hi
His
s t o r y . Yale University
Press, New Haven, Conn., 1957, p~ ^U3*
^9john B. Watson, Behaviorism. Revised ed., W. W. Norton
and Company, I n c . , Publishers, New York, 1930, p. 11.

32
in that before it considers the subject, it claims to know
30
the most appropriate means of investigating it.
Professor
Hayek, in what is perhaps the most detailed historical analy
sis

of scientism on record, accuses a body of scientists

and engineers of Paris and specifically those of the Ecole
31
Poly technique as being the major force of its development.-^
The more instrumental individuals in the scientistic move
ment were the well known quasi-philosophers Henri de SaintSimon and a young polytechnician, Auguste Comtei
Although science is a worthy objective of academic
endeavor, there has arisen serious doubts as to the univer
sal applicability of dogmatic scientism.

Human beings, >*hich

form the basis for organizations, are objects to be sure; but
they are fundamentally different from any other physical o b
ject.

Thus, the question arises as to the suitability of

A. Hayek, "Scientism and the Study of Society,"
Part 1. Economica. Vol. IX (New Series). No. 35 (Aug.. 19(j-2) .
p. 269.
31

Hayek*s treatment of the subject consists of two
series of articles in Economica. The first series is, "The
Counter Revolution of Science,,T Parts 1, 2 and 3 in Vol.
VIII (New Series), Nos, 29, 30 and 31 dating from Feb., 19(4.1
to Aug., 19I4-I. The second series was entitled "Scientism
and the Study of Society," Parts 1, 2 and 3 in V o l s . IX, X,
and XI (New Series), Nos. 35, 37 and l|.l dating from Aug.,
1914.2 to Feb., 19(4(4.. A treatment of the philosophy Hayek
opposed may be found in Raymond Bayer, Epistemologie et
Logique. Presses Universities de F r a n c e . P a r i s . 195k. pp.

IFT2H.
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using identical methods in the analysis of inorganic objects
and human beings.
Human!stic Sui G e n e r i s .

Although several problems con

sidered to be unique to the social sciences were discussed
in a previous section,
until now.
ma n himself.
do not.

the most challenging has been reserved

This issue is no less

than the basic nature of

Man has purpose to his action;

inorganic objects

The objects of the natural sciences react to stimuli

according to regular patterns.

A ball dropped from a high

position will fall according to definite and determinant laws
of gravitation and physics.
the actions of man.

There is no such regularity in

The most general prerequisite of human

behavior is a state of dissatisfaction and the possibility
32
of removing or alleviating it by taking action.
Therefore,
the subject matter of the study of management and organiza
tions

is fundamentally different from the subject matter of

physics,

chemistry and astronomy.

Although purposeful human action vis-a-vis nonpurposeful
physical object response to stimuli is complicating enough,

3^Ludwig Von Mises, Epistemological Problems of E c o n o m i c s .
D. Van Nostrand Company, I n c . , New Y o r k , i960, pT
and
John Neville K e y n e s , The Scope and Method of Political Economy
l4.th ed. , Kelley and Mi liman, Inc., N e w YorIT7 1955, P- 85"^

there is an additional problem that must be discussed briefly.
This is the problem of expectation.-^
exist within a vacuum.

Individuals do not

The actions of man are influenced,

to some extent, by one's evaluation of the possible reactions
of others to his anticipated behavior.

In spite of the

increasing use of "game theory," one often wonders if the
full importance of this assertion is appreciated.

If a true

understanding of human action requires, as this writer believes
it does, an understanding of the "psychic s t a t e " ^ of others,
then it becomes necessary to impute one's expectations into
his fellow man.

In other words, action is co-determined in

that the behavior of one individual is influenced by the
prior and expected action of others.

Therefore, for any true

predictive science of human and organizational behavior, one
must consider the effects of changing expectations upon p re
dicted action.
The doctrine that ma n is the one unique object in the
universe whose behavior cannot be explained within the frame-

33}jerbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, 2nd ed.,
Macmillian Company, New York, 1957, p.
3^-Ernest Nagel, Logic Without Metaphysi cs . The Free
Press, Glencoe, 111., 1956, pp. 3^2-3 6 3 .
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work for all others is, of course,

a rather old contention.

35

Within the area of management this very point has been
argued by Oliver Sheldon who stated "Where human beings are
concerned scientific principles may be so m u c h waste paper."
Admittedly,

it is the faith of science that sufficiently

general and objective principles

can be found to cover all

situations and that through these principles
predictions

can be m a d e . ^

"reasonable"

One wonders, however,

if the

imputation of subjective expectations is sufficient cause to
disbar the study of human behavior,

in and out of organiza

tions, from the domain of science.

In fact,

it seems

that

the prohibition of expectation imputation would severely limit
such a science.
Limitations of Pure Beh a v i o r i s m .
position that reduces

Any methodological

the actions of m a n to a simple stimulus-

response relationship is questionable.
explanation which m a y be tested;

Behaviorism offers no

it simply describes and must,

35

George A. Lundberg, "The Postulates of Science and Their
Implications in Sociology," in Natanson, o£_. c i t . , p. [^7.
^ O l i v e r Sheldon, The Philosophy of M a n a g e m e n t . Sir Isaac
Pittman and Son, Ltd., N e w York, 1930, pp~ 35-36 and Elton
M a y o , The Social Problems of An Industrial C i v i l i z a t i o n .
Graduate School of Business Aclministration of Harvard Univer
sity, Boston, Mass., pp. 3-33*
37

Lundberg,

loc. cit.
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therefore, be satisfied with the mere recording of events.
Scientism is not only limited but extremely dangerous
assuming that the preservation of individual freedom is one
objective of systematic organization theory.

Hayek points

out that in addition to the limitations imposed via the
transferability of natural methods to the social areas
39
scientism breeds "social engineering."-^

Comte's own state

ment that "the purpose of the establishment of social philos
ophy is to reestablish order in society" reveals the dangers
involved.

Scientific management provides all too clear a

picture of the limitations and dangers discussed.

Taylor

assumed that science provided solutions to all the problems
of man.

He made it clear that his objective was:

To prove that the best management is a true science
resting on clearly defined laws, rules and princi
ples as a foundation.
And further to show that the
fundamental principles of scientific management are
applicable to all kinds of human act ivi t y . ^

^ft

^ Von Mises, Epistemological Problems of Economics, o p .
ci t ., p . 6 6 .
^ H a y e k , "The Counter-Revolution of Science," Part 2,
o p . cit., p. 31^*
^ F r e d e r i c k W. Taylor, The Principles of Scientific
Management. Harper and Brothers Publishers, New York, 1923,
p. 77
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Dwight Waldo in an outspoken manner states that:
Measurement is in fact the criterion of genuinely
scientific research and . . . in the spirit of the
scientific maxim, when we can measure, then we know,
the assumption is made that measurement solves prob
lems .^1
Morris Cooke also voices a rather dogmatic statement:
We shall never fully realize either the visions of
Christianity or the dreams of democracy until the
principles of scientific management have permeated
every nook and cranny of the working world.
And finally, Harrington Qnerson proclaims

"it is not men,

materials, money, machines and methods that count, but far
more potently theories and principles. "^-3
Taylor, his followers and scientific management were
guilty of applying their own form of "methodological scien
tism," whereby the insights of science were applied successively to metals, materials, men and society.

U4

Although

tremendous advances toward efficiency were made during this

^ D w i g h t Waldo, The Administrative State . The Ronald
Press Company, New York, 194-8, p .
L. Cooke, "The Spirit and Social Significance of
Scientific Management," Journal of Political Economy. Vol.
XXI, No. 8 (June, 1913), P- 493^ H a r r i n g t o n Emerson, The Twelve Principles of Efficiency.
The Engineering Magazine Company, New York, 1913, p. 8.
^4-Robert T. Golembiewski, M e n . Management and Morali t y .
McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 19657 P* 32 and E. H.
Anderson, "The Scientific Revolution and Its Impact on Modern
Economics." The Southern Economic Journal, Vol. XXIII, No. 3
(Jan., 1957), p.~Z3T-
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era, one cannot help but wonder what the present state of
management knowledge might be today if a less dogmatic route
had been followed.
Perhaps the picture painted is too dark and the case
against scientism too strong.

Stuart Chase, fortunately,

has stated a position that is undoubtedly the most desirable
of all, given the nature of social subject matter.

Chase

rejects dogmatic scientism in favor of what one might call
the ’’scientific attitude" which is simply the epitome of
skepticism.

This attitude requires that all scientific

findings be developed in a manner open to examination by a l l . ^
It is the attitude which allows one to accept those techniques
which prove valuable and reject those which do not.
What then is the proper methodology for the science of
management organizations and what elements can it select
from associated disciplines?

Must the development of such a

science await a Francis Bacon of its own to light its way?
Fortunately, organization theory need not grind to a halt
and await such a man primarily because it can borrow from the
methodological experiences of other areas of study.

It has

been argued that the methods of the physical sciences are not
especially useful in dealing with problems of society.

^Chase,

o£. c it. . pp. 6-7.

But

39
the study of management and organizations is a synthetic
k6
discipline which obtains its concepts from many areas.
Therefore, the methodology of any single science, regardless
of what it may be, is inadequate for the problems management
must face.

The following section will attempt to expose the

issue of organizational membership as an economic problem,
not economics in the fashionable terminology associated with
monetary inducements, but rather as a problem of choice and
allocation of limited resources among competing demands.
Economics of Organizational M e m b e r s h i p s
Economic decisions
choice)
face.

{referring once again to problems of

are the fundamental decisions men and organizations
From the viewpoint of the individual,

the contention

that man is more than an "economic man" is so obvious that
it needs little explanation.^"®

gu t to argue or concede that

man is motivated by more than money does not invalidate the

^ N e i l H. Jacoby, "The Role of the University in Manage
ment Research," in Koontz, ojd. c i t . , p. 208.
^ S o m e basic work has been done in this area by Rocco
Carzo, Jr. and John N. Y a n o u z a s , Formal Organizations, Richard
D. Irwin, Inc., and the Dorsey Press, Homewood, 1 1 1 ., 1967,
pp. i4.76-l4.8 6 . However, the analysis in this paper bears only
slight resemblance to their formulation.
^"®J. J. Spengler, "Generalists Versus Specialists in
Social Science:
An Economist's View," The American Polltical
Science R e v i e w . Vol. XLIV, No. 2 (J u n e , 1*550) , pT 3^T*

^0
basic truth that man must choose between competing ends such
as economic prosperity and uninhibited personal freedom.
Alternatively, organizations may be looked upon as a collection
of scarce means of production fit for alternative uses.

It is

the function of management,

then, to use these resources in the
h.9
most responsible way possible.
Therefore, a prospective
organization member and an organization may be viewed as two
parties, each of which possess certain "goods" the other
desires.
The individual seeks economic, security, status and ego
need satisfaction, some of which may be satiated within an
organization while others must be satisfied without.

By

entering an organization, one may find wealth and security,
but leisure obtained by a restriction of organizational partic
ipation may provide status and self-realization.

Thus, one

must choose between membership and nonmembership, leisure and
work.
The organization must also make a choice.

Its choice is

between the contributions the prospective member can make and

h.9
^ J. L. Meij, "Management, A Common Province of Different
Sciences," Management International R e v i e w . No. 5 (1962), pp.
39-ij.O and Paul J. Gordon, "Transcend the Current Debate on
Administrative Theory " Academy of Management Journal. Vol.
VI, No. ij. (Dec., 1963), pp. ^90-'j^l.

ill
the corresponding dysfunctional consequences such as risks
of premature forced retirement as a result of disability,
etc.

Organizational membership becomes a problem of exchange--

exchange between the prospective member and the organization
with respect to the advantages and disadvantages of membership
as opposed to nonmembership.
In order to develop the analytics of the proposed model,
the following assumptions are advanced:
1.

Both the prospective member (P) and the organiza
tion (L) are utility maximizers.

2.

P has limited energy (E) that can be expended in
the pursuit of work and leisure or membership (M)
and nonmembership (N). L has limited resources
with which to obtain the services of P.

3.

A uniform time period spent in membership requires
twice the energy expenditure as that spent in non
membership.
A unit of energy is signified by the
symbol (U).

i|..

The order of preference between membership and non
membership is determinant.

Figure 2 reveals the preference map (system of indifference
curves) for the perspective member.

Curve Ij shows the locus

of all points along which the individual's utility is constant.
Curve I2 shows a constant but higher level of utility while
Iq reveals a constant but lower utility level.

Curve 1-^ also

illustrates that P is indifferent between a combination of
Mi, N-l and M 2 , N 2 units of "membership" and nonmembership"
goods.

To be consistent with assumption one, P will attempt

E/U

1

“

M-

E/2U
FIGURE 2
P'S PREFERENCE MAP

M

1+3
to reach the highest curve possible

(I2 ).

Unfortunately,

this is easier said than done because of the energy constraint
noted in assumption two.

In other words,

the I curves show

what P is willing to do while line E/U, E/2U shows what he
is able to do.

The construction of E/U, E/2U is quite simple

in that point E/U shows the obtainable quantity of "non
membership goods" if all energy were expended on leisure
while E/2U represents exactly the same situation if all
energy were expended on work.

The slope of the line illus

trates the fact that each unit of "membership goods" requires
twice the energy as a unit of "nonmembership goods."
The slope of an I curve at any point represents the
amount of N that P is willing to sacrifice for an additional
unit of M and will be called the marginal rate of substitu
tion of M for N or (MRS j^ j ).

The slope of the "energy con

straint," E/U, E/2U, represents

the amount of N that P would

have to give up for an additional unit of M or
f ^ j = (E/U) (2U/E) = 2U/U
Once again referring to Figure 2 it may be noted that
at point A the amount of N that P is willing to give up
(MRS^

is greater than the amount it is necessary for him

to sacrifice
lines.

(2U/U) as measured by the slopes of the respective

Being a utility maximizer,

P would gladly give up the

kk

necessary units of N at this point for an additional unit of
M because by doing so his utility would be increased.

Only

at point B where MRSj^ - 2U/U is P at equilibrium for at this
point, the amount of N he is willing to give up is equal to
the quantity he must give up for an additional unit of M.
Thus, P obtains an equilibrium, but what about the organiza
tion?

What additional conditions are necessary before both

parties reach a point of exchange or simultaneous equilibrium?
It has been previously noted that P can join the organiza
tion (L) if and only if L has a need for his services.

To

illustrate this "exchange reciprocity" an "organization
Edgeworth-Bowley box," which is familiar to economic theory,
may be constructed.

In Figure 3 the same preference map shown

in Figure 2 is illustrated while a corresponding organization
preference map is rotated l80° and superimposed on P's map
forming a box.

The indifference curves of P are convex to

0 and the curves of L are convex to 0*.

Also, the "box" has

been constructed so that the quantities 0M and ON represent
the combined holdings of "membership" and "nonmembership"
goods for both parties.
Assuming that the "goods" are distributed initially at
point K*, it can be seen that P possesses On-^ units of N and
Om^ units of M while L holds n^N of N and m^M of M.

At this

point P is on curve IQ and L is on curve JQ so that the

N
M

Organizational
Membership
Contract
Curve

FIGURE 3
THE ECONOMICS OF ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP

1*6
MRSmn for L is less than the MRSj^j for P, as indicated by
the slopes of the respective curves.

Individual P can sac

rifice more units of "nonmembership goods" for an additional
unit of "membership goods" than bhe organization requires.
Because of this, either one or both of the parties may bene
fit from exchange.

If exchanges of N 1s by P for M's from L

followed IQ , P would be no worse off because he would remain
on a curve of constant utility (I0 ), but the organization
would become increasingly well off as it is moved from curve
JQ to higher curves J-^ and finally J2 as exchange advanced
toward point X.
An example of such an exchange would be the young shift
worker who, by virtue of his lack of seniority, is required
to work the "extra board."

In m a n y cases the individual does

not work an entire forty-hour week.

However,

able on "undesirable" shifts and operations,

jobs are avail
and it is well

known that those "extras" who accept these assignments

are

placed in regular positions sooner than those who do not.

As

a result, P might accept the "dirty" jobs although leisure
may be worth just as much due to the extreme inconveniences
such jobs create.

His total utility is not decreased because

the increased utility of additional M is just offest by the
decreased utility of fewer N with resultant change in
utility equal to zero.

The organization in this case receives

all the benefit of P's increased work.

U7
It is also conceivable that the exchange may take place
along JQ in wh ich case P would receive all the benefit and
the total utility of the organization would remain constant.
The first example that comes
relates

to mi n d of this type of exchange

to the faculty member who leaves a teaching position

to complete his
uling classes,

terminal

degree.

The disutility of re sched

temporary appointments

and a salary increase

sufficient enough to insure his return upon completion may
be just enough to equal

the increased utility of an additional

terminally qualified faculty member.
ber receives

Thus,

the faculty m e m 

the benefits of the exchange.

These are extreme theoretical examples because the d is 
utility of a sacrifice will seldom,
the utility of attainment.
ceed from K to Y;

if ever, exactly equal

In most cases exchange will pr o 

the exact path of which is determined by

the relative bargaining powers of the two parties.

Regardless

of the path between these extremes, both parties will increase
their total utility until some point on XYZ is reached.

At

any point along this line the MRSj^ for one party is equal to
the MRSj^jjj of the other so that no additional exchange may take
place without at l e a 3 t one party's

total utility being reduced.

Thus, XYZ is the line toward which exchange progresses,
once it is attained,
will be established.

but

exchange will cease and an equilibrium
Therefore,

the equilibrium condition

for exchange is that the MRSj^ of one party be equal to the
MRSj^ of the other or that an indifference curve of one is
tangent to an indifference curve of another.

At this point,

the ma ximum amount of N that P is willing to sacrifice for
an additional M is just equal to the m in i mu m amount of N
that L would accept in exchange for an additional M.
jectively,

Sub

this is the point that is reached when P applies

for membership in L and L accepts P ’s employment.
reason the writer refers

For this

to line XYZ as the "organization

members hip contract curve."
In spite of the fact that this model is abstract and
extremely theoretical,
in organizational life.

its ramifications are evidenced daily
But the point to be made is the

underlying similarity between the concept of rational choice
so familiar in micoreconomic

theory and the psychological

decision to become associated with an organization.

It is

a m atter of economics and the allocation of limited resources
among competing uses.

A choice must be made between the re l a

tive advantages and disadvantages of membership and no n member
ship.

In this case,

the choice is no different than the de ci

sion to purchase good^ or go od2 «

The process

and the choice sociologically influenced,
economic,

is psychological

but the problem is

and organization theorists would seriously err to

forget this fundamental formulation.

1*9
No doubt social research has done much to destroy the
concept of the "economic man," but it has left undamaged the
rationale of the utility maximizer and the basic theorems of
resource allocation.

In view of this, the methodology of

economics should provide many interesting analogies from
which management and organization theory may borrow.
General Semantists As Epistemological Dualists
To this point several epistemological problems of manage
ment and organizations have been noted; yet, the issues devel
oped dealt with the nature of the subject matter Itself (the
"knowable")

and with the inexact or probabilistic nature of

the resulting examinations in social theory (the "knowledge").
Thus, there remains the process of knowing, which to this
point has remained untouched by the analysis.

Initially, it

becomes necessary to theoretically examine the actual process
by which objective phenomena come to be known to man while
postponing topics relating to the merit of the specific pro
cesses until the next section of the paper.
At one time many philosophers advanced a position that
has come to be known as episteraological monism.

Basically,

this argument asserts that when things are known they are
identical, element for element, with the content of the
knowing state.

Although few subscribe explicitly to this

-^McEwen, o£. cit.. pp. 7-8.

position today, it is all too obvious that everyone from
time to time confuses the perception of an object with the
object itself.

In other words, one often acts as if percep

tual reality is identical to objective reality.

What is more

obvious perhaps is the confusion of the words (symbols) used
to describe perceived events and the reality that actually
exists.
The general semantists have labored long searching for
the relationship between language, thought and action and
have taken a position counter to empistemological monism.
One might call their argument epistemological dualism which
asserts that whatever knowledge one has of real objects or
occurrences is only indirect and representative of objective
reality.

Thus, the datum whereby one knows any object is

not identical with the object known.

Obviously, the logical

extension of this argument is that if the sense datum differs,
the symbols used to represent the object are even more dif
ferent.

This is as one would expect since if perception

varies from reality, symbols explaining perceptual images
must vary from the image which is already at variance with
the existing event.

Dualism reveals that in all situations

the scientific context in which objects are found is a tri
adic relationship involving 1 ) a "mind" which interprets,
2 ) some specific objective occurrence and 3 ) some "sign”

51
w hi c h represents

the occurrence.

51

Such a relationship is

not at all unfamiliar to the general semantists.
52
is representative of their argument.

Fig ure k

D e v i a t i n g somewhat from the traditional explanation,
suppose

the referent is an objective occurrence,

physical or social.
Korzybski's

It is the thing that actually happens;

"mad dance of e l e c t r o n s ."^5

objectiveness,

Alt hough there is

it mu st pass through the observer's perceptual

process before it becomes known.

This so called "fact" that

is observed is not as concrete as it m a y seem.
tion takes place,
scious,

either

thought occurs;

When percep

and a l th o ug h it is u n c o n 

only certain characteristics of the occurrence are

retained.

To fail to recognize

of m i s p l a c e d c o n c r e t e n e s s . " ^

this is to commit the "fallacy
All suc h "facts" are detached

from their context by an ab straction process
not possible

so that it is

to grasp all the aspects of any given event.

A b s t r a c ti o n does not stop here, however,

because p h e n o m 

ena recorded only in one's m i n d are of little use to anyone,

^ I b i d . . pp. 8 - 9 .
^ C. K. O gd e n and I. A. Richards, The M e a n i n g of M e a n i n g .
Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., N e w York, 1$23~ pp. 11-15*
^ A l f r e d Korzybski , Science and S a n i t y , 3rd ed. , The
Institute of General Semantics, L a k e v i l i e , C o n n . , 194-8, PP*

306-^12.
-^Alfred Schultz.
tion of Human Action,

"Common Sense and S cientific I nv e s t i g a 
in Natanson, o£. c i t . . p. 303*
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Thought or Reference

(Causal Relation)

(Imputed,Relation)
Referent

Symbol

SOURCE:
Diagram obtained from C. K. Ogden and I. A.
Richards. The Me aning of Meaning, Harcourt. Brace and World,
N ew York, 1^23, P. 11.
FIGURE k
TRIADIC NATURE OF SYMBOLS

save the recorder.

The observer must, therefore, report the

recorded data which requires additional abstraction.

One

must select the proper symbols to report perceptual ideas and
no symbol is capable of representing all the characteristics
of an event recorded in one's mind just as perception is not
capable of sensing all there is about an objective occurrence.
In the final analysis, the report of a physical or social
event is at least three steps removed from the process being
described.

Only an imputed relationship exists between the

referent and the symbol.

This abstraction cannot be pre

vented, but a lack of awareness of the process can.

So, when

the scientist accepts epistemological dualism, he abandons
the search for "absolute truth" and seeks instead an emendable system of reasonably acceptable constructs concerning
the referent.
Philosophically there remains additional questions.
Given that abstractions are necessary and even desirable in
some cases and assuming further that perfect knowledge about
any "mad dance of electrons" is impossible, what is the most
accurate route to knowledge?

How does one know what causes

conflict in organizations, and furthermore how does one report

^ M c E w e n , l o c . c it .

Sk
ills findings once a hypothesis is formed?

Some argue that

basic truths about man provide the foundation via deductive
logic for all knowledge.

At the moment when man began to

argue such points and to raise questions as to the most
accurate span of the triangle from referent to symbol,
epistemology was born.
Observations on Epistemology
Reported accuracy is the final stage of science.

The

inclination of ma n to treat words as materially connected
with objects rather than simply the symbols,

as in

principia m a t h e m a t i c a causes untold intellectual and
academic problems.

Identification via similarities, even

at the expense of important differences, is perhaps the
heart of the confusion between SCIENCEnatura-|_ and
SCIENCEe
.
s o c i.al
It is equally erroneous, however,

to neglect the simi

larities between the two "SCIENCES" since there are only two
starting points for the acquisition of knowledge:

deduction

^ M e r l e B. Turner, Philosophy and the Science of
Behavior, Appleton-Century-Crofts. P ublishers. iJew York.
1967, p. 107.
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and induction.
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The following diagram, Figure 5, illustrates

the logically valid epistemological positions.

Noting first

the right half of the diagram, one observes the deductive
method.

The initial step is to abstract certain theoretical

propositions from the real world in order to simplify the
complexity of reality.

For instance, one might decide to

deal with only the economic aspects of the motivation of man.
Of course, it is possible to recognize that motivation is
more than economic, but in order to simplify this very com
plex situation, only certain aspects are explicitly analyzed.
After establishing the basic premises and constructing the
necessary "abstract propositions," a logical model is con
structed on the basis of which a deductive argument is formu
lated.

Although realism is important, the logical argument

often places a greater emphasis on the logical consistency
between premise and conclusion than on correspondent prac
tical reality.

The deductive method moves from the general

propositions of theoretical abstraction to the specific
phenomenon to be described or
Inductive reasoning also

explained.
begins with the real world.

However, its abstractions are

experimental in

ments are designed to observe

only certain aspects of reality.
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Feibleman, o p . cit. . p.

that experi
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NOTE:
C. E. Ferguson, Microeconomic Theory. Richard
D. Irwin, Inc., Homewood, 111. , 1966, p. l(..
FIGURE 5
THE LOGICAL METHODS OF SCIENCE
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It should be noted that the word "abstraction” is used because
the process of ex perimentation ne cessarily attempts

to hold

certain things constant while concentrating on others deemed
to be of primary interest.
ous observations

By way of the experiment,

are ma de and the results are given s t a t i s 

tical or probabilistic interpretation.
projects

n um e r

Thus,

one refers or

the characteristics of the "whole" based on o b s e r v a 

tions of its

"parts" and correspondingly moves from the s p e 

cific to the general.
With a stated objective of this paper being the re la
tionship between general semantics and methodology,

it

becomes necessary to translate the above distinction into
a psychic process

so that the association between the r e f e r 

ent and thought m a y be

noted and the stage set for the

following discussion.

Figure 6 represents the structure of

science regardless of one's epistemological
In the illustration,

sensory elements

"protocal e x p e r i e n c e ” which form a P-field,

sympathies.
are labeled
and any pur ely

rational constructs are designated as concepts forming a
C-field.
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Protocals

able of perception.

are given from without and are c a p
Rules” for passing from the protocal

^® Henry Margenau,
ci t . , p . 27 •

"What Is A Theory," in Krupp,

op.

to
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C-FIELD

C-FIELD
LOGIC

P-FIELD

Range of Empiricism

Range of Rationalism

J

NOTE:
The above diagram was adapted in part from Henry
Margenau, "What Is A Theory?" in S h erman Roy Krupp, editor,
The Structure of Economic S c i e n c e . P r e n t i c e - H a l l , Inc., Englewood C l i f f s , New J e r s e y , 19b6, p. 3 0 .
FIGU RE 6
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE
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the concepts or constructs are called "rules of correspon
dence.

In the diagram, double lines designate rules of

correspondence,

circles are concepts, and single lines

between concepts depict logical connections relating one
concept with another.

Measurement proceeds along double

lines while reasoning and theoretical analysis move along
the single ones.
of circles

A theory,

(concepts)

therefore, becomes a complex

together with the double lines

(rules

of correspondence) that connect them to the P-field.*"^
This,

then, is the critical point from the position of the

general semantists

qua epistemological dualist;

ception of the material world is subjective;

one's con

but not

entirely so, for there would be no such subjective impres
sions unless

there was an objective process

to which it

r e f e r r e d . k1

This objective-subjective relationship creates

a duality which lies at the base of numerous communication
di ffi culti es .
Appealing as it may be, the above explanation is not
acceptable _in toto to one group of philosophers known as the
rationalists.

Their fundamental point, which is well

taken,

is that observations would be nothing but clumsy accumulations

5^Ibid., p . 29.
6 0I b i d . , p. 3 0 .
^>1 Peibleman, oja. c i t . , p. 252.
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of disconnected occurrences, a heap of confusion if it were
not clarified, arranged and interpreted by the systematic
prior rationality of man's mind.
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This basic rationality

is represented by the small circles and comes before experi
ence or the P-field.

It is this logic that makes the P-field

meaningful so that the rules of correspondence may be con
structed in order to relate the C and P-fields.

Although

this is not inconsistent with the dualistic contention
(since, according to the rationalists, reality is not neces
sarily material but may be manipulations of the mind),

it

does raise serious questions concerning the strictly empirical
nature of a science of management and organizations.

In view

of this, the remaining portion of this section is devoted to
an analysis of the basic epistemological positions most evi
dent in the contemporary study of organizations.
Constructs of Empiricism
Like any other philosophical position,

empiricism is

simply a name used to represent a whole series of arguments;
but for purposes of illustration,

an extreme position known

as ultra-empiricism will be examined.

Perhaps the most

k^Ludwig Von Mises, Human A c t i o n , Yale University Press,
N ew Haven, Conn., 191+9, p . 1+1.
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informative testimony of this position is given as follows.
If one designates the process of science to consist of
assumptions

(A), theory (B), and consequences

(C), there

must exist no empirical difference between the three.
other words, empirically A = B = C.
assumptions

(A+) in which A + D A

In

If one takes the set of

(meaning A is a proper subset

of A+ or that there are some elements in A+ not present in A),
one would reject that part of A+ not present in A since A+ ^
B ^ C.

Also, if C O C -

the authenticity of C- does not vali

date A and B because not all of C is confirmed.

In Samuelson's

own w o r d s :
If C has complete empirical validity then bully for
it, and bully for B and its assumptions A.
But we
cannot say bully for A+ in the same sense unless i s
full content A+ = B+ = C+ is also empirically valiu.°MA1though more will be said concerning the empirical vari
ability of assumptions,

the above quotation serves the purpose

of illustrating the argument of the ultra-empiricists.

Indi

viduals who advocate this position are not content with l o gi 
cal tests resulting from a deductive process, but insist upon
direct empirical verification.

To them testability means

6^
^The content of the argument was taken from Paul A.
Samuelson, "Comments on Ernest Nagel's Assumptions in Economic
Theory," in Joseph E. Stiglitz, editor, The Collected Scientific
Papers of Paul A. S a m u e l s o n . Vol. II, The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1966, pp. 1775-1777.
6^-Ibid.

direct confirmation of objective data obtained by sense observation.

Concepts are based on sense impressions and theories

result from the inductive process consisting of the generali
zations of propositions on the basis of the examination of
specific c a s e s . ^
empiricism.

Such is the extreme position of ultra

Epistemologically, it argues that perceptual

knowledge is the ultimate datum standing in need of no expla
nation whether with reference to the heteronomous activity of
ZL <7

the mind or in any other manner.

However, before examples

of such a position can be applied to concrete examples in
organization theory, it is necessary to provide a brief his
torical perspective of its development.
Aft

His torical Perspective.

Empiricism has a long history.

For Protagoras {1+50 B.C.) knowledge and sensation were identical

^Fritz Machlup, "The Problem of Verification in Economics,
The Southern Economics Journal. Vol. XXII, No. 1 (July, 1955),
p. 8.
Herbert G. Hicks and Friedhelm Goronzy. "On Methodology
in the Study of Management and Organizations," Academy of
Management Journal. Vol. X, No. 1+ (Dec., 1967), p. 3 7 3 , ^ .
Cornelius Benjamin, "Is the Philosophy of Science Scientific?"
Philosophy of Science. Vol. XXVII, No. 1; (Oct., I960), p.
356 and MarTo Bunge, "The Place of Induction in Science,"
Philosophy of Science. Vol. XXVII. No. 3 (June. I960), p.
67

Nikunja Vihari Banerjee, Language. Meaning and Persons,
George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London, 19o3, p. llj-.
Aft

Most of the historical background may be found in
Churchman and Ackoff, o£. cit. , pp. 50-71+.
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and Aristotle after "solving the problems of deduction" in
Prior A n a l y t i c s . turned to inductive problems
Posterlori A n al y t i c s 1

in his

But the first systematic effort to

establish empiricism as a philosophy of science was made by
John Locke (1632-170^4-) *
Basically, Locke's argument began by defining "simple
ideas" which are supplied to the mind directly by sensation,
because reason,

according to him, could not manufacture but

only manipulate ideas.

Thus, as the argument goes,

simple ideas precede all rational processes.
cation of his

these

Later m o d i f i 

theory allowed for "compounding" which made

possible the union of simple ideas into more complex ones.
George Berkely questioned Locke's

"simple ideas" and

argued that they depend on experinece, not sensation, with
experience being the more complex of the two because it
contained memory and generalization.

Thus,

according to

Berkely, one sees only a "variety of light and colors."
Based on these arguments,

the idea that man's mind is a

tabula rasa (blank tablet) upon which experience writes was
developed.
John Stuart Mill

rejected in principle "any supposed

modes of philosophizing, which do not profess

to be founded

6U
upon experience."
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He obviously made an exception in the

case of logic and mathematics.

More recently, Karl Marx

objected to rational or logical sciences arguing that logic
70
was class determined and advocating a form of polylogism.
Although he offered no empirical alternative to the rational
methodology of science, Marx is mentioned because of his
extreme distrust of reason.

Historically, one might say

that the empiricists of management and organization theory
have a rather rich heritage.
A Posteriori Organization T h e o r y .

Recent advances

toward a theory of organizations have brought with them an
increased interest in empirical research and a profound
distrust of "armchair reasoning."

As one writer states:

One reason why management has not further devel
oped as a science is because so far it has relied
on deductive logic.
It has adopted generaliza
tions developed by educators and practitioners,
then disseminated them to students as universals
. . . what is needed to close the gap between
reason and the real world is inductive logic.?-*-

k^John Stuart Mill, A Systern of L o g i c . 8 th e d . , Longman,
Green and Company, London, 1919, Book VI, Chapter 9, Sec. 3.
70

Von Mises, Human A c t i o n , o p . c i t ., p. 31-

^ M a n e c k S. Wadia, "Management Education and the
Behavioral Sciences," Advanced Management, Vol. XXVI, No.
9 (Sept., 1961), p. 9.
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R o e t h l i s b e r g e r , through hia action and by explicit state
ment,

advocates

"grass root empiricism" until more facts and

relationships are uncovered.

Thus, he maintains that "the

quest for knowledge through the accumulation of facts ought
to be the paramount objective of the behavioral sciences."
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The Harvard Business School's studies at the Hawthorne
Works of Western Electric,
pated,

in which Roethlisberger pa rtici

is praised as one of the most influential studies

management history.

in

In order that some appreciation may be

gained of the ma gnitude of this study,

a few brief details

will be elaborated to illustrate its empirical foundation.
The Hawthorne Studies in Chicago took place over a fiveyear period between 1927-1932 during which time over 20,000
individuals were studied.

In the beginning the general

interest was primarily directed toward an analysis of the
relationship between w orking conditions and incidents of
73
fatigue and monotony.
Experimental conditions were est ab
lished and m a n y of the methods of empirical research were
utilized including observation, personnel interview and

^ R o e t h l i s b e r g e r , "Contributions of the Behavioral
Sciences to a General Theory of Management," in Koontz, o p .
c i t ., p. 6 5 .
7

,JF. J. Roethlisberger and William J. Dickson, M a n a g e 

ment and the W o r k e r . H arvard University Press, Cambrid ge7

Mass., 1956.
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mod ified questionnaires.

On the basis of these efforts,

the

original hypothesis was found to be relatively insignificant,
and the true importance of the social nature of m a n came to
be appreciated,

thus ushering in the Human Relations Era.

Another rather influential empiricist,
research,

by virtue of his

is Frederick Herzberg who, after m aking use of a

secondary "survey approach" in Job A t t i t u d e s :

R eview of

Research and O p i n i o n . entered upon a "fresh approach" in
The Motivation to W o r k . ^

In the latter work, Herzberg con*

ducted a semi-struetured survey of 200 professional workers
in the immediate area of Pittsburg.
that the factors

From this he postulated

involved in producing job satisfaction are

separate and distinct from the factors leading to job s atis
faction.

In a later study, Work and the Nature of Man, he

further tests his hypothesis in an effort to form "a general
theory of work and the nature of ma n."

Thus, Herzberg stands

as one of the true champions of empiricism in management and
organization theory.

Like so ma n y others, his advocation is

not explicit but is easily inferred by the methods of his
research.

son
and
frhe
Ne w

^ F r e d e r i c k Herzberg, Bernard Mausner, Ri chard 0. Peter
and Dora F. Capwell, Job A t t i t u d e s : A Review of Res earch
O p i n i o n . Psychological Service of Pittsburg, 19^7 and
Motivation to W o r k . 2nd e d . , John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,
York, 1959.
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If one desires an explicit advocation, a somewhat emphatic
one comes from Harold Koontz.

Koontz strongly asserts that the

principles developed by Fayol e_t. a l . were not _a priori but
based upon _a posteriori information developed through a lifetime of experience.
priori is "bad."
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The assumption is that anything a

This assertion equates

"a lifetime of

experience" to "empirical knowledge" and raises some serious
questions of its own.

Specifically, need ji pos teriori informa

tion be simply lived or must it be controlled.

This analysis

assumes that at least some systematic control must be attempted
before such empirical data are recognized as constituting
scientific knowledge.

For unless some effort is expended

toward control, there is no check on the selective percep
tual processes of the observers.

Therefore,

the "principles"

proposed by the traditional school, with a few exceptions,
may be recognized as hypotheses based on experience, but the
limited and unique experiences upon which they are founded
hardly support their claims of universally applicable princi
ples .

75
^Harold Koontz, "Making Sense of Management Theory,"
in Koontz, ojo. c i t . , p. 12 and William V. Muse, "The Univer
sality of Management," Academy of Management Journal, Vol. X,
No. 2 (June, 196?), pp. 179-10*4-.
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Many individuals associated with the study and practice
of management have recognized the empirical foundations of
scientific management while others have chosen to criticize
it as "untestable.

Regardless of its testability,

the

research into "hard facts" is conceded to have been the
underlying principle of this school of thought.^7

Emerson

as well as Taylor referred often to observations which were
7A

to provide the foundations of the science of management.'
There is little doubt that it was the disciples of scientific
management that initiated the systematic empirical test or
experiments in management that had for a long time been common
place in the physical sciences.

The following statement by

Taylor gives some idea of the importance he attached to the
gathering of data.
The manager assumes the burden of gathering informa
tion and all the traditional knowledge which in the
past was possessed by the worker and then classifying,
tabulating and reducing this knowledge to rules, laws
and formulae.79

^ H e r b e r t A. Simon and James G. March, Organizations,
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York, 1958, p . 32.
^ L y n d a l l Urwick, The Elements of Administration. Sir
Isaac Pittman and Son, L t d ., London, 19^.2, p. 17.
^Emerson,

o£.

c i t . . p. 195 and Taylor, o£. c i t . .

PP. 57-59 .
"^Taylor,

ojd.

c i t . . p. 3 6 .

As pointed out previously, one of the results of the
development of the social sciences was a serious reevaluation
of the applicability of scientific procedures to the study of
man.

One would expect,

therefore, that little empirical in

vestigation would accompany the development of the sciences
of society.

Fortunately, or unfortunately, depending upon

how one views such matters, a notion of this type is incorrect
as the Hawthorne Studies illustrate.

Since these studies,

many investigations have been conducted and names like Mayo,
Likert, Cyert, Herzberg and others have become almost completely identified with empirical methodology.

fin

As a matter

of fact, the before mentioned attitude of Koontz concerning
the importance of empirical investigation is most likely not
atypical at all in the area of organizations.

But, in spite

of empiricism's appeal, one must recognize the adage "con
temporary fashion does not alone an adequate methodology
m a k e ."
Historicism and Problems of Bnpirical T h e o r y .

Some

would deny altogether the possibility of deriving & pos teriori

For examples see Richard M. Cyert and James G. March,
A Behavioral Theory of the F i r m . Prentice-Hall, In c ., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963, pp. 14-7, 67, 1^9-239 and Renis
Likert, New Patterns of Management. McGraw-Hill Book Company,
I n c . , New York, 1961.
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laws from historical experience.

Empirical data, according

to this group, deals only with the past and can never turn
to the future.

Von Mises summarizes this group's feelings

by stating "history makes man wise, but not competent to
solve concrete problems of the future."®^

The argument con

tinues to call for a method that will transcend the individ
ualistic and temporal characteristics of the fallacies of
human perception and time.
General semantics has long attempted to make man aware
of the perceptual problems evidenced by one's limited ability
to recognize differences.

Although perceptual variation is

seriously denied by only a few monists, an empirical epistemology must certainly contend that a significantly large
amount of such variation does not exist.

The following state

ment should suffice to confirm this contention.
. . . Yet it is plain, the ideas they (the qualities
of the objects that affect one's senses) produce in
the mind enter by the senses are simple and unmixed.
And there is nothing can be plainer to a man than
clear and distinct perception, he has of those sim
ple ideas; which being each in itself compounded,
contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance
or conception of the m i n d . ^

On
Von Mises, Epis temological Problems of Economics t o p .
c i t ., p. xv.
flP
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Unders tanding.
abridged and edited by Raymond Wilburn, Iih F. Dutton and
Company, New York, 19k7, P* 3^4-•
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This statement, postulating absolute perceptual uniformity
with the observed, appears extremely objectionable to a gen
eral semantist and is fundamentally at odds with current
psychological research.

The idea of the ’’mental filter"®^

is too well recognized to accept such a proposition.

Thus,

the first objection to a purely empirical theory of organiza
tion-perceptual problems of observation.
Another problem area of pure empiricism could be labeled
difficulties of "evolution and flux."

Prom the viewpoint of

general semantics, this might be called a methodological "is
of identification" because, as Hayek so adequately argues,
it is useless to think that observed information at a given
moment will yield anything of use beyond that particular
time and p l a c e . ^

This appears as a relatively radical view

point, yet, one is forced to appreciate it when one recalls
the relative meaning of MOTIVATION]_q]_^ and MOTIVATION1933 In 1913, because of the economic position of the average
worker, the relationship between monetary incentives and
positive motivation was more direct than it is in 1968.

How

ever, the theory is still "motivation theory" and to many the

^ R a y m o n d v. Lesikar, Business Communication. Richard D.
Irwin, Inc., Homewood, 111., 1968, pp. Jj.8-59.

®^Hayek, "Scientism and the Study of Society," Part. 2,
o p . cit. , p. 14.9 .
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mere similarity of the label is confusing.

Motivation, then,

as general semantics points out, is not a thing but simply a
label.

It can be defined or given meaning only in terms of

the relationship between man and the factors in his economic,
social, political and psychological environment.
Temporal factors are, however, not the only ones re
quiring respect of the position of historism.

Ernest Dale

points out that universal empirical theories contact diffi
culties when applied to the multiplicity of economic, social
and religious organizations.

As a solution he offers a rather

"historic" answer in the form of the "comparative approach."
This approach is concerned with a recognition of fundamental

81

similarities among different situations within a given class. '
For instance, a theory might be developed for economic organi
zations and another for religious organizations.

It is really

quite simple--only comparable situations should be comparedJ
Dale's argument would contend that the Hawthorne Studies were
interesting and adequately revealed what happened in a Western
Electric Plant at one time and in one place.

However, this

tells one little about the administration of a university or

®^Ernest Dale, The Great Organizers. McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., New York, I960, pp. 7-12.

hospital.

Of Herzberg's study in The Moti vation to W o r k . it

would accept the results relative to the 200 Pittsburg accoun
tants and engineers but would question their applicability to
west coast dock workers.

In all fairness it must recognized

that Herzberg has expanded the universe in later studies, but
the point is basically the same.
And finally,

one further

justification of this approach

comes in the form of a renewed interest in international
business organization.

Only time will tell what type of

limited applicability problems different cultures and mores
will present.
Does
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the variability of perception disqualify empiricism

as an adequate epistemology for the science of ma nagement and
organizations?

And even more basic, what alternative is there

that might be employed?
Rationalism and the Theory of Organizations
The fundamental thesis of rationalism,
of philosophy the a_ prior is ts belong,

to which school

is that the key to true

knowledge is not by the evidence of sense but pure thought
87
and logic.
They argue as follows.

ftA

Winston Oberg, "Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Ma n a g e 
ment Principles," Academy of Management J o u r n a l . Vol. VI, No.
2 (June, 1963), p . 1^2.
®7Kaufmann, o£.

c i t ., p. 1 0 .
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1.

Logic is not subject to the illusions of sense.

2.

Results of logical reasoning from "truth" state
ments are universally and
eternally valid.

3.

The only observations that are precise and inter
sub jectively valid are those that can be formu
lated in mathematical terms.

An epistemology founded on propositions such as these might
be labeled the antithesis of empiricism.

But, like empiricism,

rationalistic philosophers can be seen to occupy a whole con
tinuum, one extreme of which actually approaches empiricism.
The extreme anti-empiricists will be called "radical
rationalists" or "extreme a p ri o rists."

Actually this group

has an almost theological foundation in that they conceive
the world as perfectly attributable to the order of a Divine
Rational Being in Whose image human reason is created.

Man,

having been created in the image of God but lacking omni
potence,
plan.

is capable of understanding only part of the rational

88
The impact and logic of the rationalistic or si priori

position can be appreciated only when one recognizes what is
actually being stated.

Succinctly it is this:

if one begins

with certainty and following the rules of logic deduces valid

8 8 lbid.
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consequences, the consequences must be as certain as the
axioms upon which they are based.
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Therefore, a priorism

is more abstract in its approach than empiricism.
fr

It moves

>m the general to the specific in direct opposition to

empirical induction.

However, for a mode of inquiry to be

said to be abstract from raw experience, it need not be
thought of as taking abstract entities as its objects.
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In

other words, there are no methodological reasons why explana
tions concerning the nature of "reality" cannot be approached
deductively although the success of deduction is predetermined,
to some extent, by the nature of its abstract premises.
On Ultimate Givens.

This section proposes to examine the

starting point of deductive reasoning.

The point of departure

may, for lack of a better term, be called a premise.

_A

priorists have long claimed that economics and various other
sciences are based upon certain fundamental truths which are
not subject to empirical verification.
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The argument

®^Rollo Handy, Methodology of the Behavioral Sciences.
Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, SprTngfTeld, 111., 1961|, p. 25.
^ I s r a e l Scheffler, "Explanation, Prediction and Abstrac
tion." British Journal of the Philosophy of Science, Vol.
VIII, No. 28“(Feb., 1^571, p. 30TI

91por adequate support see Machlup, op. cit. , p. 5,
C . I . Lewis, Mind and the World Order, Scribner and So n s,
New York, 19^2, p. 293 and Arthur Pap, The A Priori in
Physical Theory. King's Crown Press, New York, 19^, p. 5.
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continues that new experience can only force one to modify
or discard inferences drawn from previous experience.

But

experience cannot require discarding or extensive modification
of ^ priori theorems which are not derived empirically;

they

are logically prior to sense observation and can neither be
proved by corroborative experience nor disproved by experience to the contrary.
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Contradictory observations can
i

force reevaluation of the logic, but if the'logic is not in
err, it must be considered valid.
of the undisputable ja priori

But what is the nature

truth and how does one recog

nize such a truth when one sees it?
A priori

truths are difficult to discuss from any point

of view, but they are absolutely impossible to examine scien
tifically.

The reason for this is, quite frankly,

"truths” are irrational, by definition.

However,

that these
they are

not irrational in the sense that is commonly associated with
abnormality;
tion.

they are simply incapable of rational examina

They are the irrational starting point of the rational

process and are prior to rationality,

thus not rational.

Be

cause of the impossibility of a logical examination of these

92
7 Von M i s e s , Epistemological Problems of E c on o m i c s .
o p . c i t ., p. 2 7 .
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irrational elements, some writers have chosen to call these
truths "ultimate givens."
Science, in attempting to trace every event to its cause,
acknowledges that there are limits to the human mind in search
for knowledge.

Specifically, it fully recognizes that certain

phenomena cannot be traced to other phenomena.
These are the
93
ultimate givens.
Physical science can offer no scientific
explanation as to the cosmic existence of the basic elements
of which everything is composed.

Yet, elements do exist,

irational (in the sense mentioned above) as they may be.

All

that can be said is that to deny their existence appears to
the human mind as nonsense and that thinking based on such
elements has led to satisfactory theories.

"All man's actions

are purposeful" is a proposition not subject to empirical veri
fication since an overt action may appear as a S -+R pattern.
Yet, purposeful behavior is a truism and psychological theories
based upon it have proved satisfactory.

Therefore, scientific

inquiry cannot proceed beyond the limits drawn by the ineffi91*
ciency of man's senses and the narrowness of his mind.
In
fact, the human mind is not capable of conceiving a kind of
knowledge not limited by an ultimate given inaccessible to

^ V o n Mises, Human Acti on, o p . cit. , pp. 17-10.
^ V o n Mises, Theory and History, o p . cit. , pp. 8-9.
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further analysis.

Thus, the scientific method that safely

escorts m an to the ultimate givens is entirely rational,
95
but the ultimate given can only be termed irrational.
This, then, is the nature of the ultimate givens strongly
supported by some and jokingly rejected by others.

Assuming

such a system, however, rather elaborate deductive formulations
have been constructed.
Deductive Nature of the A P riori.

The contemporary vogue

in management and organization theory is empirical research.
Of this there can be no question.

Yet, the rationalists speak

of empirical theories as little more than inductive generali
zations or simple "correlational statements" and observed
links among protocal data.

96

Data collection to them simply

do63 not constitute a theoretical system.

Some of these,

while recognizing the importance of induction in physical
analysis,reject the method when applied to the study of human
behavior because of the unique characteristic of purposeful
human action.

Since a human may react to a stimulus one way

at one time and in a different manner at another, inductive
generalizations are approached with extreme skepticism.

7;?Von Mises, Human A c t i o n , o p . c i t . . pp. 20-21.
^ F r i t z Machlup, "Operationalism and Pure Theory in
Economics," in Krupp, o£. cit . , p. 60.
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Therefore, it is evident that the rationalistic or &
priori approach is fundamentally deductive.

It is a procedure

that begins with a base of self-evident truths and applying
the rules of logic obtains solutions or consequences of these
truths that may be used in prediction.

Now that the philo

sophical nature of this argument is understood, one most
likely is asking himself questions

concerning the origin of

such an argument and is seeking a theory of organization that
proceeds along such a route.
Historical Perspective.

The basis for the empiricists’

reaction against rationalism can be found in history.
Mises states,

As Von

"Although there was a long line of Utopians who

drafted earthly paradises where pure reason was supreme,

the

real truth seekers never pretended reason would make man omn i
potent . "
Aristotle,

in his M e t a p h y si c s. defines the striking

importance and uniqueness of reason.

Both men and animals

have the abilities of perception and memory.

Therefore,

intelligence, defined as the ability to recognize similarity
and difference as well as the ability to bring experience
together in a manner so as to regulate behavior,
session of both m a n and beast.
than intelligence;

is a p o s 

But man is capable of more

only he is capable of reason or that

ability which allows one to know why things operate as they
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do.

Rational knowledge is the knowledge of why things act

as they do, not just the knowledge that things do operate.
The practical function of such knowledge is the ability to
anticipate experience--being able to foresee, and therefore,
better able to consider the consequences of action before it
is t a k e n . ^
Plato's idealism or "world of forms" would also be con
sidered rationalistic.

To Plato what is ultimately real is

the "ideas" or forms beneath appearances which are immaterial
entities not themself existent in the world of sense perception.
The idea, which is perfect, is the ultimate reality; whereas
one's perception of it is not reality and is imperfect.

98

In addition to Plato, Aristotle and St. Thomas Acquinas
(12^0 A.D.),

the main stimulus to rationalism came from the

philosophic thinkers of the l£th and 16 th centuries.

It

came in the form of a reaction against the dictates pressed
upon them by others whose logic could not be checked by their
own faculties.
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And more recently, a less general treatment

comes from Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason.

Kant distin

guished between the "noumenon" or the unknowable thing itself

" M a r x W. Wartofsky, Conceptual Foundations of Scientific
Thought. The Macmillian Company, New York, 1968, pp. 313.
" i b id . . pp. 86-8 7 .
" c h u r c h m a n and Ackoff, o£. c i t . . pp. 11^-17.

8i
and the "phenomenon" or that which is known by virtue of
transcendental unity of apperception.^-00

His great lesson

is that the flux of raw data would remain an unperceived
process were it not for prior structuring according to cer
tain categories of understanding which reify events on a
space-time frame.'1'0'''

His ja priori element of structuring

signifies only that a conceptual framework is prior to
experiencing an event.
But what about contemporary management theory?

Are

there examples of rationalism in its theoretical foundation?
Rationalistic Tradition in Management and OrganizationsThe study of management and organizations is like ma ny other
sciences in that various theories have been developed using
the rational as well as the empirical alternative.

Herbert

Simon has developed several primarily rational and completely
deductive theories of executive compensation as well as group
conformity and interaction.

100Turner, o£.
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c i t . . p. 195*

1 0 1 Ibid.
-|QQ
See Herbert A. Simon, "Compensation of Executives,"
Sociomet ry. Vol. XX, No. 1 (March, 1957), pp. 32-35, "A
Formal Theory of Interaction in Social Groups," American
Sociological R e v i e w . Vol. XVII, No. 2 (April, 1 9 5 2 ) , pp.
202-211 and Herbert A. Simon and Harold Guetzkow, "A Model
of Short and Long Run Mechanism Invovled in Pressures Toward
Uniformity in Groups." Psychological Review. Vol. LXII,
No. 1 (Jan., 1955), pp. 56-b«.
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However,

the most influential formulation which utilizes

this method is Maslow's theory of m o t i v a t i o n . ^ 3
original and general formulation,
rational theory.

Initially,

jn its

it assumes the form of a

it makes several basic assump

tions which could be considered quite s e l f - e v i d e n t . ^ ^
are the ultimate givens of Maslow's

These

theory for which no empiri

cal Justification is required.
1.

Man Is a wanting animal--he always wants and
wants more.
{a priori tr u e)

2.

A satisfied need is not a motivator of behavior.
(_a priori true)

3.

Man's needs are arranged in a series of levels-a hierarchy of importance.
(ja priori t ru e )

Prom these three self-evident _a priori truths a complex
and extremely general (in the sense of wide applicability)
theory ma y be developed.

Maslow's theory is, at least, a

moral victory for the rationalists since no theory in the
social sciences, either empirical or rational,

comes to the

w r i t e r ’s mind as being influential.
It should also be noted that a great deal of current
systems analysis is fundamentally deductive although it relies
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A. H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality. Harper and
Row, Publishers, New York, 19 5>k-t PP* 62-106.
^ ^ H e r b e r t G. Hicks, 'Hie Management of Organizations.
McGraw-Hill Book Company, N e w York7 1967, PP~ 237-238.

h e a v i l y u p o n emp ir ical
cation.

Why,

then,

the a n swer to all

nali st s m a d e
empiricism

is not

for c o n f i r m a t i o n and v e r i f i 

the a priori

the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l

and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l
Limitations

stud ie s

rationalistic method

pro blems

of

the social

sc ien ces?

of R a t i o n a l i s m .

N e ed le ss

to say,

the r a t i o 

a m o s t r e s p e c t a b l e poi nt of the li m i t a t i o n s

of

in d e a l i n g w i t h the v a r i a b i l i t y of p u r p o s e f u l

h u m a n action.

Par ad o x i c a l l y ,

e m p i r i c i s m occupies

" r e s p e c t a b l e " p o s i t i o n today than does
the c o n t e n t i o n of the w r i t e r that

a mor e

rati ona lism.

It is

the r e a s o n for the u n p o p u 

l a r i t y of r a t i o n a l i s m is a d i r e c t c o n s e que nc e of c o n t e m p o r a r y
scientific
status
tions

sk ept ic ism .

of m a t h e m a t i c s ,
are c o m p l e t e l y

abstract.

No one

E u c l i d i a n p o in t

s c ien ce
oth er

priori

(which has

that its

founda

and its cont ent a b s o l u t e l y
to the e x i s t e n c e of a

no m a g n i t u d e )

or line

b e c a u s e m a n is unab le

s u c h ab s t r a c t concepts.

pe r c e p t i o n ,

the i n t e l l e c t u a l

in spite of the fact

can t e s t i f y as

l e n g t h and no width)
perceive

a

No s c ie nc e enjoys

th ey are c e r t a i n l y not

(with o n l y

to p h y s i c a l l y

If they are not capa bl e of
capable of test.

Although

can a c c e p t the l o g i c a l p e r f e c t i o n of m a t h e m a t i c s ,

are a of s t u d y has

the s c i e n t i f i c

c o m m u n i t y has

t e n t i o n in so ci al
e m p i r i c a l fact.

d e v e l o p e d s u c h prec i s i o n .

areas

be e n r e l u c t a n t

no

Therefore,

to acce pt any c o n 

that can no t be s u p p o r t e d by con c re te
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But w h y m u s t
as m a n a g e m e n t

an a r e a in its m e t h o d o l o g i c a l

an d o r g a n i z a t i o n theory,

v e r i f i c a t i o n as one of its s c i e n t i f i c
odological

i n f a n c y i m po se s

establish empirical
criteria?

enough limitations

s t r u c t i n g and c r e a t i n g a d d i t i o n a l

infancy such

Surely m e t h 

without

con

ones.

Why An Epistemological D i c h o t o m y ?
As

the g e n e r a l

or r e a s o n i n g has
man.

scientific
case

o f t e n p o i n t e d out,

either

caused untold communication difficulties

Dichotomous

methodology.

semantists have

One

t h i n k i n g has

b e e n no less

destructive

for

in

ca nn o t p r e v e n t w o n d e r i n g w h y a soc i al -

investigation must

the r a t i o n a l i s t s

e i t h e r be e m p i r i c a l ,

d i s r e g a r d it;

w h e r e u p o n the e m p i r i c i s t s

in w h i c h

or p u r e l y r a t i o n a l ,

r e j e c t it as u n f o u n d e d

"armchair

philosophizing."
It seems

almost

too

obv iou s

to m e n t i o n

that b o t h

s y s t e m a t i c r e a s o n i n g a n d sens e p e r c e p t i o n are
suggesting hypotheses
are

clearly defined

assumptions

fo r

to be e x a m i n e d .

it m a y b e c o m e

After

necessary

capable

of

the h y p o t h e s e s
to m a k e

certain

the p u r p o s e of s i m p l i c i t y or f u n d a m e n t a l

u n d e r l y i n g p r e m i s e s m a y be s u g g e s t e d by a c t u a l o b s e r v a t i o n
o f e x i s t i n g co n d i t i o n s .
reasoning m a y develop
effect relationship
assumptions

Based u p o n

a systematic

these p r e m i s e s ,

e x p l a n a t i o n of c a u s e

that l o g i c a l l y r e s u l t s

or axioms,

or one m a y

deductive

i n fe r

and

f r o m the se t of

theoretical

general-
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structured,
c h e c k or

observations

test

as

to

certain premises

the

such

verifiable,

but

t i o n m a y be

tested.

nature

and

it, m a y

esis

is

be

a rational

experience
an argument
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those

dictions.

Thus,

an d c r i t i c a l
utilizes

if it

as

it

as
is

this

it r e d e f i n e s

the

fact

ojd.

has

to be

s t a n d the

in t h a t

in

ci_t. , p.

Such

not
as

accept
con
in

that

in m a k i n g p r e 

unguided
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by r e a s o n

This

approach

the f r a m i n g o f s c i e n t i f i c

it m a n d a t o r y f o r
science

test.

it is r a t i o n a l i s t i c

of s e n s e

to

t e s t e d by

ideas

guiding principle

critical

chosen

that a h y p o t h 

it does

from rational

as

vation and o b s e r v a t i o n i m p r e g n a t e d

^^Kaufmann,

iterative

It c o n t e n d s

of r e a s o n u n c h e c k e d by sense.

bu t m a k e s

empirically

such a p o s t u l a 

the w r i t e r

cannot

However,

induction modestly

hypotheses,
mentally,

reason

Obviously,

inductive methods.

the d e r i v a t i o n of p r o p o s i t i o n s

it r e c o g n i z e s

a valuable

are no t

7 illustrates

i d e a or e m p i r i c a l

proof.

theory .

of rea s o n i n g from

anti-rationalistic

sti t u t i n g final

provide

of Maslow's

to G a l i l e o .

and r e j e c t e d

theory becomes

v a l i d i t y of

approach,"

traced

the

events

Figure

"iterative

call

as

On c e

of a c t u a l

the r e s u l t s

of d e d u c t i v e

Th is

ev e n t s .

10.

their

reason
by

test.

Funda

tempered by o b s e r 

th o u g h t ;

it is

an
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World of the Theorists

Self-Evident
Truth

Theory-

Deduction

Predi ction

Verification

b

-----------1

Observed
Pact

Observed
Fact

Induction

World of the Experimentalists

I

SOURCE:
John G. Kemeny, A Philosopher Looks At Sc ience.
D. Van Nostrand Company, Princeton,
FIGURE 7
THE ITERATIVE NATURE OF DEDUCTION AND INDUCTION
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orderly construction fitted to the world of the senses, an
experimental search for a world of order.
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A bipolar orientation to epistemological alternatives
is limiting to say the least.

The value of the empirical and

rationalistic approaches is a relative concept that may occupy
almost any point along a continuum between the two.
ment does not contend, however,

This state

that the selection between them

and the relative weights applied to each is arbitrary.

Such a

choice requires some of the most detailed analysis that the
social scientist is called upon to accomplish.

In making this

choice, one will find that selection is a function of certain
variables which are:
1.

The nature of the subject matter.
For instance,
the fact that man's actions are purposeful com
plicates the formation of theories based on a
few limited observations.

2.

The specific topic under consideration.
A study
concerning the effect of rest periods on physical
fatigue requires detailed observation.
However,
a theoretical question involving the psychic
motivation of man might be examined quite success
fully via deductive reasoning from "self-evident"
truths.

3 . The purpose of the study.
If universal theories
of organizations applicable to all forms is the
stated purpose of an organizational science,
deduction may be the most suitable method since

10^V. Edwin Bixenstine, "Empiricism in Latter-Day
Behavioral Science," Science, Vol. CXLV, No. 8 (July 31,
196J+), P. 467.
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its results are more general.
Bnpirical observa
tions of specific cases raises questions concerning
the applicability of any single empirical theory.
[*..

Etc.

It must be noted that an emphatic etc. is included as the
final element since there are numerous other situations that
can influence one's exact position along the deductiveinductive scale.
The recommendation of methodological tolerance does not
answer the traditional epistemological questions concerning
the ultimate source of knowledge which has been discussed at
length above.
such questions;

Obviously,

there are no scientific answers to

yet, after some deliberation,

the author is

prepared to venture an opinion which has been found to provide
some personal satisfaction to this most frustrating issue.
If the question is concerned with ultimate knowledge,

it seems

that the rationalists do indeed possess a theoretical victory
since "observation unilluminated by reason is sterile."107
It seems doubtful that anyone would equate science with the
accumulation of data since it is the inherent logical struc
ture of the mind of man that gives initial meaning to sense

^■°^Morris R. Cohen, Reason and Nature, 2nd ed. , The
Free Press, Glencoe, 111., 1953, P* 17, Tjalling C. Koopmans,
"Measurement Without Theory," The Review of Economic Statis
tics . Vol. XXIX, No. 3 (Aug., 151+7) , P ■ 151+ and W. Stanley
Jevons, The Theory of Political Economy, Kelley and Millman,
Inc ., New York, 19577 P* 22.
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perceptions.
However, to expect scientific skepticism to accept
unchallenged any theoretical report is equally erroneous.
Even if reason does precede experience, it is experience
that provides the test and determines validity for modern
management and organization theory.

In other words,

the

results or consequences of a deductive theory must coincide
with observed reality in order to be scientifically m e a n 
ingful.

This conclusion applies only to the consequences of

the theory, for the empirical validity of the assumptions
upon which the theory is based is an entirely separate
methodological question and will be discussed in the
following section.
Now that a plea for a complementary rather than com
petitive relationship between induction and deduction has
been made, an additional question comes to mind.
accepts, as the writer does,

If one

the proposition that human

action is fundamentally different from any other object of
science, one is inclined to inquire into the possibility of
the existence of methods more suited for the analysis of man.
Toward An Adequate Eplstemology of
Management and Organizations
Although criticized by Nagel, Maclver makes an inter
esting point in his book Social Causation when he states:
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In the social realm the scientist enjoys the incom
parable advantage of being immersed in the striv
ings, purposes and goals that constitude the pecu
liar dynamics of this area . . . We must supple
ment experiment and the "objective evidence" pro
vided by the observable and measurable behavior by
the admittedly precarious but valuable process of
imaginatively reconstructing the hidden systems of
thoughts, attitudes and desires to which causal
efficacy is imputed.10°
Other influential individuals have voiced similar ideas
relating to this unique position of the social scientist.
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As a result, scientist and philosopher alike have sought
new methods and alterations in existing ones which would be
more clearly associated with the uniqueness of the social
s ci ences.
The Logic of Verstehen
Referring once again to the datum labeled "ultimate
givens" it may be seen that when the natural sciences
encounter such data the logic of their methods is exhausted.
Perhaps this is not true when one human being studies other
human beings because of the simple fact that he himself is

^°®Nagel, Logic Without Me taphysics, o p . cit. . p. 372.
^ ^ S e e Paul P. Lazarsfield, "Philosophy of Science and
Empirical Social Research," in Ernest Nagel, Patrick Suppes
and Alfred Tarski, editors, L o g i c . Methodology and Philosophy
of Science. Stanford University Press7 Stanford, Calif., 1962,
p. 4.73 and Prank H, Knight, Freedom and R eform: Essays in
Economics and Social Philosophy. Harper and Brothers, New York,
191+7, p. 221+.
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human.

When knowledge is obtained via this process an act

is performed which was described initially in German epistemology as das spezifische Verstehen der Geisteswissenschaften
or simply Verstehen.110

Vers tehen means understanding, but

it is a "specific type of understanding" possible only in
the social sciences where the observer is a member of the
same class as the observed.

Therefore, Vers tehen is the

postulation of an intervening process located inside the
human organism by means of which an observed event is made
meaningful.111

According to this, the reaction or response

to any stimuli supposes the existence of mental determinants
or intervening variables such as memory, expectations and
desires.11^

The physicist need worry little about the con

scious reactions of an aircraft to a wind current.

Such an

uninvolved relationship does not exist between the inter and
intraorganizational relations of man.
Cogni tion from Wi thin and Cogni tion from Wi thout.
ural phenomena are approached from without.

Nat

The result of

such observations is the establishment of laws of dependence

iin

Von Mises, Human A c t i o n . o p . c i t . , pp. t|.9-50.

111Theodore Abel,
in Feigl and Brodbeck,

"The Operation Called Verstehen,"
o j d . c i t . , p. 682.

1 1 ^Arthur Pap, An Introduction to the Philosophy of
Sci e nc e , The Free Press, Glencoe, 1 1 1 . , 196"^ p"! 3 8 3 .
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by which one explains the phenomena of n a t u r e . B u t

in the

social arena cognition comes from within since the observer
is able to understand the meaning of an act to the actor. .
Although there is no specific example of such a process
that can be drawn from organization theory, the writer is
inclined to believe that any theory of organization, save a
purely behavioristic one, makes use of Verstehen.

Man simply

is incapable of "understanding" the action of others without
at least projecting himself to some extent.

An attempt to

understand human action in organizations by observing man's
responses

to various stimuli would result in an extremely

limited understanding if understanding resulted at all.
Imagine trying to explain interdepartmental conflict solely
on the basis of the observed evidence of overt resentful acts
and slowed intercommunication.

Such a theory could provide

only a description of effects with absolutely no explanation
of causes.

The predicament of the management and organization

theorist is quite adequately expressed by Simon upon intro
ducing a particular study.

H ^ V o n Mises, Epistemological Problems of Economics .
o p . ci t .. p. 1 3 0 .
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Lacking the kinds of empirical knowledge of the
decisional process that will be required for a
definitive theory, the hard facts of the world,
can enter the theory only in a relatively unsys
tematic way . . . but none of us are completely
innocent of acquaintance with the gross char
acteristics of human choice . . . I shall feel
free to call on this common experience as a
source of hypothesis .-^h Actually, the process by which Vers tehen takes place
or is accomplished is purely psychological and to a large
extent quite structured.

Briefly, then, an analysis of

the process will be undertaken.
The Process.

Vers tehen consists of three steps

1.

Internalizing of the stimulus.
At this stage the
observer attempts to describe a situation or event
by categorizing it and evoking personal knowledge
which fits into this category.

2.

Internalizing the response.
One infers the motive
of the act from the known or observed modifications
it produces.

3.

Behavior maxims.
Certain maxims link two feeling
states together in a uniform sequence and implies
a functional dependence between them.
The func
tional dependence consists of the fact that the
feeling state ascribed to a given human action is
directed by the feeling state one presumes is
evoked by an impinging situation or event.
These
maxims can be constructed ad hoc and be acceptable
not because they are experimentally verifiable but
because they are somewhat "intersubjectively selfevident. "

^■^Herbert A. Simon, "A Behavioral Model of Rational
Choice," Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. LXIX, No. 1
(Feb., 1955)7 p. 100.
■*-^Abel, o£. cit. . pp. 683-68I4..
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Obviously, V e r s t e h e n is a product of the S G I EN C Es o c^al
rather than the S C I E N C E n a -t;ura]_.

If, however,

it is not

p ur e ly "scientific" in the S C I E N C E n a tu r ai sense, what p o s s i 
ble fun ction does it perform?

An example will be used to

illustrate its usefulness.
Suppose

that stimulus S x has r e sulted in three d i f f e r 

ent responses R ^ , R 2 and R^ wi th equal regularity and s e v 
eral other responses
If Hi

(...Rn ) have occasi on a ll y occurred.

is used to designate the hypotheses w h i c h postulate

a causal relationship be t ween S x and the various R.. , one
can see that the p r ob a bi l it y of any given m u t u a l l y e x c l u 
sive hypothesis

being confirmed is:

n=3
P(H-, ) = P(H? ) = P(H->) and

Z

J

P(Hi)<l

1=1

n=3
where 1 -

Z
P ( H j ) = u n certainty
i=l
1

U nc e rt a in t y must be considered since

the set of responses

(R-^, R 2 , R-^) is not collectively exh austive of all possible
responses.

A behavioristic de s cr i pt i on can only take the

R^ that actually o cc urred and relate it to S x .

However,

Vers tehen offers not only an e xp l an a ti o n of why a given R^
took place but is fully capable of re co gnizing the p o s s i 
bil ity of other R^'s and m a y even provide subjective p r o b 
abilities

as to their likelihood.

Thus,

Vers tehen appears,
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from the viewpoint of SCIENCE
ful than pure behaviorism.

. , , to be m uc h more fruit-

3 O C X Gl-L

As one would expect, however,

Vers tehen has not received universal acceptance.
Cri ti cisms of Vers t e h e n .

Criticisms have been directed

toward -Verstehen on several counts ranging from charges of
its ascientific subjectivity to referring to it as nothing
more than empathy.

As for the ascientific argument,

is little question as to its justification.
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there

Certainly,

if publicly testable data is the necessary condition for
science then Vers tehen is ascientific.

But this argument

equates ascientific methods and su bjectivity and requires
that the validity of the "argument rest upon the definition
of subjectivity.

The opponents of Verstehen say it is s u b 

jective because the understanding of another person's

action

depends upon private, uncontrollable and unverifiable

in tu

ition on the part of the observer.

However, Weber, e_t. a l ...

admit it is subjective only in the sense that its goal is
to find what the observee "means" in his actions,

in con-

trast to the me aning which the action has for the observer.

•^^Arthur
j)anto, "On Explanation in History."
Philosophy of S c i e n c e . Vol. XXIII, No. 1 (Jan., 1956), p.
IB and H. M. Blalock, Jr., "Theory, Measurement and Repli
cation in Social Sciences," The American Journal of Sociol
ogy . Vol. L X V I , No. I4. (Jan., 1^61), pp. 3M-3-3^4-3 H ^ S c h u t z , Oja. ci t . . p. 214-0 .
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In the latter sense Vers tehen is simply an alternative
epistemological position, not a subjective interpretation.
Therefore, its ascientific character refers only to its
relationship with SCIENCEn a turai „

Recognizing, however,

the impossibility of complete s CIENTIFICnatura^ analysis of
purposeful behavior, Vers tehen offers an improvement upon a
purely behavioristic analysis of man.
The proposition that Verstehen is nothing more than
empathy is also a matter of definition.
to the writer and others,
are two different things.

3.3.0

It seems, at least

that empathy and undeTstanding

It is one thing to understand the

psychic motivation of a factory owner in early America, but
it is quite another to appreciate or empathize with the
"sweat shops" he created.

Thus, there is a fundamental dif

ference between understanding and approval as is quite obvious
from the above statement.
Verstehen offers to the theorists of management and orga
nizations an alternative to the purely scientific methods which
have been so successful in physical analysis, but leave much
to be desired in dealing with the unique characteristics of
the purposeful behavior.

However, one would commit the

"fallacy of epistemological dichotomy" to advocate Vers tehen

H 6

Von Mises, Human Ac t i o n . o p . ci t .. p. 50.
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as a sole met hodology;
testable h ypo theses

yet,

its use in the fo r m u l a t i o n of

shou ld not be discounted.

The insight

such a m e t h o d gives lends dyn amic m e a n i n g to observed r e 
sponses

and removes

the

"shell of unc e r t a i n t y " around many,

because only m a n can u n d e r s t a n d man.

On Ideal Types
Regard les s
the analysis

of the actual m e t h o d one m i g h t select for

of s o c i o - s c i e n t i f i c data, mo r e often than not

one is faced w i t h mo r e

variables

so me t h i n g is n e ed ed to enable
centrate on the mor e

than desired.

As

the social scientist

important determ ina nts

a result,
to co n

of effects.

One pa rt icula r m e t h o d of c o n c e n t r a t i n g on a l i m i t e d
nu mb er of variables

is k n o w n as

the

"theory of ideal

and was a dvo ca te d e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y by M a x Weber.

types"

Weber

states:
An ideal type is d e v e l o p e d t h r o u g h the one-side d
intens if i c a t i o n of one or several aspects by
integr at in g them into an i m m a n e n t l y co nsi ste nt
conceptual r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a m u l t i p l i c i t y of
s c a t t e r e d and dis cre te individ ual phenomena.
Ideal

types are u s e d to s i m p l i f y comp lex situations.

are e s p e c i a l l y useful

^•■'■^Von Mises,
o p . c i t . , p. 76.

They

in de te c t i n g and a b s t r a c t i n g specific

Epistemolo £k cal Problems of E c o n o m i c s ,
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characteristics from a complex whole and organizing them into
a coherent scheme.

120

In addition, they may be used to place

hypothetical rational actors in some simplified situation so
that the consequences of their action may be deducted.

There

fore, the fundamental purpose of an ideal type is to develop
skills in logical research and to assist in the construction
of hypotheses by noting how the main forces act upon a given
situation.
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Although few recognize it, Vers tehen and ideal

types are quite complementary.

As a matter of fact, Vers tehen

assumes that human action displays certain typical patterns
so that the meaning an "actor" attaches to an action can be
understood by the observer.

Thus, it assumes an intersub-

jective character of commonsense knowledge.
But what exactly does the construction of "ideal types"
accomplish?
1.

Specifically, it allows three things.

The arrangement of ideal types makes
analysis of standardized behavior in
That is to say, certain factors such
norms or rationality may be analyzed
logical framework.

122

possible the
isolation.
as social
within a

1^ J . W. N. Watkins, "Ideal Types and Historical Explana
tions," in Peigl and Brodbeck, o£. cit. , pp. 732-733.
l^-Carl G, Hempel, "Typological Methods in the Social
Sciences," and Max Weber, "Objectivity in Social Science and
Social Policy," in Peigl and Brodbeck, op. cit., pp. 219 and
396.

122

Nagel, "Problems of Concept and Theory Formation in
Social Science," o j d . cit. . p. 209.
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2.

It becomes a device for ascertaining deviating
behavior in the real social world.
In other words,
the ideal may be used as a norm from which reality
deviates and toward the accomplishment of which
managerial action is directed.

3.

By varying certain elements numerous rational models
m a y be constructed and compared.
In doing this, one
can vary or rotate the dominant factor and deductively
ascertain the consequences.

J4..

In addition to the three noted above, the writer thinks
an additional factor should be mentioned.
An ideal
type may provide the framework for a more general
theory of management.
Any general theory must be
abstract because the more closely it approximates a
specific situation the less applicable it is to many
varying circumstances.

Thus, ideal types are an effort to develop a more consis
tent and complete scientific system.

Obviously, scientific

systems are never complete in that the door always remains
open to test so that no absolute scientific knowledge is
possible.

By constructing an ideal type, however,

the

scientist, whether he be economist or organization theorist,
is able to insure the internal consistency of his logic and
improve his understanding of the subject matter.
Unfortunately,

a theory may be internally consistent and

false which creates special problems of its own.

In other

words, h o w realistic are ideal types?
Ideals and Reali t y .

The construction of a repres enta

tive Ideal to describe an event is essentially a search for
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"limiting or strategic factors m123 which are the primary
determinants of the observed phenomena.

There is, therefore,

a most important question concerning how closely an ideal
must approach reality in order to be considered a valid
representation of the observed event.

Weber maintained that

ideal types cannot be defined as genus proximum or differentia
specifica and that concrete cases cannot be subsumed under
T ^I
them as instances.
They are purely mental constructs
which have no counterpart in reality.
utopia that simplifies analysis.

They are a type of

To consider them as real

is to be guilty of the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness,"12^*
that is, the identification of theoretical constructs as
purely perceivable occurrences.

Ideal types are specifically

designed to abstract certain elements from a set of "all"
possible elements, therefore, a perfect description of reality
via this method is impossible, by definition.

12^Ches ter I. Barnard, "The Environment of Decision,"
in Harold Koontz and Cyril O'Donnell, editors, Management:
A Book of Readin gs. McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. , 19614.,
ppl
.
12^Hempel, 0£. c i t . . p. 211.
12^Sherman Roy Krupp, "Theoretical Explanation and the
Nature of the Firm," The Western Economics Journal. Vol. I,
No. 3 (Summer, 1963), p. 20l±.
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In view of this, explanation by way of an ideal type will
at best define a range of phenomena that may result in a given
situation;

thus establishing an "applicability" theorem.

The applicability theorem, by virtue of its delineation of
the range of possibilities, eliminates many things which are
logically impossible under the established conditions.
fore,

There

ideal types are not exhaustive descriptions of reality

and if they were,

their complexity would offer no theoretical

improvement over the analysis of dynamic reality itself.
Ideal Types and Organizations.

Herbert Simon,

after

denying the ideal economic man of classical theory, replaces
it with an ideal satisficing model while Likert emphasizes:
. . . in working situations a wide variety of m o t i 
vational forces influence the behavior of man.
How
ever, in developing an integrated theory of ma n ag e 
ment it is necessary to use primarily one assump
tion as to the character of the most pervasive m o t i 
vational force affecting human behavior in working
situations.127
But perhaps the best example of an ideal type in m a na g e
ment and organizations is provided by Douglas McGregor's
Theory X and Theory Y.

Initially, McGregor criticizes an

1 pi’
Martin Bronfenbrenner, "A Middlebrow Introduction to
Economic Methodology," in Krupp, The Structure of Economic
S c i e n c e . o p . c i t ., p. 10.
127

Renis Likert, "A Psychological Foundation for a
Modified Theory of Management," Acta Psyc hologica, Vol.
XI, No. 1 (1955), P. 171.
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"ideal type" based on the following assumptions about industrial man.
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1.

The average human being has an inherent dislike
of work and will avoid it if he can.

2.

Because ma n dislikes work he mu st be coerced,
controlled, directed and threatened wi th punish
ment to get him to work toward organizational
objecti v e s .

3 . The average hu man being prefers to be directed,
wishes to avoid responsibility, has little
ambition and desires security above all.
Based on this ideal construction,
created m a n y dysfunctional situations.
McGregor offers an ideal which assumes:

classical

theory

As an alternative,
129

1.

The expenditure of physical and mental effort in
work is as natural as play or rest.

2.

Man will exercise self-direction and self-control
in the service of objectives to which he is committed.

3.

Commitment to objectives is a function of the rewards
associated wit h their achievement.
The average hu man being learns, under proper condi
tions, not only to accept but to seek responsibility.

f>.

Creative ability is widely, not narrowly, distributed
in the population.

6.

Under mo d e r n industrial life, the intellectual p o 
tentials of the average h u ma n being are only p a r 
tially utilized.

T oft
Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of E n t e r p r i s e . McGrawHill Book Company, Inc., N e w York, I960, pp. 3
1 2 9 Ibid. . pp. ^ 7 -5 7 .
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It is obvious that neither set of extreme assumptions truly
describe man in reality.

However, either set can be used,

within certain limits of applicability, to predict the
result of various managerial behavior.
Therefore, in using ideal types if one allows

"I" to

be the ideal, phenomenon "a" cannot be said to be either
"I = a M or "I t a."

It can only be "more or less I."

But

to be "scientific," there must be objective criteria for the
"more or less" comparison which may be either purely compara
tive (ordinal) or numerical (cardinal).

Thus, any given

situation in industry may be described as more Theory X or
more Theory Y, but never situation a = Theory X or a =
Theory Y.
The "Managerial Grid" in Figure 8 offers a convenient
means of illustrating this "more or less" comparison.

If the

management of a hypothetical firm is described by point A with
coordinates

(1,9), they may be said to over subscribe to The

ory Y and create a "country club" environment.

On the other

hand, a management team located at B (9,1) might be too much
Theory X and practice task management or mechanistic manipu
lation.

As in many cases the most desirable situation is

neither extreme but some point which displays characteristics
of each, such as C (9,9) where the management is both people

lOlj.
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SOURCE:
Prom Robert R. Blake, Jane Srygley Mouton and
Alvin C. Bidwell, "Managerial Grid," Advanced Management Office
Executive, September, 1962, p. 13.
FIGURE 8
THE MANAGERIAL GRID
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and production oriented.

130

Limitations of U t op i a.

Nagel argues against any form

of intuitive understanding such as the logical model based
on "intuitive" premises.
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His primary objection seems to

be a plea for more empirical content in the assumptions of
the ideal types.
Essentially, such objections attempt to make clear the
distinction between argumentative validity and "truth" since
it is quite possible for an argument to be valid (internally
consistent) yet empirically untrue (as it relates ex post
to reality).

132

Argumentative validity is nothing more than

a consistent relationship between

premise (s) and conclusion.

The following syllogism is a perfect example of this situa
tion.
All men are motivated solely by money.

(Premise)

All employees of Organization X are men.

(Premise)

All employees of Organization X are motivated solely
by money.
(Conclusion)

l^Hicks,

The Management of Organizations, op. cit., p.

335.
131

Schutz, "Concept and Theory Formation in the Social
Sciences," o j d . cit. , p. 233*
1-^^David K. Berio, The Process of Communication. Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, New York, I960, p. 239.
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Thus, the argument progresses quite validly from premise(s)
to conclusion, and is, therefore, argumentatively valid;
yet, one has every reason to suppose that the conclusion is
untrue based on empirical evidence.

An interesting character

istic of this type of syllogism is that if the premises are
true and the argument logically valid, the conclusion must
be true.
All men are

mortal.

(Premise)

All members

of Organization X are men.

(Premise)

All members

of Organization X are mortal.

(Conclusion)

In a sense, the case of the ideal type appears somewhat at
variation with "truth" if its assumptions are not empirically
valid, thus bringing up another question.

Is it possible for

a conclusion to be considered useful if its conclusions ap
proach reality but its premises are untrue or void of empiri
cal content?
Homo Oeconomicus and Ceteris Paraibus:

Comments on Assumptions

Classical management and organization theory has been
criticized on the basis of its economic man (homo oeconomicus)
assumption.

Usually the criticism consists of a detailed

proof of the nonexistence of such a creature followed by an
advocation of an equally unreal alternative.
In addition to the economic man assumption, almost every
social science has faced ridicule for its use of a ceteris

1*07
paribus clause (all other things equal) made necessary by the
complexity of social data.

In view of this, it would seem

benefical for social theory to reexamine its traditional
position to insure that the use of such assumptions is
entirely necessary.
The Pragmatic Tradition.

It was illustrated in an

earlier section that the ultra-empiricists maintain the
necessity of independent empirical verifiability of assump
tions, theory and consequences.
However, one group of scholars often called the "Chicago
School" rejects this empirical requirement with respect to
assumptions altogether.

To them the only test of the validity

of a theory is how well it predicts.^33
The pragmatic position is established as separate from
the empiricist in that it requires no test of the assumptions;
yet, it cannot be termed _a priori because it strongly advo
cates the empirical testing of conclusions.

Therefore, the

ideal type finds a champion in the pragmatic philosophy, where
as those who require that theories have 1) empirical reference,
2) logical interconnection, and 3) admission of possibility

-^Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics, The
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953, pp. 12-13.
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of

r e j e c t i o n - 1-^-

must obviously reject the theoretical estab

lishment of ideal types on points one and three.
No doubt many may find the position of the pragmatists
questionable since its logical extreme is "no matter how
unrealistic the assumptions may be, if it enables useful
predictions, the theory is valid,"

However, one should

recognize that assumptions are abstractions by definition
and must always lack empirical justification to a greater

135? In spite of this, those who attack on

or lesser extent, ^

the basis of assumptions rather than the predictability are
not difficult to find.

Some members of this group actually

admit that various theories would result in essentially the
same conclusions if empirically verifiable assumptions were
used.

If this be true, one is tempted to sympathize with

the pragmatists and ask why it is necessary to shoulder the
expense and trouble of empirical verification when the results
are the same without it.

And even more fundamentally, one

might ask if empirical verification is the only test of
realism?
Criteria of Unrealism.

Nagel argues that unrealism of

^-^Rubens tein and Haberstroh, ££.

c i t ., pp. 16-18.

^■^Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, translators
and editors, Max Weber On the Methodology of the Social
Sciences. The Free Press, Glencoe, ill.J l W 9 , p p . i^-1^5.
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assumptions can assume one or more forms.

1

They may be:

1.

Unrealistic because they are not an ’’exhaustive
description of reality" or designed for the
"ideal case."

2.

Unrealistic in that they are false or highly
improbable based on the existing evidence avail
able concerning the subject matter.

With reference to the first, the tenets of general semantics
and intellectual commonsense tell one that any statement is
unrealistic in the sense that it is not an exhaustive de
scription of reality.

Words can never say "all" there is

about any objective process or event in the "real world."
Whereas the above discussion has shown that ideal cases are
not exact reproductions of reality, they are far from mean
ingless.

In fact, as long as one remains fully cognizant

of the fact that one is dealing with an ideal case, they may
prove quite useful in analyzing complex situations.
To this point Nagel does no serious damage to the prag
matic tradition.

However, he finds it impossible to accept

an assumption which is counter to empirical evidence although
he does at times seem somewhat sympathetic with Friedman's
position on this point.

Thus, Nagel occupies the middle

ground between dogmatic ultra-empiricism and dogmatic

136grriest Nagel, "Assumptions in Economic Theory,"
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings. Vol. LIII.
N“

2 W y 7 "1 9 W , _ P P ^

2 l ^ - 2T F : --------------------
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pragmatism at the other.
One thing appears certain, however,

the more general

the theory the less realistic are the assumptions because
generality requires that a theory specifically describe no
particular case.

McGregor's Theory Y is general because no

specific man is categorized by its assumptions.

Maslow's

need hierarchy applies to many cases simply because it
describes no particular man's set of needs.
cant theory explains much by little.

Thus, a signifi

A theory consists of an

assertion that certain forces are, by implication, important
and others are not for a particular class of phenomena.

There

fore, in speaking of the "crucial assumptions" one is trying
117
to state the key elements in an abstract theory. ^
Thus, it seems that the criteria of unrealism is a func
tion of one's objective.

The avowed pragmatist is perfectly

correct in proclaiming that the empirical reality of the
assumptions is irrelevant as long as the theory derived from
them provides a sufficient degree of predictive accuracy.

His

objective is practice and predictive validity is what he seeks.
To the pure scientist, however, a theory is more than a tool
for prediction.

It is a work of logical beauty which aims

1 37pr iedman, o£. cit . . pp. 21^-26.
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at the systematic perfection of universally acceptable knowl
edge.

As a result, predictive validity for practice is not

his sole objective.

For the scientist of management and

organizations a choice is available; will he be content with
supplying the practitioner with a tool for prediction or does
he aim at a completely perfect logical science.

The first

alternative gives him a general (once again meaning wide
applicability) yet imperfect description of many situations
while the second gives him a more perfect description of a
few limited cases.

This is basically the choice that Ernest

D a l e ’s "comparative approach" offers.

But such a question

as this can only be answered from the viewpoint of the indi
vidual theorists considering their personal objectives and
the conditions under which they work.
One thing appears quite clear in the writer’s opinion:
if a "general theory" is the objective of management and
organization theory, empirical equality of assumptions,
theory and consequences does not provide a satisfactory basis
for such a formulation.

The results of A = B = C can only

provide a series of "comparative theories" exhaustively
descriptive of specific cases but universally applicable to
non e .
Some Examples.

Perhaps the best known and most often

criticized assumption of management theory found its inception
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in economics and was used extensively in classical theory.
This, as mentioned before, was the idea that man 1) knows
all the choices available to him, 2) considers the result
of the alternative consequences of choosing various courses
of action, and 3) has & complete utility ordering (cardinal)
for all possible sets of consequences."^®

Taylor, ^t. al. ,

in developing their theory obviously considered that the
economic motives were the most important motivators of man.
It is on the basis of this assumption that many have attacked
scientific management.

It hardly seems necessary to under

score the "unrealism" of this proposition, but from a prag
matic viewpoint this is completely irrelevant.

Within this

framework only the consequences of classical theory need be
examined.

If the theory enables sufficiently accurate pre

dictions, good for it.

If not, it should be rejected, not

because its assumptions are unrealistic, but because the
theory itself provides unsatisfactory predictive results.
Another assumption that has been used explicitly in
economics and often implicitly in management and organiza
tion theory is the condition of ceteris paribus.

This is a

convenient means of analyzing the effects of a change in a

^ ® M a r c h and Simon, 0£. cit. . p. 1 3 8 .
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given variable while holding all other influencing forces
constant.

In other words, ceteris paribus enables one to

clear away the complexities of a multi-variable situation so
that a greater insight may be o b t a i n e d . T h e

assumption is

obviously a complement to the theory of ideal types.

It is

important to note that ceteris paribus is not an absolute con
cept.

The holding constant of all variables other than the

one under consideration does not mean that others show no
change at all.

It simply means that the sum total of their

change is not significantly large to constitute an influencing
force.

As Grunberg has s h o w n : l e t

variable P at time^;

Pt be the value of

Pt +1 then is the value of P actually

observed at t + 1; if X^ is the ith variable in an infinitely
large set of irrelevant variables covered by ceteris paribus.
effective fulfillment of the clause means:

{dPt+1/bX1 )6X1 + (8Pt+1/9X 2 )dX2 + ...(3Pt+1/3Xn )dXn S e
where e is an arbitrary variable such that if
pt " e “ pt+l “ pt + 6
the prediction is accepted as sufficiently accurate.
With the current emphasis on total and partial systems
analysis, it will no doubt be necessary for management and

James M. Buchanan, "Ceteris Paribus: Some Notes on
Methodology," The Southern Economfc Journal, Vol. XXIV,
No. 3 (Jan., 1^58) , P- 269.
^°Grunberg, o£. cit., p. 151.
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organization theory to rely more heavily on the explicit use
of ceteris paribus.

Theorists will find it impossible to

analyze the composition and operation of the technical or
power subsystems of a formal organization without assuming
away or holding constant the influence of other subsystems.
The limitations of man and the tools available for analysis
make such measures absolutely mandatory.

In doing so, no

serious problems will be encountered so long as there is a
conscious awareness of the limitations of such an analysis
and management theorists do not fall prey to the "fallacy
of mistaken concreteness."
Summary
This chapter has embarked upon a rather ambitious journey
in quest of explanations relative to the epistemological founda
tions of management and organizations.

The verbal travels have

led to an examination of several diverse yet strategically
interrelated

topics.

Succinctly, the major propositions

advanced may be itemized as follows:

1. Management belongs to the SCIENCESsoc^a2_ rather
than the SCIENCESnatural• By virtue of this
association, the study of organizations faces
several unique problems not adapted to the methods
of physical science. The primary unique problem
emerges as the purposeful behavior of man which
distinguishes him from any other cosmic object.
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2.

The basic problems of any "SCIENCE," management and
organizations being no exception, are epistemological
in that they deal with the relationship between per
ceived and objective reality.
Two opposing schools
of philosophy have offered explanations of this re
lationship.
The epistemological monists argue that
objective reality and the knowing state are identi
cal, item for item.
True to the tenets of general
semantics, this study has concluded that an alter
native argument known as epistemological dualism is
more productive of realistic knowledge.
This philos
ophy contends that perception abstracts only certain
items from objective being, thus denying the possi
bility of perfect knowledge.

3.

Subclassified under dualism are two additional epistemological positions.
Although they exist on a
separate plane, they apply only to the most accurate
methods of obtaining knowledge.
The first position,
known as empiricism, maintains that only knowledge
capable of perception is valid.
Within organiza
tions, the works of Herzberg, Likert and Cyert ex
hibit excellent examples of such a philosophy.
The
alternative position may be referred to as ratio
nalism and contends that there are basic a priori
truths concerning human behavior which, aTthough
true, are not subject to empirical verification.
Whereas the empirical method moves from the specif
ic to the general (induction), the rational method
moves from the general to the specific (deduction).
The general solution to this issue seems to be that,
both methods are necessary in the "scientific cycle."

i|.

The two methods mentioned above (induction and de
duction) are the only logically valid epistemologi
cal processes.
However, the writer maintains that
certain alterations may be made in them to facili
tate their applicability to social problems without
destroying their scientific usefulness.
The primary
alternative suggested is the use of Verstehen or the
person to person understanding made possible- by the
fact that both the observer and observes in the
social realm are human beings.
This method should
provide a great deal of insight into the formulation
of hypotheses and the explanation of phenomena.
Through the use of this methodology the observer is
better able to understand the meaning an actor
attaches to his action.

116
5.

Finally, it ia suggested that an appreciation of the
usefulness of Verstehen could allow more productive
use of ideal t y pe s. STnce general semantics ade
quately illustrates the utter impossibility of
knowing all there is to know about any event, the
delineation of the most important factors and a
concentration of effort upon them would be advan
tageous.
Thus, the advocated methodology would
consist of several steps:
a) the delineation of
important factors at work in the given problem by
way of subjective agreement, b) logical deductions
from the assumptions and premises established via
(a), c) empirical test of the consequences of the
logical process, d) expansion of the logical system
by establishing the results as a norm and noting the
alterations resulting from the inclusion of factors
originally held constant in ta).

The above process is applicable to SC IENCEgoc ial not
SCIENCEn a ^ur a2 , and it is believed by the writer that such
a method would obtain more productive results than are p re s 
ently evidenced.

Specifically, it would overcome many of the

difficulties inherent in the either-or orientation of either
induction or deduction.
Numerous variations may be used, as others have shown;
but if a "general theory" is the goal of the science of
management and organizations, strict empiricism appears
inadequate for the accomplishment of the desired end.

Only

an elaborate deductive-inductive system based on trans-perceptual truths, developed within a logically structured frame
work and checked by empirical fact can provide such a theory.

CHAPTER III
SYNTHESIS AND EXPANSION:

INQUIRIES INTO

VALUE JUDGMENTS AND ABSTRACTION
Vague and insignificant forms of speech, and abuse
of language, have so long passed for mysteries of
science; and hard or misapplied words with little
or no meaning have, by prescription, such a right
to be mistaken for deep learning and height of
speculation, that it will not be easy to persuade
either those who speak or those who hear them,
that they are but covers of ignorance and a hin
drance to true knowledge.
--John Locke
Chapter two dealt with various philosophical issues in
management and organizations; however, social theory possesses
another dimension which might be referred to as the "practical
plane."

At this level there exists certain communication

problems which result, in part, from the dynamic nature of
the subject matter itself.

Revolutionary changes have taken

place in the past three-quarters of a century.

The experi

ments of Frederick Taylor at Midvale Steel bear little
resemblance to the sophisticated systems analysis of today.
This increased complexity has all but created a crisis of
communication for students of management.

Just as Newton was

obliged to develop intergal calculus in order to explain grav
itation, management and organization theorists are confronted
with obsolete communicative concepts which prevent an adequate
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analysis of their subject.1

Although it is doubtful that

extensive modifications of the magnitude of N ewton’s are
necessary, one is inclined to suggest at least some funda
mental alterations in the dissemination of knowledge within
the field of management.
For this reason, it becomes necessary to examine a few
theoretical questions in order to grasp the full relationship
between general semantics and the philosophy of science.

But

first, for reasons that will become obvious later, the assump
tions of the chapter at hand must be made explicit.

They are:

1.

Science aims at the accomplishment of systematic
transperceptual knowledge.

2.

Science remains receptive to any suggestions that
meet its general criteria and offer improvements
over existing methods.

Recognizing these assumptions and the objectives of the presen+
chapter, the first step is to examine the nature of the lan
guage of science.
The Language of Science
Inseparably bound in epistemological questions is the

■^Stuart Chase, The Power of Words, Harcourt, Brace
and Company, New York, 195^, PP* 111-112.
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associated issue of language's relation to reality.

p

Science

cannot be content with the mere recognition that the symbolic
report of an experiment is a triadic alliance between object,
thought and symbol.

It has been the objective of the s c ie n 

tific enterprise to develop the most precise language p os s i
ble to facilitate
stands

the accuracy of its reports.

Mathematics

alone as the most successful of such attempts.

How

ever perfect it m a y be, mathematics itself faces limitations
which can be overcome only through the frequent use of less
perfect,

yet more expressive collections of symbols.

matics plus

Mathe

these expanded symbolic systems constitute the

language of science.
Basically,

this combination may be designated as a sub

set of any total language scheme, because it is more re st ric
tive than language in t o t o .

Figure 9 should aid in explaining

and illustrating this distinction.

As some philosophers argue,

scientific language is cognitive and performs

an informational

function, whereas non-scientific or humanistic language is
non-cognitive containing only an emotional a p p e a l .J

This

^Peter Winch, "Philosophical Bearings," in Maurice
Natanson, editor, Philosophy of the Social S c i e n c e s , Random
House, N e w York, 19t>3, p. 109.
^W. T. Jones, The Sciences and the H u m a n i t i e s . The
Univers ity of California Press, B er k el y , C alif., 1965,
pp. 152-153.
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Designative

[Humanistic

|... Commonsense

| Scientific

|

NOTE:
Diagram adapted from W. T, Jones, The Sciences
and the Humanities. University of California, Berkely, 1965,
“ 1537 ---------FIGURE 9
THE LANGUAGE OF SCIENCE

suggests a continuum ranging from highly scientific,

con

sisting primarily of designative symbols with a limited
number of expressive components,

to humanistic, containing

a relatively low percentage of descriptive elements and
numerous expressive ones.

In the middle is a compromise

or "commonsense" language where designative equals expres
sive elements.

The entire scale is language but only the

right side is the language of science.
For an example of this idea, examine the proposition;
"the organization reveals the dynamics of a budding flower.
This statement is emotive and non-cognitive.

Even the

expert scholar of organizations would be forced to call
freely upon imagination to grasp the significance of such
an assertion.

As a result, it would lie on the left-hand

portion of the scale where the extreme is typified by vague
terms displaying a propensity for beauty rather than utilit
Socrates via Plato in the Apology places the poets at this
extreme when he states:
They showed me in an instance
do poets write, but by a sort
tion.
They are like diviners
also say many fine things but
meaning of them,^

that not by wisdom
of genius and inspira
or soothsayers, who
do not understand the

^t-John G. Kememy, A Philosopher Looks at Science. D.
Van Nostrand Company, Trinceton, N. J. , 1 9 ^ , p. 7.
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Vague language is necessary to the poet, but it is not equally
valuable to the scientist.

The use of such a symbolic system

would reduce the logical precision of science to meaningless
rubble.
Alternatively, the proposition,

"the organization is

dynamic" falls more to the right-hand side of the continuum,
because it can be subjected to the tests of logic and observa
tion.

It seems that organizational dynamics is a function of

certain variables such as management and owner attitudes,
adaptability and longevity.

These factors may be tested

directly or elaborate ^x post examination of their effects
may be conducted.

Therefore, in spite of the fact that both

humanistic and scientific languages use identical symbolic
codes, the manner in which each uses it distinguishes them
as subsets of language proper.

Thus, the epistemological

arguments of the previous chapter require a specific type of
formulation which has itself become a source of controversy.
A Posteriori and A Priori Statements
Rational arguments are formulated in terms of "analyti
cal" statements.

These statements have a rather simple sub-

ject-predicate structure and for this reason are often
referred to as S-P sentences.

The distinguishing feature of

these formulations is that the predicate follows logically
from the definition of the subject so that the truth of the
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statement relies in no way upon experience.

cr

An example of

this type of proposition is:

"a business organization is a

collection of individuals."

By virtue of the customary usage

of the term "organization," the collection of individuals
characteristic could be assumed.

If the subject of the sen

tence were not a collection of individuals, it would not have
been labeled an organization.
On the other hand,

"synthetic" statements are those in

which the predicate is extraneous to the definition of the
subject.^

Take for example the proposition,

"Herzberg's

theory was confirmed by Z Corporation's experiment."

In

this case, there is no logically necessary connection between
Herzberg's theory and the Z Corporation's experiment.

The

relationship is an account of specific experience; and for
this reason, it might be labeled an empirical statement.
Thus, a statement may be si priori, in which case its truth
is not contingent on experience, or a posteriori whereupon
it i s .
Some would argue that analytical propositions only make
explicit those meanings that have been conveniently assigned

^Merle B. Turner, Philosophy and the Science of Behavior.
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1967, pp.- £9-50*
^Ibid.
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to words and symbols.

7

In short, no new knowledge is

expounded because the contents of the statements are known
prior to their formulation.

At best,

meanings explicit--never more.

they can make implicit

To this group, only theories

based on synthetic propositions and subject to empirical tests
have scientific significance.
The & priorists counter by asserting that the laws of
logic are more than rules in that they describe the structure
of the world.

Therefore, logical deduction does result in

new knowledge because it is the dynamic procedure of the
universe itself.

They see no methodological problems in

moving deductively from the known to the unknown, because
their procedure for doing so is the route along which reality
progresses.
Using a little imagination, one may recognize that the
arguments on the "practical plane" are essentially the same
as those in process at the "philosophical" level.
cal fundamental question must be answered:

The identi

Are the phenomena

of social affairs logical so as to make possible a purely
deductive social theory?

Certain theoretical conceputalizations,

^Arthur Pap, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science.
The Free Press, Glencoe, T i l . , 1962, p. 79 and SemantTcs and
Necessary T r u t h . Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn.,
195&, p. v.
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such as the theory of consumer behavior in microeconomics,
suggest an affirmative reply.

This theory, constructed upon

the relatively simple assumption of utility maximization,
diminishing marginal utility and the possibility of preference
ordering, has proved quite informative and theoretically valid.
These assumptions are essentially the ones used to develop the
rational choice model in chapter two which illustrates their
applicability to organization theory.

Therefore, in the

writer's opinion, analytical statements of a priori truths
can accomplish more than merely making the implicit, explicit.
The advisability of looking to these statements as the
foundation of all theories, however, is not to be implied from
the previous argument.

As was noted before, a strictly a

priori deductive theory of management and organizations faces
pragmatic limitations even if one insists upon its theoretical
and exhaustive validity.

This practical consideration is the

empirical bias of contemporary social science which seems to
establish the necessity of both synthetic and analytical state
ments in an academically acceptable theory.

Although premises

may be adequately formulated analytically, there is a practical
necessity for results to possess the multi-valued orientation
and flexibility typical of the synthetic form.

The presenta

tion of results, however, brings up a more fundamental ques
tion as to the nature of scientific meaning.
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Dimensions of Meaning
Figure I4. exposed the basic structure of meaning as a
triadic relationship;
several forms.

an association that may assume one of

For instance, the context within which a

symbol is used is likely to influence the relationships be
tween referent, thought and symbol.

It may be safely assumed

that the term "organizational conflict" reflects a different
meaning to the organization theorist and the departmental
supervisor.

For the former, it is an extremely interesting

social phenomenon that may at times be both functional and
dysfunctional.

For the latter, it is a headache requiring

excessive time and effort.

This type of variation is known

as "contextual" meaning.
There are various other types of meaning such as prag
matic, connotative and denotative, but one of the most trouble
some in management is simple semantic meaning.

This basically

is the relationship between an object and the symbol or word
used to describe it.

Urwick has exposed the magnitude of the

problem by noting twenty vague definitions of the word
g

"management" itself.

Although this problem is not unique

Q
Lyndall Urwick, "The Problem of Management Semantics."
California Management Review. Vol. II, No. 3 (Spring, I960),
p^ JH and "The Tactics of Jungle Warfare." Academy of Manage
ment Journal, Vol. VI, No.
(Dec., 1963), p. 3 ^ *
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0
Lyndall Urwick, "The Problem of Management Semantics "
California Management R eview. Vol. II, No. 3 (Spring, I960),
pT
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ment Journal, Vol. VI, No.
(Dec., 1963), p . 32^.
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to the social sciences, it is more acute in this area
9
because:
1.

Terms used in everyday conversation are the founda
tion terms of various social disciplines although
their "scientific meanings" are more respective.
Take for instance, the term "rationality" which,
when used in connection with organizations, means
more than social conformity.

2.

At times there are no observable referents to
which the terms refer.
An example of this is the
"hierarchy of needs." In spite of the fact that
no one ever has or ever will see such a phenomenon,
this "intangible referent" provides a vital and
perfectly valid link in the epistemology of orga
nizations .

3.

Often there are identifiable referents relative to
which agreement among qualified investigators is
common; yet, there is disagreement about specifying
a label to represent the phenomenon.
Although the
symbol "conflict" is a word used to describe a
phenomenon, there is controversy as to whether it
should be labeled functional or dysfunctional.
All words are subject to vagueness but some are more
subject than others.
The situation becomes quite
evident in the normative-positive or "is-ought"
controversy to be discussed later in the chapter.

These complications lead to the communication malfunc
tions because:
ideas in

9

a) men suppose their words

to be the marks of

the minds of other men and b) men suppose words to

Rollo Handy, Methodology of the Behavioral Science,
Charles C. Thomas, Publishers, Springfield, til., 196£,—
pp. 157-158.
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represent the reality of things.

10

Consequently, an academic

theorist may completely bypass a practitioner in the discussion
of functional effects of conflict if it is assumed that con
flict means the same to each party.

But what possible improve

ments do "scientific meanings" offer that provide a more accu
rate span of the triangle?
Little doubt exists as to a "relativity of m e a n i n g " ^
concerning any term.

However, there is a common base of

agreement upon which language is built and because of which
communication is possible.

This relatively small domain of
■jp

agreement may be called "communieatable invariance."

The

search for scientific meaning becomes a quest for this invar
iance.

But meaning is a psychological process and for this

reason the scientific meaningfulness of any event may, and
to a large extent is, predetermined by one's epistemological
perspective.

11

Previous association with the perspectives cf

■^John Locke, "Of Words," in Donald E. Hayden and E„
Paul Alworth, Classics in Semantics. Philosophical Library,
Inc., New York, 1965, p.
Anatol Rapoport, Operational Philosophy, Harper and
Brothers, Publishers, New York, 1953, P* 23*
12Ibid.
^^William P. McEwen, The Problem of Social-Scientific
Knowledge. The Bedminster Press, Totowa, Ne w Jersey, 19&3,
P. 63.
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extreme empiricism and extreme rationalism provides a justi
fication for limiting the discussion to these two areas,
although in reality a multitude of variations exist.
Essentially,
(epistemological)

it may be argued that one's perspective
is determined by three factors:1^"

1.

A person’s value-situation or the primary preferences
which motivate him.

2.

An individual's meaning-situation which consists of
the type of knowledge one considers to te acquirable.

3.

One's knowledge-situation relating to the method by
which one constructs knowledge and the criteria by
which it is verified.

The relativity of meaning created by these counter perspectives
underscores the previous arguments against an epistemological
dichotomy.

Methodological tolerance requires that one con

stantly reexamine his perspective to insure that his criticisms
originate from a concern for the validity of theory and not
from a dogmatic philosophical perspective that polarizes his
thinking.

Table

I reveals the nature of the perspectives of

the empiricists and rationalists which, in the absence of
compromise, insure the impossibility of mutually agreeable
knowledge and the objective evaluation of evidence which is
the fundamental requirement of all science.
In spite of the need for tolerance, one philosophy of

-^Ibid.

TABLE I

THE RELATIVITY OR EPISTEMOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

Rationalists

Empiricists

Value-Situation

Desire for clear and
distinct knowledge which
is absolutely true.

Indisputable information
about factual events with
out reference to an a
priori system.

Meaning-Situation

A priori system of ’
uni
versal truths not depen
dent upon perception.

Quantitatively analyzed
sense perception of par
ticular events.

Knowledge-Situation

Formal logical deduction
from a priori axioms
requiring consistency.

Inductive inferences from
observations which are
verified by experimental
test under controlled
conditions.

NOTE:

William P. McEwen, The Problem of Sec Lai-Scientific Knowledge,
The Bedminster Press, Totowa, New j e/sev,- I56TT"PE^ ^3-7 ^
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scientific meaning has developed that would completely reject
rational analysis and label it as scientifically meaningless.
This idea, conceived by Bridgman in The Logic of Modern Physi c s .
is known as operationalism.
Operationalism
Many definitions of operationalism have been advanced,
but basically they all seem to say "the proper definition of
a concept is . . .

in terms of actual operations, thus

denying that any assertion has meaning if the operations
involved in accomplishing it cannot be defined."*^

The simi

larity between operationalism and Comte's scientism hardly
requires el aboration.^

Epistemologically, it may be said

that operationalism is ultra-empiricism of the highest order„
An extensionally oriented concept such as this identifies the
operations of verification with a definition of the process.
It attempts to separate the observations of the P-field from
the "imagined concepts" of the C-field (terms developed in
previous chapter).

17

See Fritz Machlup, "Operationalism and Pure Theory in
Economics," in Sherman Roy Krupp, editor, The Structure of
Economic Science, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey, I960, p. 55, P. W. Bridgman, The Logic of Modern
Physics. the Macmillian Company, New Y o r k , 1927, p . 30 and
Chase, op. cit., pp. 118-119.
•^Gordon w. Allport, Becoming. Yale University Press,
New Haven, Conn., 1955, p. 11.
^Ma c hl u p,

ojd.

cit. . p. $6,
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Few would deny the contributions

this type of analysis

has made in physics and other physical sciences.
inclined to question, however,

One is

the advisability of such a

method in the social disciplines.

Because of problems of

replication in management and organizations,

the theorist

faces an extremely difficult

task in bridging the gap be18
tween the theoretical and operational languages.
In fact,

as the writer views it,

to insist upon strict operationalism

would in effect reject as utterly impossible anything tha+
approaches

a science in the social sphere.

Obviously, other

writers have entertained the same notion and as a result
efforts have been made to redefine operationalism in terms of
degrees.

The definition above describes

"narrow operationalism"

to which an alternative position has been advocated in the form
of "broader operationalism."

"realistic alternative" is
1Q
founded upon five salient principles.
They are: 7
1.

This

For a belief to be a knowledge claim, it must be
stated so that its implications may be communicated
in ways that can be tested by logical reasoning and
observable evidence.

1O
H. M. Blalock, Jr., "Theory, Measurement and R e p l i 
cation in Social Sciences," The American Journal of Sociol
Vol. LXVI, No. ^ (Jan., 1 9 6 l T ^ p . 3
•^McEwen,

ojd.

cit., pp.

92, 102-125.
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2.

A verifiable knowledge claim must be confirmed in
accordance with a justified criteria before the
assertion becomes genuine operational knowledge.

3.

Regardless of how firmly established a theory may
be, it remains operational only so long as those
who subscribe to it "keep the door open" to further
inquiry that might necessitate reexamination of the
theory.

I4..

Operationalism requires that empirical testing be
regulated by conceptual principles.
For any discipline to be operational, it must c o n 
sider the limitations of the subject matter in
order to determine for its own mode of analysis;
a) what observational techniques are applicable
and b) what testing techniques are acceptable for
refuting theories and therefore for making predic
tions .

Only within the framework of "broader operationalism"
is it possible to scientifically acknowledge social reality.
Although extreme extensional orientation has certainly reduced
communicative difficulties

in some areas, its social science

counterpart, narrow operationalism, would likely create a
"scientific void" in the understanding of management and
organizations.

Obviously,

this type of analysis would aline

itself with pure behaviorism and forfeit the psychic under
standing of the meaning of an action to an "actor" which the
study of management seeks to discover.

Thus, broader o p e r a 

tionalism seems a worthy goal for management and organiza
tion theory.

This position lacks dogmatism, yet, it places

upon the scholars of the field scientific responsibilities
such as the establishment of a "justified criteria" for the
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acceptance of knowledge.

Attention to these matters could

encourage a "management m e t h o d s t r e i t which would require
a thorough examination of management methodology.

Such a

debate could hardly establish once and for all the proper
methods of the social sciences, but it might make explicit
professionally recognized criteria for confirmation.

This

is precisely why management and organization theory needs
to examine its methods.

Methodology fulfills a most impor

tant function in promoting mutual understanding among social
scientists.
standing;

The power of any argument rests upon this under

and when the foundations are too weak, it is the

argument of power that triumphs.

21

Normative and Positive Theory:

An Issue of

Morality and Abstraction
The argument of power exposes an important methodo
logical issue not yet discussed.

This controversy deals with

the proper place of value judgments in the study of manage
ment and organizations.

Before going further, however, a

definition of terms is in order.

A positive science may be

pn

Methodstreit refers to a methodological debate that
took place in the last half of the previous century between
the Austrian and German Historical Schools of Economics.
^ F e l i x Kaufmann, Me tho do logy of the Soci al Sci ences .
The Humanities Press, New York, 195>B"7 p. 2i4.l1.-
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defined as a body of systematized knowledge concerning "what
is"; a normative science relates to "what ought" to be.

The

object of a positive science is the discovery of uniformities,
while the objective of a normative science is the establishment of ideals.

22

Therefore, the problem of value judgments and science
assumes at least a two dimensional relationship.

Dimension

one is morality and questions the justice of casting of one's
values on others.

The second dimension is communication which

examines the abstract nature of judgments of value and their
effect on the communicative process.
Primary argumentation has been formulated around the
first dimension with the positivists taking the position that
science is and must be Wertfreiheit or value free.
two reasons for this conclusion.

They give

The first simply states

that it is futile to approach social facts with the attitude
23
of a censor who either approves or disapproves of an event.

pp
^ J o h n Neville Keynes, The Scope and Method of Polltical
Economy. l+th ed., Kelley and Mi11man, Inc., New~York, 1955,
p p . 314.-35 and Royall Brandis, "Value Judgments and Economic
Science," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Business, Vol.
Ill, No. 2 (Summer, 19t>3), pp.
^^Ludwig Von Mises, Human Action. Yale University Press,
New Haven, Conn., 1914-9, p. 2.
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are a n e c e s s a r y p a r t of a n y s c i e n c e

Fundamentally,

a science

that
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a gu i d e

to w h a t his
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to a r g u e

that

the s o c i a l d i s c i p l i n e u p o n the se
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values

s a t i s f y this

it is

need.

the c o n c e n t r a 

desired

ends

that

2*W. Zajdlic, "The Limitations of Social Sciences,"
K y k l o s , Vol. IX, No. 1 (1956), p. 70.
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will provide the unification of all social sciences.

26

It

may be seen from this that the essential disagreement results
from what each group views as the object of science;

is it

means and ends or is it means given the ends?
On Means and Ends
Koopmans states that disagreements in economics and
other social sciences can be traced to one or all of the
following . ^
1.

Disagreement about social objectives.

2.

Argumentation concerning observed facts.

3.

Failure to observe the rules of logic.

This section will argue that only the last two disagree
ments can be solved within the framework of science.

The

first is an axiological question that must be determined
by each individual's scale of preference.
The relationship between means and ends, science and
values is best illustrated by the following passage from
Alice in Wonderland.

pi■
Theo Suranyi-Unger, "Facts and Ends in Economics,"
The Economic Journal. Vol. XLIX, No. 193 (March, 1939),
p. 1 2 .
^ O s c a r Lange, "The Scope and Method of Economics,"
The Review of Economic Studies. Vol. XIII, No. 3 (191^519ZJ-6 ), pp. 2 £-2 3 .
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Alice asked,
"Would you tell me please, which way I ought to
go from here?"
"That depends a great deal on where you are trying
to get to,"
said the cat.
It seems, at least to this writer,

that the cat quite ade

quately assumes the role of the scientist.

It can never be

the task of science to provide binding norms and ideals
from which directives for immediate activity may be d e r i v e d . ^8
More explicitly,

it is the province of science to show,

through description of real and hypothetical events, what
would be the results of proposed lines of action or what
29
lines of action would produce certain events.
Science
deals with means and merely accepts

the ends as given.

Debate may take place only with respect to means relative
to ends.

Science can offer the most expedient means

to an

end or it can argue that a means chosen m ay lead to effects
incompatible with the explicit goals, but the validity of
the end itself escapes

the domain of logic.

Perhaps a hypothetical macro illustration will help
explain the distinction.

Suppose that the political party

pQ
Max Weber, "Objectivity in Social Science and Social
Policy," in Natanson, oja. c i t . . pp. 358-360.
29
Prank Knight, Freedom and R e f o r m : Ess ays in Economi cs
and Social Philosophy. Harper and Brothers” Publishers. N e w
York, 19^7, p. 2I4.3 .
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in p o w e r in a c e rt ain c o u n t r y desires h i gh er l i v i n g standards
for all its pop ulation.
tive it elects

In order to ac co m p l i s h this o b j e c 

to n a t i o n a l i z e all do m e s t i c industry.

Eco no mi c

and p o l i t i c a l sci en ce m a y be able to s y s t e m a t i c a l l y determi ne
that n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of i n d us tr y will not a c c o m p l i s h the
st at e d obj ective or that it will r e s u l t in consequences
p a tib le wi t h h i g h e r l i v i n g standards.

However,

can s a y n o th ing abo ut the end itself.

This

incom

these sciences

is a qu e s t i o n that

only p ol itica l and social p h i l o s o p h y m a y discuss

alt h o u g h even

these areas are not l i ke ly to r e a c h a u n i v e r s a l l y a cc ep ta ble
solution.

As A l b e r t E i n s t e i n stated in R e l a t i v i t y --A Richer

T r u t h , "for the s ci en ti st
no valuing,

no good,

there is o n l y being,

no evil,

of the fact that this appears
quite different.

in short, no g o a l . "
a bit amoral

This s i mply ill ustrates

qua scie nti st's p u r p o s e is
attitude does not r e q ui re
r e je ct e v e r y t h i n g mor al ,

that the scie nt is t

the s e a r c h for truth.

but it does

e f f e c t i v e l y separate

i d e n t i t y and thus

is no contradict ion .

all

science

questions

in that it establis hes
are open.

S u c h an

that the sc ie n t i s t qua individual

two s e par at e entities.

cedes

In spite

its m e a n i n g is

science and m o r a l i t y as
there

but no wishing,

Answers

sou ght on the basis of one's

the ends

There

is no

M o ralit y p r e 
about w h i c h

to these questions m u s t be

f a i t h and convictions,

not

t h ro ug h the use of sc ie n t i f i c and theoretical experimenta tio n.
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As Weber points out, ’’the social scientist should confine
himself to means while only the philosophers should lay bare
the meaning of evaluations."^
No doubt by this time the reader has noted a fundamental
difference between the political and social scientist and the
business manager.

Whereas the scientist has no "right" to

create the values or ends toward the attainment of which
science must strive, it may be argued convincingly that the
business manager can create these ends.

Within the pri

vately owned firm the managerial function of planning does,
in fact, do exactly this.

In short, the administrator via

planning creates the ends toward which the organization will
move.
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Professor Simon explicitly argues this proposition

in the following passage:
Factual propositions are statements about the obser
vable world which can, in principle, be tested to
determine whether they are true or false.
Decisions
are more than factual propositions.
They select one
future state of affairs in preference to all others
and direct behavior toward it.
In other words, they
contain ethical as well as factual elements.
To

3^Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, translators and
editors, Max Weber On the Methodology of the Social Sciences.
The Free Press, Glencoe, ill., 19^97 PP* IB-19.
3^-See Richard F. Barton, "Reality and Business Policy
Decisions." Academy of Management Journal. Vol. IX, No. 2
(June, 1 9o6), pp. 117-^1 2 2 .
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determine whether a proposition is correct it must
be compared with fact or lead via logical reasoning
to propositions which are empirically testable.
But ethical propositions cannot be derived by rea
soning from factual ones, nor car they be compared
with fact.32
Within the capitalistic system, the manager-administrator
may "create the values" for his organization within broadly
defined limits.

However, the organization theorist qua

researcher qua scientist does not enjoy the same privilege.
Instead, he occupies a position much more similar to the
political and social scientist.
dictate the objectives
work.

In theorizing he cannot

toward which organizations should

The work of the theorist begins after the business

managers, educational institution presidents or religious
leaders state their objectives.

Then and only then can the

scientist of organizations formulate the most effective
means for accomplishing the proposed goals.
Unfortunately,

the literature of management and organi

zations does not stand witness that theorists have always
assumed the role of the scientist as opposed to the reformer.
Classical theory was not so much interested in how organiza
tions actually worked as in developing a body of maxims which,

-^Herbert A. Simon, Adminis trative Behavior. 2nd e d . ,
The Macmillian Company, New Y o r k , 1957, pp. i+5-U.o.

11+3
if adhered to, would secure maximum efficiency.
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To Taylor

and his followers scientific management assumed an almost
religious overtone as evidenced by his reference to soldiering
)
as the "greatest evil" facing America and England.
Gantt
n

also preached of "lower moral tones" resulting from inequalities between work and pay.
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Human relations was no less

guilty of this false identification since it also "preached"
the virtues of the efficiency objective.
Contemporary periods have witnessed equally "moralistic"
attempts to decide what the objectives of business should be.
Perhaps the most pervasive of these deals with the social
responsibility of private firms.

The normative philosophy

upon which this idea is based is illustrated in the following
statement by Gantt.
The business system must accept its social responsi
bility and devote itself primarily to service, or
the community will take it over and operate it in
its own interest.36

^ R e n a t e Mayntz, "The Study of Organizations," Current
Sociology. Vol. XIII, No. 3 (1961+) , p. 96.
^ F r e d e r i c k W. Tayl or , The P rin ci pl es of S c i e n t i f i c
M a n a g e m e n t . H a r p e r and B r o t h e r s . P u b l i s h e r s . N e w York.

19237 PP. 12-11+.
35Henry L. Gantt, W o r k . Wages and Profits. 2nd e d . ,
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1913, pp. 67-6o.
-^Henry l . Gantt, Organizing for W o r k . George Allen
and Unwin, Ltd., London, 1^19, p7 l£~.
(Underlines added.)
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Sheldon voices a similar position as follows:
It is important, therefore, that early in our con
sideration of management in industry to insist that
however scientific management may become and how
ever much the full development of its powers may
depend on the use of the scientific method, its
primary responsibility is social and communal.37
At another point he argues that "management must substitute
cooperation for competition in the building of a more ideal
s o c i e t y . "3®

However, ideals are a function of the dreamer

and in this case Sheldon made no effort to explain what an
"ideal society" was so that others might compare their
conceptualization and intelligently agree or dissent.
Therefore, this "ideal society" is far from a scientific
concept; it is an opinion, an opinion which is perfectly
acceptable but not a universally applicable objective of
all men.

No doubt this cooperative ideal would be a night

mare to the competitive free enterpriser.
Thus, it becomes possible to appreciate the unusual
circumstance of the management and organization theorist.
The objectivity of science does not require that these
individuals have no values or opinions relative to the
proper ends of organizations and society as a whole.

It

■^Oliver Sheldon, The Philosophy of Management. Sir
Isaac Pitmann and Son, Ltd., iJew York, 1930, P» x i . (Under
line added.)
Ibid., p. 70,
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does require, however, that statements of scientific signifi
cance be explicitly separated from propositions of value and
opinion.

No method of science can prove that the objective

of business operations "should" be social betterment just as
there is nothing to say it "should" be profit maximization.
These "shoulds" become meaningful only after the ultimate
objective is made explicit and meaningfulness is accomplished
only within the framework of the given end.
The normative concept is manipulative in character since
it proposes to influence b e h a v i o r . ^

Positive science, on

the other hand, attempts only to explain and describe--never
to reform.

Any workable normative theory can evolve if and

only if 1 ) the goals of the organization are explicitly
determined, 2 ) tentative optimal rules are formulated, 3 )the
rules are tested in real situations and U.) they are revised
and retested to insure wor ka b i l i t y . ^

Ironically, if this

is done the theory is no longer normative but positive
because it makes no reference to ends, only to means with
respect to stated ends.
Finally, a seeming paradox must be satisfied before

39j0n e s , o£. cit.. p. 160.
^■°Avery B. Cohen, "The Theory of Firm:
A View on Method
ology." Journal of Business. Vol. XXXVI. No. 3 (July, 1963),
pp. 323-35IT
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moving to the next topic.

The proposition is simply this:

why is not the advocation of a positive approach to organi
zations itself a normative judgment?

A few moment of reflec

tion will now make it obvious why the two assumptions at the
first of the chapter were necessary.

At that point it was

assumed that the objectives of science were the accomplish
ment of systematic knowledge and the constant reevaluation
of its methods in a search for improvement.

The argument

in favor of a positive approach is, therefore, an advocation
of the more proper mean to be used in accomplishing the
stated ends of science.

A positive approach is a means to

an end, not an end itself and is, therefore, not a judgment
of value and not a normative assertion.
But when do judgments of value begin?

Is it not possi

ble to argue that selective perception itself is the result
of value orientation?

The discussion of this issue is the

objective of the following section.
Judgments of Relevance and Judgments of Value
Two distinct schools of thought have emerged in the
social sciences relative to the value-centric predicament.^
One group, that may be labeled the absolute skeptics, claims

^ M cE w e n , 0£. cit. , pp.

1U7
that the social-scientific enterprise can never achieve
objective knowledge because the personal preferences and
socio-cultural environment of the investigator predetermines
one's results.

However, internal inconsistencies become

immediately evident in this assertion.

Initially, one is

inclined to ask how these critics manage to escape their
own condemnations.

In other words, if their argument be

valid then their distrust of social knowledge must be nothing
more than a product of their predetermined environmental prej
udice.^

It may also be noted that this skepticism would

necessarily deny any type of scientific knowledge either
physical or social since a large part of the natural scien
tist's work is also subject to errors of selective perception.
An alternative position, known as modified skepticism,
recognizes that scientists entertain social preferences which
I O

account for their interest in specific problems.

However,

this does not deny the possibility of objective knowledge of
social phenomena as can be noted by reference to Table I .

^ 2 Ibid.
^ J . A. Passmore, "Can the Social Sciences be ValueFree?," in Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck, editors, Readings
in the Philosophy of Science, Appleton-Century-Crofts, IncT,
iTew York" 1953, p.~T»7^ and Morris R. Cohen, Reason and Nature,
2nd e d . , The Free Press, Publishers, Glencoe, 111. ,
p. 8l.
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Fundamentally,
developed for
k n o w n as

both groups

argue

a cquiring and verifying

the k n o w l e d g e - s i t u a t i o n

empiricism and rationalism.
m e a n i n g - s i t u a t i o n that
value-situation.
search for
wa y s

of

finally

truth w h i c h leads

are

skeptics

contend

is so d e c i d e d . ^

Thus,

the m e t h o d s

of s c i e n c e

acceptable.

However,

in this m a n n e r
share
But,
the

is
are

if

s u c h forms

as

to s o m e

the s c i e n t i s t

him

to e x a m i n e

is

various

(meaning-situation)

in h i s

research

the

an d

(knowledge-

the p o s s i b i l i t y o f o b j e c t i v e

introduced.

the k n o w l e d g e - s i t u a t i o n

who

objective

the k n o w l e d g e - s i t u a t i o n is

the m o d i f i e d
that

v a l u e - s i t u a t i o n of

question of

are

in t u r n f r o m an i n d i v i d u a l ' s

to an i s s u e r e g a r d i n g

influences

assume

Each method relates

to a p p l y a s e l e c t e d m e t h o d
Th e

approaches

information w h i c h become

an d m a y

is d e r i v e d

a c c o m p l i s h i n g this

truth reduces

that

The

objective

situation).

tural

tha t v a r i o u s

the p o i n t

The

absolute

culturally

that
the

it is

of

invalidated

ar g u e

the m e a n i n g - s i t u a t i o n

the

ca n be seen;

if

environment,

all

and non - u n i v e r s a l l y

the m e a n i n g - s i t u a t i o n

tr ue k n o w l e d g e

skeptics

determined while

difference

a product

at w h i c h c u l 

is p o s s i b l e ,

is d e t e r m i n e d

at l e a s t

to

tho se

an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e .
there

is m o r e

i m putation of values

^McEwen,

l o c . ci t .

to

the

in t o

value-centric
the

final

predicament

product

th an

of s c i e n c e .

Epistemological perspectives determine to some extent what
elements of objective events management theorists will
abstract as meaningful.

It is precisely for this reason

that Talcott Parsons calls science "a selective system of
cognitive orientations to r e a l i t y . " ^
is deliberate,

When the selection

"slanting"^ occurs; but slanting and the

selective system of science are two fundamentally different
processes.

The selective perceptual system is unconscious;

slanting is not.

Slanting involves a deliberate attempt to

deceive, whereas unconscious selective perception has no
such objective.

Logical intuition confirms the impossibility

of determining in advance the importance of a given factor in
a complex situation, thus making judgments of relevance an
In

absolute necessity.

In this sense all knowledge of society

or nature is knowledge obtained from a particular viewpoint
and is subjective.

It does not follow from this that research

^ E r n e s t Dale, "The Functional Approach to Management,"
in Harold Koontz, editor, Toward A Unified Theory of Management, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. , 1%L|., p. 22.
^ S e e S. I. Hayakawa, Language in Thought and Action.
2nd ed., Harcourt, Brace and World, Trie., Chicago, 196i;,
p. I4.8 and Fritz J. Roethlisberger, in Koontz, op. cit., pp.
58-59.
^ F r i t z Machlup, "Are the Social Sciences Really Inferior
in Natanson, 0£. cit., pp. 165-166 and Simon, o£. cit. . p. $1.
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in the social sciences can result in knowledge that is valid
for one person and not for a n o t h e r . ^
Individual hopes and social ideals can be kept from
coloring the results of research through the self-correcting
k9
mechanism of the scientific attitude.^

It must be noted

that all the projects of the physical sciences past and
present have not been independent of the values of man, yet
objectivity has been maintained.

Such universal agreement

is unlikely in social areas but even in this domain the
fundamental tenet of those who believe in scientific dis
cussion is that matters of fact and logic can be agreed upon
by competent men of good will.

50

By choosing to pursue scien

tific inquiry, the scientist enters the "corpus of science"
and by doing so is obligated to accept what is considered to
be established knowledge or show cause why he cannot do so.

51

Thus, it is not the degree of intentional or subconscious
bias that determines the validity of a theory.

This can be

determined only through the rigor of discursive reasoning and

^ 8Shils and Finch, o£. cit., pp. 8l-8l^.
^ E r n e s t Nagel, "Problems of Concept and Theory Formation
in the Social Sciences," in Natanson, o£. cit. . pp. 199-200.
^ G e o r g e Stigler, The Theory of Price. The Macmillian
Company, New York, 192+6, pp. 15-16.
^ A l f r e d Schultz, "Common Sense and Scientific Interpre
tation of Human Action," in Natanson, o£. c it.. p. 337.
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empirical teat.

Theories and principles are not easily formu

lated in the scientific community;

first they must be scruti-

nized and debated prior to their acceptance or rejection.

52

The objectivity of science arises, not because the individual
is impartial, but because he is subject to constant test by
impersonal and skeptical scientific colleagues and methods.

53

The "obligations" of scientific skepticism to insure
objectivity is not entirely free from error because all me n
are not scientists.

Students of management and organizations

are often tempted to unquestionably accept the word of influ
ential writers in the area.
to empirical and
do no harm.

logical

However,

If research findings were limited

facts such a "blind acceptance" would

astwo writers

ture of factual findings

and values

literature of organizations

clearly

state,

"the m i x 

is so prevalent in the

that it is often extraordinarily

difficult to distinguish between the t w o . " ^

It can hardly

be denied that few theorists have openly welcomed and encour
aged skepticism to the degree evidenced by Professors Simon,

Joseph J.
Science, Vol. V,

Schwab, "What Do Scientists Do," Behavioral
No. 1
(Jan., I960), p. 13.

^3joan Robinson. Economic P h i l o s o p h y . Aldine Publishing
Company, Chicago, 1962" p^ 23•
^ H e r b e r t G. Hicks and Friedhelm Gronzy, "On Methodology
in the Study of Management and Organizations," Academy of
Management J o u r n a l . Vol. X, No. i;. (Dec., 1 9 & 7 ), p. 381 •
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S m i t h b u r g and Thom pso n in the fol l ow in g q u otat io n from the
in t r o d u c t o r y sec ti on of Public A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ;
We encoura ge in the rea der a critical attitude
toward evidence.
In s t ati ng generali zat ions about
ad m i n i s t r a t i o n we ha ve tried to present the evidence
on w h i c h these ge neral iza tions are based, where e v i 
dence exists . . . we hope the reader will apply the
same standards of rigor to our un p r o v e d g e n e r a l i z a 
tions that we have a p pl ied to these gen eralizations
of others . , . and will join the great task of s u b 
stitut in g fact for fa n c y and repl ace ambiguous p r o v 
erb-like w i sd om w i t h valid pro positions wh i c h will
me e t the tests of r e as on and e x p e r i e n c e .55
What a m o s t r e f r e s h i n g statement
tivist.

this

It mu s t be conceded, however,

is to an attentive p o s i 
that it is not

m e n t of judgment per se that is dangerous because

the e l e 

clearly;

. . .
if behavioral kn ow l e d g e is not dis ciplined
by values about w h i c h considerable consensus has
developed, s o me bo dy will use that knowled ge to
di sci pline all m e n in organizations with ou t their
k n o w l e d g e .5°
The danger exists w i t h respe ct
and value as well as the failure
rate

identity.

to the c on fu si on of fact

to make explic it

their s e p a 

Miss R o b i n s o n ’s d e s c r i p t i o n of economics

"limping along wi t h one foot in un t e s t e d hypotheses
other in m e t a p h y s i c a l s l o g a n s m i g h t

as

and the

appl y equally well

to

5 5ner be rt A. Simon, D o n a l d W. S m i t h b u r g and Victor
Thompson, Public Ad mi ni strat io n, Alf red A. Knopf, New York,

1950, P . vTir.-----------------5^R obe rt T. G o l e m b i e w s k i , M e n , M a n a g e m e n t and Morali
M c G r a w - H i l l Book Company, N e w Y o r k , 19657 P* 3*

^R obi nso n, o£. cit. . p. 25-
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management.

Positive theory is a sign of the maturity of

science and as a science progresses, its prescriptive elements
tend to become less frequent.

56

Therefore, let there be judg

ments both of relevance and value.

For the judgments of rele

vance may be scientifically debated, and any scientist who
objects either to the inclusion or exclusion of a given ele
ment may attack the theory on that basis.

It is left to him

to prepare his argument and present his case.

The scientific

community may then experimentally and logically test the
validity of his claims.

Thus, judgments of relevance are

scientifically determinant and debatable constituting no
serious problem to science.
The same cannot be said of judgments of value.

The

only expedient means of reducing problems arising from a
mixture of fact and value is the "rule of explicit statement."
This rule does not require that values be excluded from the
study of management and organizations, but it does insist
that a difference be made between scientific fact and axiological prescription.

Compliance with this rule would alleviate

the question of morality because the acceptance or rejection
of the writer’s values becomes the choice of the reader.

^ R o l l i n H. Simonds, "Toward A Science of Business
Administration," Academy of Management Journal. Vol. II,
No. 2 (Aug., 1959), p. 1377
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However, even explicit statements of judgment,

if they are

in vague forms, will not solve the communicative problems
except to the extent that the terms are less ambiguous by
virtue of their reference to a specific system of axiological
cro
rules.
The explanation of the nature of this problem re
quires the use of a rather specialized technique.
The Structural Differential
The report of scientific fact is an abstraction, not
the objective occurrence itself.

Although a scientific report

is the most accurate of verbal and symbolic descriptions, it
never accomplishes complete perfection.

Such a description

is often referred to as an observation which concentrates on
denotative meanings.

60

Denotative meanings are those

emphasizing word-object relationships that can be checked
with reference to tangible reality.

Note, however,

that

even this is an abstraction because facts either exist or
do not exist--truth and falsity are meaningless relative to
them.

Observations on the other hand, may be true or false

depending on how well they coincide with the objective event.

Kaufmann, o p . ci t. , p. 200.
^ D a v i d K. Berio, The Process of Communication. Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, New York, 196"57
221.
61Ibid., pp. 218-219.
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Regardless of this inaccuracy, observations are associated
with lower levels of abstraction.
Statements made on the basis of observations are known
as inferences and assert characteristics about the unknown on
the basis of the known.

For instance, suppose it has been

observed that closely arranged work areas in steel plants
promote group dissention.

To establish a general rule of

plant layout on the basis of this observation is to infer
that the results of the experiment are broadly applicable
to yet unknown situations.
this scheme?

But how do judgments fit into

Are they observations or inferences?

Judgments are a special type of inference.

Unlike

observations they emphasize connotative or emotive meanings.^
Thus, judgments have no referent in objective reality.
specifically,

More

judgments express approval or disapproval and

take place at any level of abstraction above observation.
When one expresses approval or disapproval the judgment is
made on the basis of what is observed rather than the event
or process that actually happens.

Therefore, judgments lie

within an abstraction range of greater than observation but

fi2Hayakawa, oj>. c i t ., p. I4.I.
k^Pap, An Introduction to the Philosophy of S cience. o p ,
cit. , p. 1 0 .
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less than infinite inference.

The degree to which judgments

are based on the actual characteristics of a phenomenon is
simply a function of the level of abstraction at which they
take place.

Generally speaking, the higher the abstraction

the greater the "propensity for communicative difficulties."
*By use of a certain tool, Korzybski's structural differ
ential, the nature of this type of problem in management and
organizations may be illustrated.

Referring to Figure 10 the

communicative problem of value judgments is noted.

The large

triangle at the bottom of the page represents the actual pro
cess or event.

In this case it is the managerial concept of

human relations.

The numbers on the right and left refer

respectively to the conceptual advantages and disadvantages
of this approach.

The characteristics indexed are as follows:
Advantages

Disadvantages
1.
2.
3.
Ij..
5.
6.

Country-club atmosphere
Excessive record work
High benefit cost
Reduced efficiency
Lack of discipline
Etc.

1.
2.
3.
i|.
5.
6.

Job satisfaction
Employee-employer relations
Low labor turnover
Individual creativity
Productivity
Etc.

Briefly, this is a list of some of the advocated pros and cons
of human relations.

It is certainly not exhaustive because

of the writer's abstraction process resulting from limited
academic and practical exposure to the concept.

For this rea

son, along with the fact that all is never known concerning an
actual event, the etc. is included as the final factor in
each group.
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o o

INFINITY

o

EXPERIENCE

EDUCATION

EVENT

FIGURE 10
THE STRUCTURAL DIFFERENTIAL
(Human Relations Approach)

1*8

Hypothetically, the circle above the triangle represents
a researcher's image of the objective concept after he has
completed the necessary training as a foundation for his
research.

The lines running from the triangle to the circle

illustrate the characteristics retained after education and
individual thought concerning the subject.

Thus, the re

searcher via his preparation is separated from the concept
so that only the following characteristics remain as his
idea of the human relations approach.
Advantages

Disadvantages
1.
2.
3.
5.
6.

Country-club atmosphere
Excessive record work
High benefit cost
Lack of discipline
Etc.

1.
2.
3.
5.
6.

Job satisfaction
Employee-employer relations
Low labor turnover
Productivity
Etc.

Further experience in research and prolonged exposure to
the human relations idea results in the abstraction of addi
tional elements from the concept.

This situation is illus

trated by the rectangle above the circle.

The lines con

necting the two once again illustrate the fact that charac
teristics are "lost" in the process of abstracting.

For

purposes of illustration assume that only the following char
acteristics remain at level three.
Disadvantages
2. Excessive record work
3 . High benefit cost
6 . Etc.

Advantages
2.
3.
5.
6.

Employee-employer relations
Low labor turnover
Productivity
Etc.
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Based on this, suppose that the researcher-teacher judges
that the advantages of productivity, low turnover and favor
able employee-employer relations outweigh the disadvantages
of excessive record work and high benefit costs.

With refer

ence to this evaluation the human relations approach is de
clared to be "good.”

In doing so no reference is made to

the fact that such an assertion is opinion based on a few
uniquely abstracted characteristics of the concept

toto.

In other words, the judgment is made on the basis of a finite
number of characteristics abstracted from an infinite set of
all the qualities the concept possesses.
the danger enters.

It is at this point

To the unsuspecting student, human rela

tions is depicted as good;

thus, solving one problem and

freeing time to concentrate on others.

Relative to human

relations the thought process is stopped save for only the
most ambitious s c h o l a r s . ^

In reaching this "conclusion"

there is little or no further searching for truth and possi
bly even a blindness to any contrary conditions that might
develop.

Little might the pupil know of human relations, yet,

to him it is "good."

The point to be made is that "good" is

defined only in terms of the judge himself.

^ H a y a k a w a , o£. cit. . p. ij.6 .
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The student qua business practitioner novice, upon
accepting a job with a small firm, may find to his surprise
that the human relations approach is "bad."
his boss says it isJ

Why?

Because

The boss has abstracted high benefit

costs as a characteristic he cannot tolerate.

Obviously,

the boss has selected another group of qualities from the
infinite set and assigned subjective weights to them.

Once

again it is emphasized that judgments are made on the basis
of dominant characteristics and subjective weights, not
relative to objective occurrences.
The example developed was selected for illustrative
purposes only.

Judgments could have taken place at other

levels, as indicated by the infinity sign in the highest
level, and any management concept could have been selected.
Many complications such as a "dynamic expansion" of the
entire structural differential resulting in new character
istics at various levels were obviously neglected for pur
poses of simplicity.

But the point would have been the

same, the only difference being that the higher the abstrac
tion level at which judgment takes place, the fewer will be
the actual characteristics of the phenomenon upon which it
is based.
An explicit proclamation that one's judgments are merely
opinion, not empirical fact,

can aid in reducing the communi-

cative as well as moral problems of value judgments.

»

By
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explicit acknowledgment of opinion the thought process of
the student is not hindered and may even be stimulated
because the door remains open to examination and concept
formation.

If, however, the door remains open to thought

one might ask why so much disagreement exists relative to
the various methodological issues discussed to this point.
One reason, as mentioned before, is simply that the door
has not always been open and in addition the subject matter
of the social disciplines display a uniqueness not typical
of physical processes.

But the fundamental reason, it must

be conceded, is that the lack of sophistication in the
social sciences has left the meaning-situation of the indi
vidual more subject to the emotional influences of matura
tion and socialization.

In other words, the social scien

tist faces a greater task in achieving objectivity, although
to do so is by no means impossible, because many of the issues
he must examine contribute to his personal development and the
formation of his "self concept."
The Psychology of Self-Projection
There is little doubt that many of man's ideas and values
result from the influence of the e n v i r o n m e n t . ^

in fact,

^ S t u a r t Chase, The Proper Study of M a n k i n d , Revised e d . ,
Harper and Brothers, Publishers, New York, 19^6, p. 6.
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students of human behavior view the emergence of the "self”
and the activities of experiencing as a dynamic developmental
process beginning at birth and continuing throughout life.

66

According to this view, experiencing today is a function of
funded information or background (B) which structures percep
tion and establishes a meaningful foreground (F) to be eval67
uated before becoming genuine experience ( E). '
cally,

Mathemati

this proposition m a y be stated as
E = f ( F ,B)

so that E changes

in some relation to changes in F and B.

The process is said to be dynamic because E^ in time t-^
becomes part of the background to structure
tion in t2 *

the new pe rce p

This proposition, while deviating somewhat from

the original formulation,

68

can be illustrated as follows:

Time ^

E-|_ = f(F1 , B1 )

•if
Time t2
Time t^

E£ = f(F2 ,B2 )

'if

= f(F^,B^)

Etc.

k^Louis Kaplan, Foundations of Human B e h a v i o r . Harper
and Row Publishers, New York, 1^657 PP* 127-126.
Jones, o£. c i t . . p. I4.I.
/Q
Although Jones accomplishes a more rigorous analysis
of the process and argues that experience Ei becomes part of
foreground F 2 , etc., this illustration includes Ej in B2 ,
etc., for purposes of simplification.
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If this is true, and social research suggests that it is,
serious implications are noted for teacher-pupil communica
tions .
Communication Problems Involving the "Self”
The individual who initiates communication is known as
the source.

Communication originating from this source is

a function of the source's 1 ) attitude toward himself,
2 ) attitude toward the message and 3 ) attitude toward the
receiver.^

These attitudes are formulated by Francis Bacon's

idols of the tribe, cave, marketplace and theater which include
all external influences such as culture, education, socialization and contemporary philosophies.

70

Thus, communication is

viewed as a psychological process best understood in terms of
mental states.

71

It is this proposition, founded upon the

"thingumbob principle" which states that human organisms call
upon previous experience and assumes that what has been most

^ B e r l o , op. cit. , pp. i+6 -Z4.8 .
7®Francis Bacon, "Novum Organum." in Hayden and Alworth,
o p . cit. . pp. 15-23*
7^T. M. Higham, "Basic Psychological Factors in
Communication," Occupational Psychology, Vol. XXXI, No. 1
(Jan., 1957), p . ^ T * -----
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probable in the past will be most probable in the future.

72

The implications of this principle are best explained via
two well known models of the communicative process.
The Process of Communication
Models have proven useful in the analysis of the commu
nicative process because they permit one to isolate the parts
of reality which are of particular interest to him.

There

are models or ideal types designed to illustrate many things,
however, only two have been selected on the basis that they
most adequately relate to the problem at hand.
Johnson on Projection.

Figure 11a reveals a scheme

71
developed by Professor Wendell Johnson in 19ij-6.'J

Johnson's

model makes several important points but primarily it illus
trates that people always speak to and about themselves.
Briefly, the model is explained in the following stages:
1.

Stage 1 represents any external stimulation to the
sensory organs of the source (in this case the source
is actually the receiver).

72

Douglas McGregor, "The Major Determinants of the Pre
diction of Social Events," Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology. Vol. XXXIII, No. £ (April, 1930), p 7 “?03 and
Chase, the Power of Words. o p . cit., p. 52.
73wendell Johnson, "The Fateful Process of Mr. A Talking
to Mr. B." Harvard Business Review, Vol. XXXI, No. 1 (Jan.Feb., 1953), P. $0.
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JLki.
•HAPPENING(External & Internal)

I
I
RESPONSE

t

IMPACT

A
AFPECTORS
I
I
i
■EVALUATION

t

t

f

AFFECTORS
SOURCE (a ): Wendell Johnson, "The Fateful Process of
M r . A Talking to Mr. B," Harvard Business R e v i e w . Vol. XXXI
N o . 1 (Jan.-Feb., 1953).
SOURCE (b):
William V. Haney, C o m m u ni cat ion : Patterns
and Incidents. Richard D. Irwin, Inc., Homewood, 111. , 19&t3.
FIGURE 11
JOHNSON ON PROJECTION
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2.

Stage 2 reveals the resultant sensory stimulation.
The constriction indicates the source qua receiver’s
limited ability to respond.

3.

Stage 3 is the neurophysiological channeling of
sensory stimulation.
This is still a preverbal

the
stage.

1^.. Stage i|.shows the first stage of symbolization.
The
enlargement suggests the evaluative process which
occurs.
It is here where the background (B) struc
tures the perception.
5.

Stage 5 represents the final stage of symbolization
with the constriction indicating the selection of a
few symbols from among an infinite number available
for overt expression.

6.

Stage 5 becomes the stage 1 for the receiver of
message.

the

The expanded infinity sign at the bottom of the diagram
serves to illustrate the notion of self-projection.

On the

basis of one's experiences he evaluates the stimuli which
form the framework for communication with others.

Then, by

projecting his subjective evaluations into his fellow man,
one attempts to accomplish a transfer of meanings via verbal
or written communications.

Feedback is received and becomes

part of the source's sum total of experience.

Therefore,

communication is a continuous and iterative process between
source and receiver which is dynamic and ever changing.

To

better understand this proposition observe Figure lib which
illustrates the evaluative operations of the source.

The

lower part of the diagram may be looked upon as an enlarged
stage

in Figure 11a while the happening and impact are
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analogous to stages 1, 2 and 3.

In stage ^ certain affectors

(habits, prejudices, experiences, etc.) go to work and deter
mine the response one will exhibit to the stimuli received.7^
The response is determined only after extensive evaluation has
taken place.

For instance, stimuli received are structured

and assigned meaning on the basis of their association with
the sum total of the affectors.

The properties the source

assigns to the receiver are also determined by the unique
characteristics of the source's affectors.

Thus, the entire

communicative process is influenced by the projection of sub
jective characteristics from one party to the other.

There

fore, evaluation and response are but one's projection of
himself into others.

This is the only means by which exper

ience becomes meaningful.

Failure to consider this self

projection may result in less meaningful and faulty communi
cation.

It can blind one to the filtering process and cause

him to feel that everyone thinks as he does, or, in the case
of an instructor it may reduce his responsiveness to feedback.
Thus, self-projection is an intergal part of all communication
and only an awareness of the presence of such a process can
minimize its adverse effects.

7^Willi am V. Haney, Communication: Patterns and Incidents.
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., Homewood, 111., I960, p. 3-8.
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Another model, originally designed to illustrate mass
communication, was developed by Wilbur Schramm.

This model

is particularly useful because it is easily adaptable

to a

classroom situation.
An Adaptation of S c h r a m m .

The basic Schramm model was

developed in a book entitled The Process and Effects of Mass
Communication. ^

Essentially,

it consists of three elements:

a source, a signal and a destination.

Both the sender and

receiver perform the functions of decoding,
encoding,

interpreting and

thus creating a dynamic feedback system.

12a illustrates

the nature of this process.

Figure

However,

it is

Figure 12b that has application to the classroom environment.
For purposes of illustration,
the position of the source,
lecture constitutes
destination.

the teacher-researcher assumes

the results of research or a

the signal, while the student is the

As Berio has noted,

the learning process

is a

dyadic relationship between teacher and student which requires
7A
effective communication.
In order for effective communica
tion to take place there must be some overlap of experience
or interest.

This overlap has

been referred to as "trans-

75
'^Wilbur Schramm, The Process and Effects of Mass
Communication, University of Illinois Press , Urloana, 111.,
1955, PP. 3-26.
76
' Berio, o£. c i t . . p. 53-
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(a)

Message
Encoder

De coder

Interpreter

Interpreter

De coder

Encoder
Message

b
MRCP
Field of
Experience

Field of
Experience

Source

ecoder Recei ver

Encoder

Signal

SOURCE:
Wilbur Schramm, The Process and Effects of
Mass Communication, Un i v e r s i t y of Illinois Press, Urbana
T S 5 F . ------------------

FIGURE 12
AN ADAPTATION OF S CHRAMM
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cendental presuppositions” or an "underlying unity of spirit.
However, this paper will refer to it as the "mutually reciprocal
communication foci11 (MRCF).

It is outside this MRCF that in

jections of value judgments create their serious communicative
problems.

The assumption that everyone views human relations

as "good" requires a unity of value systems among all and a
uniformity of connotation to the term.

In reality, as has

been shown above, this may be far from true because of varying
environmental backgrounds and experiences.

Although no unity

of value systems exists, the influential source (teaeherresearcher) may perpetuate his beliefs through the receiver
(student) by expressing his subjective opinions under the
heading of scientific fact.
It is this type of value judgment injection that accounts
for the retention of antiquated ideas in educational situations.
Because the source "holds on" to certain ideas, the receiver
is tempted to accept them as true and pass them on to other
receivers when he becomes the source.

In some cases this

"injection" of judgments is not even intentional because envionmental factors have so thoroughly conditioned the source

^ E r n e s t Nagel, Logic Without Metaphysics. The Free
Press, Glencoe, 111., 1956, p. 3^4-9.
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that he fails to recognize any alternatives are possible.
Thus, many differences of opinion are environmentally deter
mined and never challenged until the environment is altered.
According to the self-projection idea any belief may be
influenced by environment and experience--even convictions
relating to methodology.

This proposition leads directly to

the hypotheses the following empirical study proposes to
examine.

Specifically, the survey will attempt to determine

whether or not environmental factors do, in fact, influence
epistemological perspectives and other methodological con
victions of management professors.

But, assuming this is

true, of what importance is such a finding?
Methodology Today and Theory Tomorrow.

No timetable can

be established for the methodological unification of manage
ment and organization theorists.

In fact, some question, as

the writer does, if a thorough integration will ever be
accomplished.

However,

there is virtue in prediction and

the increased certainty obtained by gaining insight into the
future.

For this reason,

chapter four is devoted to the

analysis of the following major and minor hypotheses.
Major Hyp° thesis - Professional attitudes toward
methodological issues are a func
tion of past and present environ
mental influences of the research
er and/or teacher.
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Minor Hypothesis - Specific environmental factors do
not influence the formation of all
methodological convictions with equal
intensity.
Therefore, the primary
determinant of one belief may or may
not be the major determinant with
respect to another.
If the two hypotheses are confirmed and if one accepts
the notion of self-projection,

the first step will have been

taken toward gaining insight into the future of management
and organization theory.

This argument is based on the idea

that today's academia, either consciously or unconsciously,
will influence the theoretical exercises of future scholars
who will Structure the course of management science.

On the

other hand, should no environmental deviations be uncovered,
serious questions might be raised concerning the exemption of
methodological convictions from environmental influences.

But

before continuing with the study, a summary of the present
chapter is offered.
Summary
Chapter three has attempted to move from the philosophical
formulations of the previous chapter to examine the practical
aspects of methodological problems in organizations.
clusions reached are itemized in the following list:

The con
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1.

The language of science Is a more restricted case of
language in general.
Science relies primarily on
cognitive-descriptive rather than emotive verbal
formulations.
Although some propositions have been
advanced to make definitions of the social disciplines
more operational, only "broader operationalism" seems
to offer real improvements in these areas.

2.

It is the opinion of the writer that only those as
pects concerning "what is" belong within the bound
aries of organizational science.
Although ideal
formulations of "what ought to be" is an appropriate
topic for philosophers, the subjective nature of
these ends and the values upon which they rest defy
scientific analysis.

3.

Judgments of relevance are fundamentally different
from judgments of value.
While values escape scien
tific analysis, questions of relevance are testable
and subject to logical debate.

4*

Korzybski’s structural differential proves to be a
valuable tool in illustrating the dangers of dis
guised value judgments.
Judgments of value are
made on the basis of dominant characteristics
abstracted from an infinite array which an objec
tive event possesses.
If care is not taken to
separate fact and value researchers may cast their
values upon students who know very little about the
subject being judged.

5.

A fundamental tenet of general semantics states that
self-projection plays an important role in all commu
nicative efforts.
It is further argued that the dog
matic assumption that everyone thinks exactly as the
source on the communication may result in serious
problems.
The conscious acknowledgment and awareness
of this process will contribute greatly to the estab
lishment of a "mutually reciprocal communicative foci"
between student and teacher.

6.

The foundation has been formed to empirically test
a major and minor hypothesis relating to the deter
minants of differences of opinion relative to var
ious methodological concepts.
The primary objective
of the test is to provide some insight into the
future of management theory by making use of the
self-projection concept.

CHAPTER IV
A SURVEY OF MANAGEMENT ACADEMIA
How sharp the blade
To trim the tree of chance?
How rich the castle where
computers prance?
Philosopher, hand me your stone,
A tool with which the blade to hone,
Centers?
Choices small in error?
Chaotic gods . . . retreat in
terror .'
Models Bayesian?
Parallel?
How much like man?
The streams of data
and of time
Must tell.
--Fred Massarik
An Overview
The present chapter will attempt to report the results
of a survey conducted among a sample of management professors.
The survey was complex in the sense that it was accomplished
in sequential stages.

Therefore,

the logical ordering of the

many topics to be discussed will be provided by the progres
sive phases required for the completion of the study.

But

first, a rudimentary framework for analysis must be estab
lished.
Specific Objectives of the Survey
In line with the empiricist's tradition,

it becomes
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necessary to examine some of the ideas thus far advanced.
Specifically, an attempt will be made to empirically analyze
the notion of self-projection among professors of management
and organization theory.

This self-projection concept will

be tested via an examination of the hypotheses enumerated
at the close of the preceding chapter.

However, one ques

tion deserves consideration prior to the initiation of the
study:

what, if any, contribution will such an analysis

make to the areas of management and organization theory?
Importance of the Study
To the writer’s knowledge, there has been no previous
research associated with the issues at hand.

This apparent

lack of interest is disturbing because of the adademic ques
tions this type of information could raise.

However, rather

than listing numerous less significant advantages, only the
writer's idea of the primary contribution of this analysis
will be noted.

If it could be determined that certain envi

ronmental factors are important in formulating methodological
convictions, some conception of the future of management and
organization theory could be obtained.

For instance, if the

study should reveal that professors in public institutions
have opinions which are separate and distinct from those
teaching in private schools, it would be possible to project
the effects of these counter positions upon the concept
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formation of future students.

With this in mind,

the

following section proposes to explain, in detail,

the

research design used in the survey.
The Research Design
The research design adopted for the primary study was
sequential in nature.

The four fundamental steps involved

provided the logical organization of the following sections.
Elaborations on Sample Selection and Response
It was determined by numerical count that nationally
there were approximately one thousand professors whose
primary teaching interests were in the area of management
and organizations.

Since nothing was known concerning the

parameters of the universe, no statistical procedures were
available to estimate the sample size needed.

In order to

Insure a return from at least ten per cent (approximately
100) of the total population, it was decided that at least
one third of the universe should be surveyed (actually 380
questionnaires were mailed).

On the basis of other studies

In the literature and subject to the constraint of cost,
such a sample was considered more than adequate.
The professors to be included In the study were selected
at random from two sources.

The first source was the Faculty

Personnel Directory^ published by the American Association of

1RIchard R. Weeks, editor, Faculty Personnel Directory.
9th ed., American Association of Collegiate Schools of
Business, 1965*
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Collegiate Schools of Business.

In order to insure adequate

representation of AACSB schools, approximately 225 of the 3^0
questionnaires were sent to the faculties of member institutions listed in the 1965 directory.

2

The remaining 155

subjects were selected from individual school catalogs on
file at the Louisiana State University library.

Of the 380

faculty members surveyed, teaching positions were held in
255 different colleges and universities.

Every effort was

made to select only those teachers whose primary interests
were in the field of management and organization theory.
However, in some cases the extraction of the management
faculty from the faculty _in toto was difficult and at other
times impossible.

This problem was especially evident in

the very small schools without structured programs within
the school of business.

When this problem presented itself,

individual course descriptions were consulted.

If neither

method provided the desired information, the school, and
therefore the faculty, was eliminated from the sample.
Regardless of the source used, the selection procedure
was the same;

all the individual members of the management

faculty of a given college or university were alined in a

O

Although no exact figures were available, a survey of
member schools revealed that they were,in general, the larger
institutions and therefore could be assumed to produce more
management graduates.
Thus, the AACSB schools were assigned
this larger "weight" in the sample.
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one dimensional array, assigned a number and selected through
the use of a table of random numbers.

Where the management

faculty for a given school was large, additional question
naires were sent in a ratio of one form per seven professors.
In addition,

the sample was divided into four geogr aph 

ical classifications.

Faculty members were then selected

in roughly the same proportions as the population disper
sion indicated by the I960 census.

This proportionate

ma tching was made on the assumption that there exists some
relationship between college enrollment and population.
Figure 13 reveals
lished.

the geographical areas

These four subclassifications

simply as the East, Midwest, South and

that were estab
will bereferred to
West.

It m a y also be noted from Figure 13 that public, p r i 
vate and denominationally supported schools were represented
in the sample.

The first figure shown in each area is the

total number of forms sent to that particular region.
three following numbers account, respectively,

The

for the

number of public, private and denominational schools sur 
veyed.

Because the catalog of almost every existing school

was consulted,

it seems reasonable to assume that these

figures represent the approximate proportions of the insti
tutions situated in the four areas.
The questionnaires were placed in

the mail on April

1,

1968, and no returns were included in the computations which

WCTii.
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FIGURE 13
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were received after June 2, 1968.

Of the 380 forms posted,

162 or 1|2.6 per cent were returned.

However, 15 of these

were not usable for the reasons listed below:
1.

Professor's primary interest in area other than
managem ent . (8 )

2.

Incomplete completion of the form.

3.

Received after June 2, 1968.

(6 )

(1)

Thus, the "usable percentage return" was 38.6 per cent.

The

returns by region and type of institution are given below:
Number
Sampled

Area

100
90
90

Type of
Institution
Publi c
Pri vate
Denominational
In total,

Per Cent of
Return

32
36
40

32.0
40.0
44.4
39.0

o|o
oho
rHpO

East
Midwest
South
West

Usable
Returns

Number
Sampled
200
90
90
3&0

Usable
Returns

Per Cent of
Return

96
29
22

46.0
32.2
24.2

w?

the data were classified and the responses

differentiated on the basis of ten environmental factors.
These subgroupings are given in

Table II.

Some of the more

interesting characteristics of the respondents can be noted
with only a brief reference to these figures.

For instance,

65*3 P©r cent of the total usable returns came from teachers
in public institutions.

Moreover, most of the respondents

(45-1 per cent) were in the age interval of 26-45 years with

l8l
TABLE II
STRATIFICATION OF DATA

Criterla
Type of Institution
Public
Private
Denominational
Age
Less than
26-1*5
1*6-60
Over 60

25

Highest Degree Held
Bachelors
Masters
Doctorate
Other
Area Where Degree Received
East
Midwest
South
West
Foreign

Number
In Group
96
29
22
HIT

65.3
19.7
15.0
100.0

18
59
56
11*

12.2
1*0.1
38.2
9.5
100.0

0
38
107
2
TI*7
1*0
1*7
23
36
1

H*T
Teaching Experience (Years)
Less than 5

Per Cent
Of Total

0
25.9
72.8
1.3*
100.0
27.2
32.0
15.6
21*. 5
.7

100.0

1*1

27.9

6-10

32

21.8

11-20
21-30
More than 30

1*7
20
7

32.0
13.6
£*. 7

H*7

100.0
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TABLE II (continued)

Criteria
Religious Preference
Catholi c
Jewish
Protes tant
Other

Number
In Group

Per Cent
Of Total

24

16.3

5
21

wr

Area Reared
East
Midwes t
South
Wes t
Foreign

14.3**

100.0

3k

23.1
354

52
32

21.8

2k
_

w r
Size of City Where Reared
Less than 25,000

62
28
25
10

2 5 ,001-100,000
1 0 0 ,001 -500,000
5 0 0 ,001-1 ,000,000
More than 1,000,000

22
W 7

Parent's Occupation
Blue-collar
White-collar
Professional
Other

3*4

66.0

97

100.0
42.2
19.0

17.0
6.8
15.0
100.0

41
49
41
16

27.9
33-3
27.9
!0.
100.0

32
36
40

21.8
24-5

wr

Present Residence
Eas t
Midwes t
South
Wes t

16.3
34

27.2
26.5

&

100.0

^Two respondents possessed L L B degrees
•JHS-This group consisted primarily of agnostics and nondenomin ati ona l.
■JHHt-inciuded in this classification were nine sons of farmers
and seven sons of self-employed parents.
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the ij.6-60 years category running a close second (30*2 per cent).
Of the lit-7 professors replying, 72.8 per cent held doctorate
degrees, and more of the highest degrees held (32 per cent)
were earned in the Midwest than in any other single region.
In addition, the Midwest was the region where many (35>k per
cent) of the respondents spent their early years.
In general,

the teaching experience of the professors

clustered in one of two classifications.

The largest group

(32 per cent) was composed of those with 11-20 years experience
while the next largest category (27.9 per cent) referred to
those with experience of less than five years.

The Protestants

exhibited a definite majority (66 per cent) relative to reli
gious preference, and more (33*3 P©r cent) professors' fathers
were employed in white-collar positions than in any other
occupational classification.
Reference will be made from time to time concerning these
characteristics, and their significance will be discussed in
detail in the analysis to follow.

But first, an explanation

of the research vehicle used is in order.
Cons truetion of the Questionnaire
Since the study was designed to uncover psychological
differences in the meaning of methodological concepts to
various groups, it Immediately became evident that a special
measuring technique was needed.

The device selected was the

iQk

semantic differential (hereafter the SD) developed by Osgood,
Suci and Tannenbaum^ as a method of measuring connotative
meanings.
Logic of the Semantic Differential.

The SD assumes the

existence of a "semantic space" which is an area of unknown
dimensionality and is Euclidian in character.^

The measuring

technique defines a concept as a point in this space.

Funda

mentally, the objective is to differentiate the meanings of
concepts or the meanings of the same concept to various groups
or individuals.
In order to illustrate the operations of the SD, assume
it has been determined that there are two basic dimensions of
meaning relative to methodological concepts.

These dimensions

will be labeled EVALUATIVE (to reveal if the concept is "good"
or "bad") and POTENCY (to define the degree of "goodness" or
"badness").

With this in mind the geometric or spatial prop

erties of this two dimensional space can be illustrated.

Note

the coordinates on the following page.^
If a concept, such as empiricism, has an ordered pair of
numbers indicating its coordinates within the "space," say

^Charles E. Osgood, George J. Suci and Percy H.
Tannenbaum, The Measurement of Meaning. The University of
Illinois Press, Urbana, Illinois, 195/.
^ Ibid., p. 25.
^Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research.
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., New~7ork, 1966, pp.
6.
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Potency
7 ■

6

‘
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-7-6 -5-k -3-2 -l -l

-■-2
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— 3
-5

..-6
■'-7

point A = (5,6), properties of its meaning are revealed by
these numerical values.

This ordered pair gives an indi

cation of the concept's "absolute meaning" from which an
additional property of "distance" or "relative meaning" can
be derived.

Within the semantic space those concepts whose

ordered pairs place them near each other, such as PA (5,6)
and PB (5,7) may be said to possess similar connotations.
As one might expect, because of the Eucledian character
of the semantic space, the measure of distance between con
cepts is simply the generalized geometric, linear distance
formula.

Therefore, to compute the distance (D) between the

concepts A and C, where d is the algebraic difference between
the coordinates on a specific dimension (evaluative or potency),
one would proceed in the usual manner.

First, square each of

the differences between the coordinates for each dimension and
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sum the squared differences so that

= I (EA - V

2 + 2 (?A - V

2

where

E. = the coordinate measuring the evaluative dimension
for the ith point
= the coordinate measuring the potency dimension for
the ith point
Then extracting the square root of the sum one obtains:

However, these computations assume that quantitative values
for the coordinates have been derived.

Therefore, before con

tinuing the necessary prerequisite steps will be analyzed.
Concept Selection.

The first step in developing the SD

was to select the concepts to be tested against a series of
scales.

As the form in APPENDIX A illustrates, six phrases

were selected to serve as the stimuli.

Although a greater

number would have been desirable, limitations imposed by time
and the importance of a large return made restraint an absolute'
necessi ty.
It was recognized in the beginning that many potential
respondents would find some of the concepts unfamiliar.
combat this "built-in bias" two steps were taken.

To

The first

187
attempt to minimize apprehension was to use a rather simple
stimuli to introduce the pattern of response.

Therefore,

since it could be & priori assumed that most professors of
management have definite opinions about the nature of their
subject matter, the "present state of management theory" was
placed first as an "interest getter."

The second and third

stimuli were included to test epistemological perspectives
and were followed by two phrases dealing with value judgments.
Finally, a concept relating to the political convictions of
the professor was placed last, save for the page designed to
obtain classification data.
In addition, a brief yet general explanation of the
"stimuli phrase" was included under concepts two, three, four
and five.

This was done in an effort to establish a reason

ably successful communicative foci.

As a final attempt to

insure uniformity of conceptualization, the instructions
included on the form asked the respondents to answer on the
basis of how the phrases "should" relate to management theory
(excluding concepts one and six).

This was deemed necessary

due to the fear that one subject might evaluate the "present
state of management theory" relative to all stimuli while
others would answer on the basis of their subjective preference.
The latter was concluded to be the most useful alternative for
analysis.
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Once the concepts were selected only the scales remained
unnamed.

The process by which the scales were chosen is the

subject of the following section.
Choice of Scales and Reversals.

In the survey each per

son was asked to judge a concept against ten bipolar adjective
scales which had been tested in a pilot study conducted among
a do^en graduate students at Louisiana State University.
purposes of the pretest,

For

twelve scales were included, but two

were eliminated because of disproportionately large variances
which indicated no meaningful connotation between scale and
stimuli existed.

As a result the questionnaire in APPENDIX

A illustrates the final form which was actually mailed.

The

ten surviving scales were as follows
(E)
(E)
(E)
(E)
(E)

good-bad
fair-unfair
valuable-worthless
successful-unsuccessful
complete-incomplete

(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)

s trong-weak
brave-cowardly
free-cons trained
deep-shallow
wide-narrow

The E or P which precedes each adjective pair refers to the
dimension they were designed to measure, i.e., evaluation or

^These scales were selected from both lists offered by
Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum, ojc. ci t . , pp. I4.3 and 53-58,
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potency.

These bipolar adjective pairs were selected on the

basis of two criteria:
vance to concepts used.

factor representativeness and rele
The relevance choice was purely

intuitive, but the factor representativeness was an objec7
tive measure obtained via Osgood's factor analysis.
When a subject was asked to judge a concept similar to
the following,
"Empiricism"
Good

X

:_____:____ :____ :____ :____ :____ Bad

Pair ____ :_____ : X

:____ :____ :____ :____ Unfair

each judgment served to locate the stimulus as a point in the
semantic space.

Each meaning thus developed had two essential

properties--direction from the origin of the space (depending
upon the polar adjective checked) and distance from the origin
(relating to the extremeness of the scale position marked).

8

Prior use of the SD has noted a tendency of respondents
to develop a "system" or "pattern" of replying which resulted
in a failure to think and consciously choose various alterna
tives along the scales.
four of the scales

In order to minimize this inclination,

(one, two, seven and nine) were reversed

? Ibid. . p. 26.
Q Ibid.. p. 100.
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placing the "positive" alternative at the extreme right instead
of the left.

The rotation was accomplished in a purely random

manner making use, once again, of a table of random numbers.
After the scale selection, elimination and rotation had
been completed, all the necessary components were available
for the construction of the questionnaire.

It can be noted

that Osgood's Form II, with each stimuli occupying a separate
page, was adopted.
In addition, seven "spaces" were positioned between the
bipolar adjective pairs.

For computational convenience a

number ranging from seven to one was assigned to each block
beginning with seven at the most extreme positive adjective
and reducing successively by one to one at the most extreme
negative adjective.

Thus, if the respondent checked the

space nearest "good" on a good-bad continuum, his reply was
assigned a numerical value of seven.

On the other hand, if

he marked the space nearest "bad" it was assigned a value of
one.

Each space in between was designated as an incremental

value of one throughout the seven space range.

Thus, a reply

to any bipolar adjective scale was assigned a value from one
to seven depending upon the extremeness and direction of the
response.

The significance of this explanation will become

evident later when reference is made to the mean values of
the various scales for different groups.
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The complete questionnaire consisted of ten pages

(one

page cover letter, two pages of instructions, six concepts,
and a classification data page).

Each form was accompanied

by a return envelope to be mailed under a business reply
permi t .
Uniqueness of the Problem.

The above discussion relating

to the logic of the SD is general and can be applied to any
instrument so constructed.

For this reason, it was described

in terms of the differentiating of two concepts relative to
a given group.

However, in an effort to investigate the

hypotheses of the proposed study a somewhat different approach
was required.

Rather than noting differences relative to con

cepts, it was necessary to examine the divergency between two
groups (say Eastern and Western professors) with respect to
the meaning of a single concept (i.e., empiricism).

In doing

this, one would essentially be analyzing the relative positions
of the central tendencies of two uncorrelated "clouds" of points
9
in the semantic space.
Therefore, although this analysis was
approached from a different angle, it too dealt with the dis
tance between two points in a semantic space.
After all the replies were received,

the data were pro

cessed on the Louisiana State University IBM 701^0 research

9 Ibid., p. 90
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computer system.

In an effort to confirm or disconfirm the

hypotheses, a statistical analysis of the data was required.
Statistical Procedure
In considering the quantitative comparisons of similarity
and difference, one's thoughts immediately anticipate the use
of product-moment correlation analysis as an index of similar
ity.

However, as Osgood notes, the possibility of consistent

covariance, which definitely proved a factor in the study,
can result in intercorrelations approaching r = 1.00 despite

10
gross absolute discrepancies.

For this reason the general

ized distance measure (D) and a commonly used test of signifi
cance were used as the primary analytical methods.
Test of Significance.

Although the D measure provides

an adequate index of relative difference, it reveals little
with respect to statistical significance.

11

To insure that

1 QIbid.
■'■^Because of this limitation, the "t" test was employed.
Since the standard deviation (o) of the universe was not
known, it was necessary to estimate its magnitude via sample
information.
Initially, the null hypothesis p.^ = ^2 and
alternative hypothesis p.^ ^ M-2 were established and the "t"
test applied using the relationship
t - (D - H^J/s^
D

where

= Xi - Xj
= hypothetical difference between two population
means (M>i - M-j ) which in this case is zero
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the differences involved were significant, a null hypothesis,
stating that M-i =

M-j,

or the mean of population^ equaled the

mean of populationj was established.

If the null hypothesis

proved probabilistically false on the basis of sample informa
tion at or = .05 for a sufficient number of scales, the groups
were considered to think significantly different with respect
to the concept.
Procedurally, this was accomplished by sequentially
stratifying the respondents with respect to the factors to
be scrutinized.

The test of significance was then applied

to the mean values by scales for each combination of two
groups.

Therefore, for each combination, sixty tests (6 con

cepts x 10 scales each) were required.

Based on this analysis

a decision rule was established for the determination of
statistical difference.
The Fundamental Decision R u l e .

The basic criterion for

(continued)
sd

4
which is the estimated standard
^ e r r o r of the difference between two means.

s^ = (n-j.3^2 + r^Sp^/n^ +
- 2) or the weighted
average of the individual sample estimates of
the variances of the populations based on
sample size.
Additional information on the specific aspects of the "t"
test can be found in any basic statistical inference text such
as Samuel B. Richmond, Statistical Analysis, 2nd e d . , The Ronald
Press, New York, 196i^, pp. 190-193*

i9ii
determining the significance of the difference between groups
was as follows:
If at least one of the five scales measuring a given
dimension (first five evaluative and second five p o 
tency for each concept) discredited the null hypoth
esis so that probabilistically
j the entire
concept was considered different with respect to the
i and j groups.
Since the rationale for such a rule is not immediately obvious,
a brief explanation is offered.

At a = .05 (this level of

significance was used throughout), one would expect five out
of every 100 scales to show a significant difference as the
result of pure chance.

If, however, more than five scales

out of 100 show a significant difference ( |a,± ^ M'j), some
force can be assumed at worx other than random variation.

In

the present study a single significantly different scale for
a dimension of a given concept would actually be 20 per cent
(one out of five) significant or, on the average, the same
as 20 out of 100.

Thus, as Osgood points out, the significant

difference of one dimension insures the difference of the entire concept.

12

If one cannot accept this explanation, it

may be noted that even one significant scale out of ten
(total for both dimensions)

is twice the number expected due

to chance at a = .05'.

■^Osgood,

Suci and Tannenbaum, ££.

cit. , p. 100.
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An Example.

It is often easy for a writer, enthusi

astically involved in a topic, to assume universal familiar
ity with his subject.

Lest this criticism be applied, a

brief example will now be given to illustrate the testing
procedure.

Referring to the questionnaire in APPENDIX A one

can note that each question on the last page is designed to
subclassify the respondents with respect to a factor Judged,
by a consensus of knowledgeable persons in the field, to be
influential in the formation of methodological convictions.
For simplicity, note question one in which all respondents
fell into one of three alternative classification choices
(members of the faculties of public, private or denominational
schools).

Because of the mutually exclusive character of this

classification scheme, sorting with respect to the alternative
possibilities presented no problem.

Once the groups were

sorted, mean values were computed for each scale and every
concept by substratified groups.

The result of these compu

tations was an array of sixty means
for each group.

(6 concepts x 10 scales)

The mean values were then tested by combina

tions of two groups to see if significant differences existed
with respect to any scales.

In other words, private school

faculties were tested against public school faculties, private
against denominational and denominational against public.

The

number of combinations tested for each question (environmental
factor) is given by the following formula:
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=

_m *

[Xj ~ 3cl (m - x)

where

m = number of alternative classifications possible
x = number of groups to be analyzed per comparison

^

In the above example

^ >■ = 3*

After the tests had been conducted the decision rule
was applied to determine if any two groups showed a statis
tically significant difference with respect to sample means.
The results of the tests were then listed in APPENDIX B,
Table VI.

After the tests of significance were completed,

additional analysis was possible via computation of D values
and the use of visual profiles.
Analysis Relative to Hypotheses
Although examples such as the one above may be offered,
the full

importance of

with respect to the

the tests can be appreciated only

hypotheses to be investigated.

There

fore, the hypotheses will be reiterated and examined in the
following sections.
The Major Hypothesis
The major hypothesis advances the proposition that:
professional attitudes toward methodological issues
are a function of the past and present environmen
tal influences of the researcher and/or teacher.
Initially, one might ask what would be required to con
firm this hypothesis.

Fundamentally,

it is necessary to test
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all subclassifications with respect to the environmental
factors noted in each question on the classification page of
the questionnaire.

If, upon testing, it can be noted that

significant differences exist relative to the substratums
present, the factor indicated by the question can be said to
be a determinant of difference.

In the interest of brevity

the concepts will be coded as follows:
Concept
Concept
Concept
Concept
Concept
Concept

A
B
C
D
E
F

-

The Present State of Management Theory
Rnpiricism in Management Theory
The A Priori in Management Theory
Posi~Hive-Descriptive Methodology
Normative-Prescriptive Methodology
Political Conservatism

In addition, environmental factors will be referred to by
the following numerical values:
Category 1 - Type of institution in which professor
teaches
Category 2 - Age of teacher
Category 3 - Highest degree held
Category Ij. - Geographical area where degree received
Category j? - Teaching experience
Category 6 - Religious preference
Category 7 - Geographical area where professor was
reared
Category 8 - City size where professor was reared
Category 9 - Parent's occupation
Category 10 - Geographical area of present residence
Therefore, the necessary condition for the confirmation
of the major hypothesis is the existence of differences-differences resulting from environmental factors.

In order

to show this, however, some indicator of gross difference
must be constructed which will measure total variation in
me ani n g .
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The Ratio of Comparison.

The ratio of comparison is

given by the following relationship.

Cr = d / ^2^ where
Cr
12 )
V /

d

= ratio of comparison
= number of combinations (comparisons) possible with
respect to a given factor where m is the number of
classification alternatives possible and the two (2 )
illustrates that all comparisons take place between
two groups
- the number of combinations of two groups showing
a significant difference

Therefore, if, as in question one, the respondent could select
one of three types of institutions in which he taught, m would
assume a value of three (3 ) so that
that of the three comparisons

= 3*

Assuming further

(public-private, private-denomi

national, and denominational-public), only one (public-denomi
national) showed a significant difference with respect to a
given concept (empiricism).

Therefore, the ratio would

equal
Cr = d/(“ ) = 1/3 = -33This result could be interpreted as revealing that 33 per
cent of the combinations showed a significant difference in
thinking with respect to epmiricism.
One can easily see that the same comparison could be
made for all subclassifications relative to each of the ten
environmental factors by concept.

The maximum value that Cr
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for a given concept could assume would be one (Cr - 1).

Such

a value is possible if and only if all stratifications thought
significantly different relative to the concept so that
and,

If each concept exhibited a Cr = 1 relative to a given environ
mental factor, it would be possible to derive an
6

The Sr is this case represents the "summed" or "super" com
parison ratio and is used as a measure of overall difference
among groups with respect to a given environmental factor.
An Sr -+6 would obviously be quite unusual and certainly
unnecessary for confirmation of the major hypothesis.

As a

matter of fact, an S -► 3 appears sufficiently large to allow
an inference that the connotative meanings of the concepts
to the various combinations of subgroups with respect to an
environmental factor are different.
in support of this position.

Two reasons are advanced

The first relates to the fact

that only statistically significant differences were considered,.
Therefore, probabilistically there was always the chance that
the null hypothesis

(p.^ = p.j) might have been accepted when

in fact it was false.

Such an erroneous acceptance of a false

hypothesis would prevent Sr -*6 .

Another complication which
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could have prevented an extremely large value of Sr was a
bias within the classification alternatives themselves.

Some

factors such as "city size where a professor was reared,"
tended to have alternatives that "fused" together in the cen
ter.

Thus, it may have been difficult to separate differences

in groups such as those containing professors reared in cities
with populations of 50,000 as opposed to those from cities of
125,000.

On the other hand, very definite variations might

have existed between professors reared in extremely large as
opposed to extremely small cities.

In this case, an environ

mental factor could arise as influential only in extreme cases
with a large "gray" area in between.

To combat the elimination

of any such "influential extremes" an S -+■3 was considered to
be an indication of sufficient difference to allow a confirma
tion of the major hypothesis.
Analysis of the D a t a .

Table III is a "macro summation"

of the information contained in APPENDIX B which contains the
significant results of the individual "t" tests.

To illustrate

how the individual values in Table III were obtained,
APPENDIX B, Table VI.

turn to

The tables in APPENDIX B correspond

respectively to the successive columns of Table III.

In

addition, each exhibit in the appendix lists first the various
groups to be compared followed by a
is then noted (say Public-Private)

value.

Each comparison

along with the proper number
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TABLE III
THE SUMMED COMPARISON RATIO

Categories
cr

Concepts

1

2

3

k

6

7

8

9

10

A

.33

.00

1.00

.67

.60

.17

.30

.10

.00

•33

B

.33

.33

1.00

.50

.ifO

.17

.50

.10

.17

.83

C

.33

.17

1.00

.67

.IfO

.17

.60

.10

.00

.67

D

.00

.33

1.00

•33

.20

.17

.ifO

.20

.00

.33

E

.00

.00

1.00

.50

.10

.17

.80

.IfO

.00

.67

F

.00

.if0

1.00

.17

.20

.50

.ifO

.30

1.00

.50

S r = .99

1.23

6.00

2.8if

1.90

1.35

3.00

1.20

1.17

3.33

Note:

See page 197 for code of concepts and categories.
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of degrees of freedom and the critical values of Mt."

The

calculated "t" values are then listed, by scale, for each
concept with respect to the groups which exhibited a signifi
cant difference.

Any scale which possessed a calculated "t"

whose absolute value was greater than the critical "t" was
signifi ca nt.
In the case at hand, public and private school faculties
(see column one) thought significantly different relative to
concepts A, B and C.

However, the public-denominational and

denominational-private comparisons revealed no significant
differences relative to any concept.

Therefore, since the

meaning of concept A was tested by three comparisons and had
a significantly different meaning to only one combination of
the three compared, its Cr = d/

= 1/3 = *33*

This was

entered as the first figure in column one of Table III.

The

remaining columns were constructed in a similar manner by
noting the values of

for each environmental factor and

dividing it into the number of times a combination of two
groups showed a significant difference relative to a concept.
To insure the procedure is understood, note one more example.
Column four of Table III corresponds to Table IX and relates
to the geographical area where the respondents' highest
degrees were received.

Note that there were six possible

combinations of two groups

(given by the

value) from
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the four groups used as a basis for stratification.

Out of

these six combinations of two, four (East-West, West-Midwest,
East-South and Midwest-South) showed a significant difference
with respect to concept A.

Thus,

67 was

entered as the first value in column four of Table III.
Now that the analytics of the "summed comparison ratio"
table have been explained, the table's function in analyzing
the major hypothesis may be expounded.

Reference to the

final figure in each column gives a value for Sr or the over
all measure of difference with respect to each environmental
factor tested.

A brief look at the Sr values reveals that

three factors assumed a value of Sr -*- 3 and could be considered
overall determinants of difference.

In addition, one factor

(geographical area where highest degree was received) was
sufficiently close to 3 (2 .8t|.) as to be included in the over
all determinant classification.

But what does this say rela

tive to the major hypothesis?
A Suggested Interpretation.

The only factor resulting

in Sr = 6 was the comparisons based on highest degree held.
Because of the extremely small number of respondents falling
into classes one (bachelors degree) and four (all other
degrees), only masters and doctorate degree holders were
compared.

A significant difference was shown with respect

to every concept.

As the assumed positive signs before all

calculated "t" values in Table VIII, APPENDIX B illustrate,
the holders of masters degrees reflected more favorable and
stronger connotations relative to all issues.

This propo

sition can be advanced because the mean value for each scale
was computed by groups and the mean of scale^ for group three
(doctorate) was subtracted from the corresponding scale for
group two (masters).

Hence, ^

" ^3 could assume a positive

value if and only if the means for group two were numerically
larger than the corresponding means for group three (i.e.,
^2 “ ^3 > 0 or ^ 2 > ^ 3 ^*

These larger mean values for group

two could only result from the selection of more extreme
spaces toward the positive bipolar adjective.

Perhaps the

only explanation for this result is that one of the effects
of doctoral education is the development of a more "scien
tifically skeptical" attitude that prevents one from favoring
extreme "black" and "white" alternatives.
A rather interesting situation developed relative to
the other major determinants of difference.

Every major

determinant, with the exception of the highest degree held,
related directly to a geographically influenced factor.
Specifically, geographical area where the highest degree was
received (Sr - 2.8^), geographical area where respondent was
reared (Sr = 3*00) and present residence (Sr = 3*33) showed
the greatest number of significant differences with respect
to all methodological beliefs.
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In view of this, it seems that environmental factors
do influence methodological convictions for if this were not
true, there would be no explanation for the existence of the
significant differences.

In effect an S^-^3.00 says that

relative to at least fifty per cent of the concepts tested
the groups compared entertained significantly different
opinions.

If the respondents were stratified on the basis

of geographical area where they presently resided,
S

r

an

-*3 would illustrate that at least one half of the total

comparisons made, among the various stratums, showed a
significant difference.

From this it could be inferred that

geographical residence is a determinant of difference with
respect to methodological beliefs.
The fact that some factors assumed an

value greater

than three while others did not provides the sufficient con
dition for confirmation of the major hypothesis.

Such a

finding is sufficient for it does, in fact, say that method
ological convictions are influenced by varying environmental
conditions.

Admittedly,

the hypothesis would have been more

directly confirmed if it had stated,

"geographical factors

influence professional attitudes toward methodology."
that as it may,

Be

the confirmation of the major hypothesis

was important because it provides

the necessary condition

for further analysis of the minor hypothesis.

Therefore,

conceptual simplicity of the major hypothesis should not

the
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depreciate its value for without its prior confirmation the
minor one would be meaningless and entirely unnecessary.
Minor Hypothesis
The minor hypothesis states:
Specific environmental factors do not influence
the formation of all methodological convictions
with equal intensity.
Therefore, the primary
determinant of one methodological belief may or
may not be the major determinant of another.
The macro analysis employed in the confirmation of the major
hypothesis contributes only partially to the confirmation of
the minor one.

As with most macro investigations,

the pre

ceding analysis leaves much to be desired concerning micro
elements.

It is especially tempting to ask if, perhaps,

some of those environmental factors elevated to the status
of overall determinants might prove unimportant relative to
any given concept.

This situation appears to have developed

in column four of Table III.

Although the geographical area

where the respondent's highest degree was received appeared
important as an overall influence

(Sr = 2 .8I4.}, it was exposed

as quite uninfluential relative to concept F (Cr = .17).
Obviously, this raises questions which require additional
analysis of the individual values comprising Sr .

Such ques

tions can be answered by a closer examination of the relation
ship between each concept and the various environmental factors.
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Concept A.

This concept relates to the "present state

of management theory" and its highest ratio of comparison
(Cr = .67) is shown in the first row of column four.

One

could infer from this that the geographical area where the
respondent's highest degree was received (as indicated by
column four) constituted the primary influence on his
appraisal of contemporary management theory.

Figure lij.

provides a visual profile of the mean responses of the pro
fessors educated in the areas specified by the legend at
the bottom of the diagram.
It may be noted that professors educated in the Southern
schools felt that management theory was in a "better" state
than did any other group.

Such a conclusion was reached by

noting the deeper penetration of the purple line toward the
positive (left) side of the bipolar adjective pairs.

An

additional observation may be drawn from the overall pattern
of responses by all groups.

This pattern indicated that the

greatest differences were relative to absolute gross magni
tudes on the evaluative scales rather than diametrical oppo
sition of connotative meanings.

For instance,

the evaluative

D scores in Table IV show that the largest linear separation
in the semantic space with respect to concept A existed be
tween Southern and Midwestern educated professors

(Dg = 1.21).

The second largest relative difference was between those
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"THE PRESENT STATE OP MANAGEMENT THEORY"

Good

Bad

Pair

Unfair

Valuable

Worthless

Successful

Unsuccessful

Complete

Incomplete

Strong

Weak

Brave

Cowardly

Constrained

Free

Deep

Shallow

Wide

Narrow

Legend:

(By geographical area where highest degree was received)
East_____ __
West
-Mi dwe s t ___
South
--FIGURE ll;
SEMANTIC PROFILE ON CONTEMPORARY THEORY
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TABLE IV
EVALUATIVE D MATRICES CORRESPONDING TO
THE PRIMARY DETERMINANTS OP DIFFERENCE
WITH RESPECT TO TESTED CONCEPTS

Concept A
2

3

4

.66
1.02
.00

.40
.00

.66
.53
1.21
.00

(By geographical area where highest degree was earned)

Concept B

1
1
2
3

.00

2

3
1.08
.00

1.09
.67
.00

4

k
1.74
.84
.91

.oo

(By geographical area of present residence)

Concept
1
1
2
3
4

.00

2
1.04
.00

c
3
1.15
.33
.00

4
2.05
1.11
.92
.00

(By geographical area of present residence)
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TABLE IV (continued)

Concept D

1
2
3
k
5

1

2

.00

.71
.00

3
1.06
.72
.00

5

k
.96
.91
1.09
.00

.80
1.27
l.k2
.00
.00

(By geographical area '
where reared)

Concept E
1
1
2
3
k
5

2

.00

.51
.00

3

k

.82
.51
.00

.66
.95
1 .23
.00

5
2.25
2.53
2.7k
1.9$
.00

(By geographical area where reared)

Concept F
1
1
2
3
k

.00

2

3
.k5
.00

k
.65
.28
.00

1.10
1.38
1 .6k
.00

(By parent's occupation)
Note:

The alternative subclassifications are referenced by
the numbers indicating the row and column.
For in
stance if the distance between group^ and group3
is desired, move horizontally across the row^ and
vertically down column^ until the desired cell is
obtained.
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teachers educated in the Midwest as opposed to the West
(I>E - 1 .02).

In each of these cases, however, only one of

the five evaluative scales on the visual profile measuring
concept A had a mean value which was located to the right
(negative) side of the bipolar continuum.

This result

clearly indicates that all groups had a relatively "good"
connotation of the present state of management theory.

It

is interesting to note that the one negative tendency was
relative to the complete-incomplete scale.

Once again it

seems the groups were in agreement that although the "present
state" was good, it was not complete and requires continued
improvement.

No astounding differences were noted on the

potency sc a l e s , as evidenced by the D scores in Table V.
Concepts B and C.

Collectively, concepts B and C con

stituted the epistemological issues examined in chapter two.
Because both concepts were related to the same issues they
provided an automatic consistency check on the factors exam
ined.

For instance, it was assumed that if any environmental

factor proved to be an insignificant determinant of difference
with respect to empiricism, it should likewise be unimportant
relative to ji priorism.

A look at Table III shows consistently

large and small Cr values in each column of the rows representing
concepts B and C (rows 2 and 3).

This truly amazing consistency

adds a degree of reinforcement to the confidence with which the
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TABLE V
POTENCY D MARTICES CORRESPONDING TO
THE PRIMARY DETERMINANTS OF DIFFERENCE
WITH RESPECT TO TESTED CONCEPTS

Concept A

1
•

o
o

1
2

2

3

.62

.34
.75

.00

.00

3

4

4
•49
.60
•4 4

.00

(By geographical area where highest degree was earned)

Concept B

1
2

1

2

3

.00

.80
.00

.78
.65

.00

3

4

4

2.00
1.30
1.81
.00

(By geographical area of present residence)

Concept £

1
•

3

4

0
0

1
2

2

3

.57

.59
.73

.00

.00

4

1.16
1.10
.75

.00

(By geographical area of present residence)
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TABLE V (continued)

ro h

Concept D
2

3

4

5

.38
.00

.75
•7 4

.79

1.47

.87

1.70
1.68

'jt.-P'w

.00

.25
.00

1.47
.00

(By geographical area where reared)

vn-P"Ui ro h

Concept E
2

3

4

.79
.00

.74

.89
1.18

.00

5
1.45
1.99
1.37

.81

.00

1.83
.00

(By geographical area where reared)

Concept P

1
2
3

1

2

.00

.76
.00

3

1.12

4

.50

.43
.94

.00

1.32

J+

.00
(By parent's occupation)

Note:

For instructions on use of this table, see note at
end of Table IV.
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results are reported.

Without such consistency one might ask,

quite validly, why an environmental factor would cause differ
ences of opinion relative to one epistemological issue and
not with respect to the other.
N o w that the criterion of consistency has been estab
lished, it m ay be noted by reference to column ten that the
geographical area of present residence was the primary
"influencer” of epistemological
files

perspectives.

Both the pro 

(Figures 15 and 16) and objective D measures indicated

that professors residing in the South and East thought most
differently concerning these issues

(Dg = 1.714- and Dp = 2.00

relative to empiricism while Dg = 2.05 and Dp = 1.16 with
respect to the a p r i o r i ).

Although all four groups viewed

empiricism as good (indicated by the penetration of all groups
toward the left-hand polar extreme in Figure 15),
agreement was not noted relative to a. priori

the same

theory.

Professors

residing in the South seemed to favor both epistemological alter
natives while the Eastern professor held a less favorable conno
tation of the a priori alternative.

This is easily noted by

the mean scale values traced by the red line which tends
slightly toward the negative

(right) side of the fourth posi

tion between the bipolar adjectives in Figure 16.

Both the

Western and Midwestern professors exhibited a neutral position
relative to a priorism and showed no significant difference in
their thinking on the matter.
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"EMPIRICISM IN MANAGEMENT THEORY"
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"THE A PRIORI IN MANAGEMENT THEORY"
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Thus, three rather interesting inferences can be drawn
concerning the epistemological perspectives of the respondents.
First of all, the geographical area in which the professor
resided appeared to be the most influential environmental
factor in the formation of methodological beliefs.

In addi

tion, all groups with the exception of the Southern professors
exhibited an exclusive empirical orientation.

The professors

who resided in the South, although entertaining a favorable
connotation concerning empiricism, showed a greater apprecia
tion of _a prioristic methods

than any other group.

Finally,

the epistemological concepts displayed a rather active potency
dimension that was not evident on concept A.

As a matter of

fact, Table V illustrates that some of the largest linear
separations between groups took place on the potency scales.
In the writer's thinking, this situation indicated that more
definite and established opinions existed concerning epi3temology than was evident with respect to the present state of
management theory.
Concepts D and E.

Proceeding onward, concepts D and E

may be labeled the value judgment issues.

Once again the

initial step was to note the consistency between the influence
of each factor on the opinions formed relative to each concept.
Unfortunately,

the various factors did not show the same as

tounding consistency toward value judgment concepts as they

did toward epistemology.

The inconsistencies were noted in

columns seven and ten of Table III.

Of the ten combinations

of two groups compared relative to geographical areas where
the respondents were reared (column seven) only four (.I4.0 )
showed significantly different connotations relative to posi
tive methodology.

Of this same series of combinations, eight

out of ten (.8 0 ) were significantly different with respect to
the normative issue.

One should note, however,

that the .I4.O

was the largest percentage difference evidenced by any single
factor for concept D (i.e.,

.I4.O was the largest value con

tained in the row designating concept D).

Thus,

there exists

a valid question as to whether or not this actually constituted
an inconsistency.

Another discrepancy developed in column ten

(place of present residence) where the values were .33 and .67
respectively.

It is the opinion of the writer that this situ

ation resulted from a less familiar "cognitive framework" on
the part of professors relative to the alternative value judg
ments positions.
In any event the two questionable cases did not con
stitute a large enough percentage of the total factors
examined (20 per cent)
the following analysis.

to seriously affect the validity of
Therefore, noting rows four and five

of Table III one may observe that the geographical area where
one was reared (column seven) was the most important determinant
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of difference in a professor's attitude toward the issues
dealing with value judgments.

Undoubtedly, the most obvious

difference existed in the form of the "good" and "strong"
connotations held by foreign born teachers (note Figure 18).
However, the number of individuals falling into this category
was so small (n = l±) that no analysis was attempted with re
gard to it.

Certainly, these data could be objected to as

unrepresentative and useless.

For this reason, only the

four "domestic" groups were investigated in detail.
The responding professors who were reared in the Mid
west distinguished themselves as the most oriented toward
positive-descriptive methods.

It can be noted from Figure

17 that the mean scores by scale for this group resulted in
a "more favorable" pattern of response on the profile indi
cating this concept than did the mean responses for any other
group.

Alternatively, Figure 18 reveals that this Midwestern

group entertained a "less favorable connotation" of normative
methods.
In general, the Eastern and Southern reared professors
seemed to be the primary advocates of the normative approach
to management.

Both value judgment profiles indicate that

the mean values by scale for the two groups trace a pattern
that penetrates more toward the positive side on the concept
relating to normative methods and more toward neutral with
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"POSITIVE-DESCRIPTIVE METHODOLOGY"
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"NORMATIVE-PRESCRIPTIVE METHODOLOGY"
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respect to the positive concept.
None of the domestic groups revealed a very active
potency dimension as evidenced by the D matrices relating
to concepts D and E in Table V.

This observation tends to

reinforce the previous statement which speculated the exis
tence of a less familiar "cognitive framework" relative to
value judgment issues.

However, the evaluative D matrices

in Table IV support the existence of the alliances uncovered
via examination of the visual profiles.

For instance, the

Dg values between Eastern and Midwestern reared professors
(dE = 1,06) and Midwestern and Southern (Dg = 1.09) confirm
that the various groups were separated with respect to con
cept D.

Corresponding values, Dg = .82 and Dg = 1.23, sug

gest a similar separation relative to concept E.
Thus, a rather distinct segmentation appears to have
developed.

The Midwestern reared respondents supported the

idea of positive methodology and exhibited an almost neutral
connotation toward the normative approach.

The East and South,

on the other hand, entertained a somewhat reversed attitude.
Concept F.

The final concept, political conservatism,

although not directly related to methodology, was included
primarily because it was considered useful in the examination
of the overall idea of environmental determination.

It was

found that parent's occupation was the primary determinant

of difference relative to this concept.

As illustrated by

Figure 19, children of professional parents revealed a more
favorable connotation of political conservatism.

Group four,

labeled "all others-*' but made up mostly of farmer's children,
had the least favorable connotation.

Initially, this came as

a surprise to the writer until an interesting similarity was
noted.

Visual analysis showed that blue-collar workers,

although entertaining a favorable connotation, were less in
favor of conservatism than professional groups.
the blue-collar group was

In the end,

"less" conservative than the pro

fessional and white-collar groups.

This might indicate, as

some convincingly argue, that recent legislative trends have
resulted in the support of agriculture and labor groups and
resentment from the professional and managerial classes.
Certainly, the above results could be interpreted as support
ing the existence of such a "class" alienation.

However,

since this bears no direct relationship to methodological
convictions no further observations will be made concerning
the subject.
A Brief Digre ssi on on Highest Degrees Held.

It was

y

m ent ioned earlier that significant differences

in connotative

meanings were revealed between holders of masters and doctorate
degrees with respect to every concept.

In addition,

it was

further noted that in each case the holders of masters degrees
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"POLITICAL CONSERVATISM"

Good

Bad

Fair

Unfair

Valuable

Worthless

Successful

Unsuccessful

Complete

Incomplete

Strong

Weak

Brave

Cowardly

Constrained

Free

Deep

Shallow

Wide

Narrow

Legend:

(By parent's occupation)
Blue-collar
White-collar
Professional
All Other

------___
FIGURE 19
POLITICAL PROFILE

225
took stronger although similar positions to those who possessed
doctorates.

Because such a general observation could be made

with reasonable validity, the minute details required no elabo
rate presentation.

This result, however, will be incorporated

in the synthesis and theoretical propositions to be advanced
in the following section.
A Summary of Opinion and a. Theory
One thing the survey of management academia made abun
dantly clear was the importance of geography in the formation
of methodological convictions.

Such an observation obviously

confirms the minor hypothesis since it suggests that certain
factors influence the development of methodological beliefs
and others do not.

In addition, specific influences such as

geographical area of present residence appear to be more
important determinants of one opinion than of another.

The

confirmation of this hypothesis and the prior confirmation of
the major one can now be interpreted in light of the implica
tions they carry for the future of management and organizations.
Epistemologically, professors residing in the East, M id
west and West emerged as exclusive empiricists while the
Southern professors, although entertaining a more favorable
attitude toward empiricism, showed an appreciation of & priori
methods.

In view of this, there seems to be little doubt that
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tomorrow's students of management will continue to be exposed
to the "virtues" of empiricism via the self-projection process
of today's academia.

Therefore, the theory of the future will

likely reveal a greater emphasis upon empirical investigation.
As a matter of fact, empiricism seemed to be so favorably
advocated by all groups that one would expect little episte
mologi cal disagreement to develop in the immediate forth
coming years.
Such a parallelism cannot be predicted with respect to
the value-centric predicament of management and organizations.
The fact that professors reared in the Midwest and those
reared in the East and South exhibited opposing preferences
relative to the question of value judgments is sufficient rea
son to forecast that controversy will continue in this area.
Such an obvious diversity will require that students of manage
ment continue their skeptical surveillance with respect to fact
and value.

The absence of uniform academic opinion profession

ally favoring one alternative or the other will encourage intel
lectual acceptance of research utilizing either or both approach
es and insure continued controversy relative to the issue.
In addition, the increased sophistication of the disci
pline and accelerated interest in general systems theory intro
duces more opportunities for the injection of subjective judg
ments.

For instance, management and organization theories
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are no longer formulated within the framework of a single
firm.

Instead, they incorporate political and social assump

tions which in turn influence the theoretical operations of
the private corporation.

The result of this increased sophis

tication is the creation of incremental pressures upon students
to critically analyze not only assumed objectives of the firm
but political and social ideals as well.
Academia likewise is confronted with increased responsi
bility to explicitly state which parts of their theoretical
labors are based on subjective preferences and which findings
are the result of scientific investigation.

In all, the

methodological future of management and organizations promises
to be an interesting period of debate, not so much relative to
traditional epistemological controversies, but with respect to
the place of judgments of value within its structure.
The data obtained in this survey support the contention
that today’s management academia takes pride in the progress
the descipline has experienced in recent years.

In spite of

this pride, none appear disillusioned relative to the work
that remains to be done.

With more and more terminally quali

fied faculty members entering the field, future theory will
likely be scrutinized with increased skepticism.

Consequently,

acceptance will require greater perfection and longer debate.
But this is as it should be in any area aspiring to scientific
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status;

for where there is controversy there is hope, but

where there is only complacency all is lost.
A Concluding Comment
N o w that the data have been presented and an interpreta
tion offered an ex post facto observation seems

in order.

No

doubt the reader has noticed that the me an responses on the
visual profiles exhibited a pronounced tendency toward n e u 
trality.

Specifically, many of the m ean values were located

along various points on the neutral or fourth position b e
tween a set of bipolar adjectives.
Several reasons m a y be advanced to account for this situa
tion.

Perhaps

the most important factor relates to the nature

of the subject under consideration.

It is likely that very

few of the respondents had any previous experience w i t h the
concepts they were asked to judge.
of graduate management programs

An extensive examination

in leading universities

revealed that practically none offered structured courses
which in any way related to the methodological foundations of
the discipline.

It is the opinion of the writer that this

lack of acquaintance bred

uncertainty and uncertainty encour

aged the cluster toward neutrality.
In addition,

there was evidence that the respondents were

somewhat unfamiliar with the semantic differential as a r e 
search device.

This unfamiliarity was,

to some extent,

expected
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since previous use of the SD has been primarily in the area
of psychology.

However, it is likely that this factor was

considerably less important than the previously mentioned
uncertainty.
Therefore, the "neutrality tendency" was definitely a
limitation of the analysis and in this sense it was dis
appointing.

But disappointment turned to challenge when it

was recognized that uncertainty based on lack of acquaint
ance indicates promise and potential.

Perhaps this study

will help to reduce this uncertainty and clear the way for
future investigations dealing with methodology of manage
ment and organizations.

EPILOGUE

Speculations on methodology are famous for plati
tude and prolixity.
The barrenness of methodo
logical conclusions is often a fitting complement
to the weariness entailed In the process of reach
ing them.
--R. P. Harrod

Methodologically, management and organization theory
occupies a rather strange position.

It is concerned with

physical processes, yet it is not a physical science.

M ore 

over, it deals with the purposeful action of human beings,
yet it is not entirely psychological in nature.
reason,

For this

it is granted the privilege of choice between the

best, and unfortunately at times the worst, of both "worlds"
of m e t h o d s .
In spite of this preferred position, the methodology of
management and organizations has failed to keep pace with
theoretical speculations.

As has been the case in the devel

opment of m any sciences, one is inclined to wonder if perhaps
the theoretical development of management is not reaching a
limit imposed by contemporary methods.

No doubt, many inves

tigations in the area remain nothing more than sophisticated
exercises in data collection for want of commonly accepted
methods of synthesis.
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The Methodologi cal Problem
Methodology is first of all a problem of philosophy and
is, therefore, best handled under the auspices of academia.
The action-oriented management practitioner can be depended
upon for little assistance in the systematic analysis of this
type of problem.

Perhaps the feature practitioners find most

disturbing is that conclusions rarely result from methodolog
ical discussions.

Therefore, the academician is often alone

in his recognition that conclusions are not prerequisite to
increased understanding.

However,

it is the intention of the

writer to confine the present comments to a brief summary of
the opinions and research findings offered in the preceding
analysis lest this study lend support to the introductory
quotation.
Epis temology
Chapter two dealt with epistemology, or the theory of
knowledge.

It was argued that the basic problems of all

sciences, organizations being no exception, are epistemological in that they deal with the relationship between per
ceived and objective reality.

The writer accepted the posi

tion of the epistemological dualists who contend that the
mental ’'filter1' of man prevents an identity between an object
or event and one's perception of it.

Because of this dualistic
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character of science, it was noted that the "principles" of
general semantics provide a dynamic framework for the analy
sis of epistemological questions.

In short, the acquiring

of knowledge is nothing more than a triadic relationship
between object*>thought>*symbol.

When a scientist, be he

physical or social, observes a phenomenon or creates a
theoretical idea, he abstracts at successive stages of
analysis on the basis of h i 3 unique experiences and beliefs.
Because of this the scientific report is similar to all other
reports, save for more rigorous checks on accuracy, and can
be quite successfully analyzed making use of the tenets of
general semantics.
Subclassified under dualism two additional epistemological positions were noted.

The first, and most influential

in recent years, is known as empiricism and claims that
experience is prerequisite to all knowledge.
man may know only what he perceives.
zations

In other words,

The literature of organi

has been dominated by the ramifications of this

epistemological perspective.

Herzberg and Likert are perhaps

the names most often associated with this type of analysis
although Ernest Dale was undoubtedly the empirical pioneer
in management.
The alternative position was referred to as rationalism
and contends that universal and empirically unverifiable
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truths exist concerning human behavior.

This method is

deductive whereas empiricism is fundamentally inductive.
Although management and organization theory has produced
no extreme a priorists t such as Von Mises and Robbins in
economics, it has been subjected to a prioristic influences
nonetheless.

Perhaps the most influential a priori works

are the theories built around Maslow's need hierarchy,
especially McGregor’s Theory X and Theory Y.
Basically, the deductive and inductive methods are
the only valid epistemological processes.

However, this

does not exclude, in the writer's opinion, the possibility
of minor alterations in the processes in an effort to
facilitate understanding in specific areas.

One such alter

ation was referred to as Verstehen or man to man understand
ing, possible only in the social disciplines where both the
observer and observee in the social-scientific relationship
are human beings.

This method provides great promise for

the formulation of hypotheses and intuitive explanation of
phenomena.

The inclusion of Verstehen in the methodology

of organizations could provide a more productive utilization
of ideal types.

Since general semantics exposes the utter

impossibility of knowing all there is to know about any
event, the delineation of the most important factors and
concentration upon them seems worthy of the status of
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"second best."
Although epistemology was noted as the most basic of
methodological considerations, other problems definitely
exist.

One such difficulty relates to the proper role of

value judgments within the confines of science.
Normative Versus Positive Theory
It is the opinion of the writer that only aspects con
cerning "what is" belong within the boundaries of organiza
tional science.

Although ideals of "what ought to be" are

appropriate topics for philosophers, the subjective nature
of the ends and values upon which they rest defy scientific
analysis.

De_ quatibus non est disputandum.

Regardless of the contention that the scientist qua
scientist is prohibited, by virtue of his position, from
advocating proper ends, the scientist qua individual qua
human being is not.

Thus, the scientist, like anyone else

may properly entertain social preferences.

It is only when

these preferences are disguised and offered under the heading
of scientifically established fact that he seriously damages
the validity and acceptability of his subject.

Insurance

against such a mixture of fact and value can be provided only
from within the scientific community itself.

Through the

perpetual examination and challenge of his colleagues the
scientist can be encouraged to explicitly specify which
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portion of his work constitutes systematically determined
fact and which portion is opinion.

Neither element should

be omitted but the separation must be accomplished if manage
ment and organization theory is to significantly progress
toward scientific status.
Some view the necessity of the separation of fact and
value from the viewpoint of scientific morality.

While the

writer recognizes this as a most important aspect, another
dimension is considered equally important.

This dimension

deals with the abstract nature of judgments of approval or
disapproval.

Events and processes are categorized as "good"

or "bad" on the basis of dominant characteristics abstracted
from the infinite array of qualities which the phenomenon
possesses.

Because there is no uniformity of intersubjective

abstraction, the probability that two individuals will ab
stract identical characteristics when passing a judgment is
infinitesimally small indeed.

Therefore, if care is not

taken the researcher may cast his subjective values upon
students who know little and skeptically inquire even less
about the subject being judged.
The influence of teacher on student is a situation common
to all communicative relationships and is known as self-projec
tion.

This conceptualization postulates that various environ

mental factors contribute to a greater or lesser extent to the
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formation of o n e '8 system of beliefs which permiates every
aspect of his communication with others.

It was with respect

to this idea that the empirical portion of this study was
undertaken.
The Empirical Analysis
Fundamentally, the objective of the survey of manage
ment professors was to determine the general consensus of
academia toward the methodological issues discussed above.
Then, making use of the results so developed, a speculation
into the future was offered.
Major Findings
Geographical factors emerged as the most important over
all determinant of different connotations with respect to
methodological concepts.

Factors such as the geographical

area where a respondent was reared, received his highest
degree, and place of present residence were found to be
extremely important.

Paradoxically,

the most important con

clusion derived from the analysis of the differences was the
existence of an epistemological similarity.

Nearly all the

epistemological differences were differences of absolute
magnitude not of direction, e r g o , contemporary thinking in
management and organization theory reveals an astounding
propensity toward empiricism.
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However, differences relative to the issue of value
judgments are sufficient to insure continued controversy.
This issue is considered by the writer to be the primary
methodological battleground of the future.

Only time can

tell the victor.
A Look Into the Crystal Ball
If the results of this analysis
thinking of management academia,

truly exhibit the

the future will likely

witness greater emphasis on empiricism.

The acceptance of

this epistemological alternative will necessitate continued
concentration upon quantitative methods and basic research
tools as integral parts of management curricula.

However,

debate will likely be quite acute with respect to the pros
and cons of normative versus positive theory.

Such a trend

will also require greater cooperation between academician
and practitioner.

The function of the former will be the

formulation of hypotheses and the scientific analysis of
data.

To accomplish this the academician must depend upon

the practitioner to supply him with the framework for
analysis and the experimental situations in which investi
gations may be conducted.
Regardless of the somberness with which the methodologi
cal picture has been painted,

it is unlikely that such diffi

culties will prove the coup de grace for management and

organization theory.

Certainly, any subject area whose

academicians are concerned and interested, to the extent
evidenced by the magnitude of the response to this partic
ular study, can cope with any problem.

In fact, it is with

respect to these "impossible" problems that academia pro
vides its most valuable contribution.

In any event a stu

dent of management cannot help but note the willingness
with which encouragement and cooperation were given to him
by established individuals in the area.
tion, the writer is sincerely grateful.

For this considera
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College of Business Adm inistration
DEP AR TMENT O F M ANAOEM ENT AND MARKETING

March 2£, 1968

Dear Professor:
When you think of the term "methodology," what thoughts
come to your m i n d — "empiricism"? . . , "positivism"? . . .
"i* Priori reasoning"?
What do such terms really m ean to
practlcing management professors in their teaching and
research?
I am attempting to answer these types of questions in
m y doctoral dissertation research at Louisiana State
University and I need your help.
Basically, I am trying
to relate certain factors in a professor's environmental
background with his convictions on selected methodological
issues.
Enclosed is a questionnaire designed to provide data
for my research.
Will you please take ten minutes of your
time to complete this form and return it to me?
I can
assure you that m y analysis of the data will be completely
statistical and there will be no attempt to identify any
respondent.
Also I will gladly share m y results with you
upon request.
Perhaps, with your help, I will be able to make a
positive contribution to the field of management.
Your
prompt reply will certainly be appreciated.
Sincerely y o u r s ,

W. Jack Duncan
WJD:jed
Enclosure

255
INSTRUCTIONS

The purpose of this study is to m easure the m e a n i n g of
certain concepts to various professors.
In order to accomplish
this objective y o u are asked to judge these concepts against a
series of descriptive scales.
Remember that these propositions
all deal with the methods used in teaching and/or researching
the area of management.
It is important that you m a r k the scales on the basis of
h o w you think the concepts should relate to m a n a g e m e n t theory
and m e t h o d o l o g y {except concepts one and six).
On each page
y o u will find a different concept and b e n e a t h it a brief e x p l a 
n a t i o n and a set of scales.
The scales should be m a r k e d as
follows:
If you think the concept at the top of the page is very
closely r e l a t e d to one end of the scale, place your m a r k in
the following manner:
Good

X

:

:

:

:

:

:

Bad

:

:

: X

Bad

or
Good

:

•
*

:

If you think the concept is quite c l o s e l y related to one
end of the scale (but not extremely), m a r k as follows:
Good

•
«

X

:

:

:

:

:

Bad

:

: X

:

Bad

or
Good

:

:

:

If the concept seems only slightly r elated to one side
(but is not neutral), m a r k as illustrated below:
Good

:

: X

:

:

•
•

•
«

Bad

: X

:

:

Bad

or
Good

:

:

:

2£6
The extreme toward w hich you m a r k depends u p o n which
extreme seems the m o s t characteristic of the p r o p o sition being
judged.
It you think the concept is neutral w i t h respect to a
p a r ticular scale or that a given scale is completely irrelevant,
place your m a r k in the middle space.
Good

:

:

: X

:

:

:

Bad

IMPORTANT:
(1)

Please m a r k in the center of the

3

pace.

This

:

:

: X

:

:

Not this

:

:

:

:

X

(2)

Please m a r k every scale for every concept--do not
omit a n y .

(3)

N e v e r put more

than one m a r k on a single scale.

None of the concepts will be repeated so please do not
look back and forth through the items and do not try to r e m e m 
ber h o w you m a r k e d associated items earlier in the question
naire.
Make each itern a. separate and independent j u d g m e n t .
Y o u are encouraged to work at a fai r l y h i g h rate of speed.
Do not be p u z z l e d over individual items; it is your first i m p r e s 
sion that is important.
On the other hand, please work carefully
so that the true impressions m a y be revealed.
The concluding page of the questionnaire is designed to
o btain some extremely important classification data.
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"THE PRESENT S TATE OP MAN A G E M E N T THEORY"

Bad

Good

Unfair

Fair

Valuable

Worthless

Successful

Unsuccessful

Complete

Incomplete

Strong

Weak

C o wardly

Brave

Cons trained

Free

Shallow

Deep

Wide

Narrow

2£8

"EMPIRICISM IN MANAGEMENT THEORY"

Empiricism emphasizes experimentation and the use of induc
tive reasoning in an effort to draw inferences regarding
underlying relationships upon which management theories may
be constructed.

Bad

Good

Unfair

Fair

Valuable

Worthless

Successful

Unsuccessful

Complete

Incomplete

Strong

Weak

Cowardly

Brave

Cons trained

Free

Shallow

Deep

Wide

Narrow
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"THE A PRIORI IN MANAGEMENT THEORY"

The a priori position states that certain premises and axioms
of management are self-evident requiring no empirical testing.
Theory in this sense is the logical deduction of theoretical
constructs from these self-evident premises.

Bad

Good

Unfair

Fair

Valuable

Worthless

Successful

Unsuccessful

Complete

Incomplete

Strong

Weak

Cowardly

Brave

Constrained

Free

Shallow

Deep

Wide

Narrow
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"POSITIVE-DESCRIPTIVE METHODOLOGY"

P o s i t i v e - d e s c r i p t i v e m e t h o d o l o g y refers to the analysis of
m a n a g e r i a l issues c o n c e n t r a t i n g on "what is" while r e m a i n 
ing n e u tral r e l a t i v e to the value judgments of "what ought
to b e ."

Bad

Good

Unfair

Fair

V a luable

Worth l e s s

Successful

Unsuccessful

C om p l e t e

I n c omplete

Strong

Weak

Cowardly

Brave

Cons t r a i n e d

Free

Shallow

Deep

Wide

Narrow
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"NORMATIVE-PRESCRIPTIVE METHODOLOGY"

Normative-prescriptive methods do not remain neutral relative
to value judgments but include the criteria of "what ought to
be" as an integral part of theoretical formulations.

Bad

Good

Unfair

Fair

Valuable

Worthless

Successful

Unsuccessful

Complete

Incomplete

Strong

Weak

Cowardly

Brave

Constrained

Free

Shallow

Deep

Wide

Narrow
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"POLITICAL CONSERVATISM"

Bad

Good

Unfair

Fair

Valuable

Worthless

Successful

Unsuccessful

Complete

Incomplete

Strong

Weak

Cowardly

Brave

Cons trained

Free

Shallow

Deep

Wide

Narrow

CLASSIFICATION DATA

1.

In what type insitution do you presently teach?
a.
b.
c.

Public (State or Municipal)
_____
Non-public (Other than Denominational) _____
Denominational
_____

2 . What is your academic rank?
a.
b.

Instructor
Assistant Professor ______

c.Associate Professor
d. Professor

3.

What is your age?

U-

What is the highest academic degree you hold?
a.
b.

5.

____

Bachelors _______
Masters
_______

c. Doctorate_______________ ____
d. Other (Please Specify) ______

In what year and from what institution did you receive your
highest degree? ________________________________________________

6 . Approximately how many years have you been employed as a
full-time teacher?
a.
b.

7.

Less than

5

6 - 1 0

Which of the following
preference?
a.
b.

Catholic ________
Jewish
________

c. 11-20
d.
2 1 - 3 0
___
most

e. More than 30

nearly describes your religious

c.Protestant
____
d.Other (Please Specify) _________

8.

In what state were you reared? ________________________________

9.

Approximately what was the size of the city (or town)
which you were reared?
a.
b.

10.

Less than 25,000
c. 100.001-500,000
2 5 ,0 0 1 - 1 0 0 , 0 0 0
d. 5 0 0 ,0 0 0 -1 ,0 0 0 , 0 0
e.
More than 1,000,000 ____

0

in

_____

In which of the following categories would you place your
father's (or guardian's) occupation?
a.
b.

Blue-collar ____
White-collar ____

c.
d.

Professional______________ ____
Other (Please Indicate)

APPENDIX B
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TABLE VI
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN CONNOTATIVE MEANINGS OF
METHODOLOGICAL CONCEPTS BY TYPE OF INSTITUTION AT
a = .05

Possible Comparisons:
Group 1 - Public
Group 2 - Private
Group 3 - Denominational
Possible Combinations of Two Groups:

Groups compared: Public - Private
Degrees of freedom: nj + n 2 - 2 = 123
Critical "t" values: -1.98 < t <1.98

Computed Values of "t" by Scales
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1.00

A

1.15

.81

1.98

1.88

2.25

2.05

1.13

2.69

.90

B

1.31

.30

1.16

2.66

1.98

2.51

1.22

1.34

2.31

1.44

C

1.68

1.77

2.05

.88

.33

1.08

2.45

- .25

- .28

- .50

Note:

Public and private school faculties showed no significant difference
with respect to concepts D, E and F. In addition, the public denominational school comparison and private - denominational
combination revealed no difference with respect to any of the six
concepts.
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TABLE VII
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN CONNOTATIVE MEANINGS OF
METHODOLOGICAL CONCEPTS BY AGE AT a * .05

Possible Comparisons:
Group 1 - Less than 25 years
Group 2 - 26-40 years
Group 3 - 41-60 years
Group 4 - More than 60 years
Possible Combinations of Two Groups:

(:)■•
Groups compared: (Less than 25) - (26-40 years)
Degrees of freedom: nj + n2 = 75
Critical "tM values: -2.00 £ t <2.00
Computed Values of "t" by Scales
1

B
C
D
F

.24
2.21

.49
-

.86

3

2

1.06
1.90
.32
- .12

-

.10

.95
- .05
-1.25

4
- .81
1.16
- .10
- .84

5
-

.10

1.06
.40
-1.75

7

6

- .53
1.12
.10

- .24

-1 . 0 0
2.03
2.66

-

.20

8

9

10

-2.17
.89
- .24
-2.85

- .34
.89
- .10
- .85

1.50
1.32
.95
1.40

.37

- .71

.20

-2.99

- .64

.80

Groups compared: (26-40 years) - (41-60 years)
Degrees of freedom: n2 + n3 - 2 = 113
Critical "t" values: -1.98 £ t < 1.98
B

-1.10

.15

2.00

.00

-1.00

- .44

1.98

Groups compared: (Less than 25 years) - (41-60 years)
Degrees of freedom: n^ + n3 - 2 « 72
Critical "t" values: -2.00 <; t £ 2.00
F

-

.86

- .20

- .70

-1.43

-2.00

- .36

- .03
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TABLE VII (continued)

Groups compared: (Less than 25 years) - (Over 60)
Degrees of freedom: n^ + n^ - 2 = 30
Critical "t" values: -2.02 < t < 2.02
Computed Values of "t" by Scales
1
D

- .42

Note:

2

3

-1.70

-1.00

4
- .46

5

6
.19

7

- .55

8
-2.21

9
- .33

10
-1.16

-2.02

No significant differences were revealed with respect to various
group comparisons and concepts. The insignificant differences
by group combinations were:
Groups

Concepts

1-2
2-3
1-3
1-4
2-4
3-4

A,
A,
A,
A,
A,
A,

E
C,
B,
B,
B,
B,

D,
C,
C,
C,
C,

E,
D,
E,
D,
D,

F
E
F
E, F
E, F
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TABLE VIII
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN CONNOTATIVE MEANINGS OF
METHODOLOGICAL CONCEPTS BY HIGHEST DEGREE HELD
AT a = .05

Possible Comparisons:
Group 1 - Bachelors degrees
Group 2 - Masters degrees
Group 3 - Doctorate degrees
Group 4 - All other degrees
Possible Combinations of Two Groups:
=

1

(only one comparison made)

Groups compared: Masters - Doctorate
Degrees of freedom: n 2 + n 3 - 2 = 143
Critical "t" values: -1.98 £ t ^.1.98
Computed Values of "t" by Scales
2

1

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

.10

.96

1.34

.20

.38

1.28

1.78

2.23

1.98

1.58

2.01

.42

.92

.52

.50

.80

.93

1.11

.64

1.75

1.38

1.77

1.53

.41

.63

.20

.76

.20

.92

.20

.20

.20

.20

.30

A

1.42

4.23

B

1.75

C

1.56

D

.49

E

.52

F

1.58

Note:

3

.30
2.21

1.44

2.22

1.11

.40

.40

.50

1.99

1.00

.20

.10

.1 0

.43

1.65

1.12

2.10

.89

2.00

Groups one and four were so numerically small that comparisons
requiring their participation were not attempted.

TABLE IX
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN CONNOTATIVE MEANINGS OF
METHODOLOGICAL CONCEPTS BY GEOGRAPHICAL AREA
WHERE HIGHEST DEGREE WAS RECEIVED AT o * .05

Possible Comparisons:
Group 1 - East
Group 2 - Midwest
Group 3 - South
Group 4 - West
Possible Combinations of Two Groups

(;)•«
Groups compared: East - West
Degrees of freedom: nj + n4 - 2 = 74
Critical "t" values: -2.00 £ t £2.00
Computed Values of "t" by Scales
i
8

A
B
C

.12
-1.27 -2.12
- .67 - .77
.66

-1.00
-1.00
1.32

- .62
-1.69
2.37

- .34
-1.50
1.61

9

10

- .40
-1.68
.94

-2.37
-1.09
1.64

.72
- .15
1.28

-1.12
-2.61
1.15

- .41
- .50
1.88

1.64

2.30

- .64

1.16

.57

‘.73
.94
2*00 -1.08

.40
.40

1.13
- .20

2.00
- .29

- .20
- .05

Groups compared: West - Midwest
Degrees of freedom: n4 + n2 - 2 = 81
Critical "t" values: -2.00 £ t £ 2.00
A

-2.00

1.10

2.66

1.32

1.00

Groups compared: East - Midwest
Degrees of freedom:
+ n 2 - 2 = 85
Critical "t" values: -2.00 £ t £ 2.00
B
C

.93
- .38

1.82
.45
.39 - .65

1.00
-1.76
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TABLE IX (continued)

Groups compared: East - South
Degrees of freedom: n^ - n* - 2 = 61
Critical "t" values: -2.00 < t £ 2.00

Computed Values of "t" by Scales
1

A
B
E

- .38
.53
1.10

1.12

1.84
1.42

4

3

2

1.45
.83
1.18

1.00
1.00
1.68

-

5

6

.20

- .43
.65
1.75

.18
1.93

7

8

2.05
2.08
2.24

- .90

1.90
- .30
1.82

.74
- .45
2.63

.15
-1.29

.55
.74
.57

1.65

- .76
- .24
-1 . 8 8

.10

2.25

9

10

.03
1.60
1.18

- .55
- .96
2.74

.31
.71
1.87

1.60
.58
2.85

Groups compared: West - South
Degrees of freedom: n4 + nj - 2 = 57
Critical "t" values: -2.00 £ t £ 2.00
C
D
E

- .24
- .75
.71

.45
- .64
.82

2.75
- .43
.92

1.24
-2.03
1.23

.02

- .42
.56

2.21

Groups compared: Midwest - South
Degrees of freedom: n2 + n3 - 2 = 6 8
Critical "t" values: -2.00
t i 2.00
A
C
D
E
F

.67
- .82
.05
.65
2.64

Note:

2.21

.64
2.18
1.60
1.05

2.88

.57
-

.20

1.08
.98

1.63
2.60
-1.09
1.06
.58

.31
1.00

-1.46
1.17
1.12

2.20

2.02

- .35
1.28

.20

.20

2.00

.80

- .0 0 , -1.18
.43
-1.46
.15
-1.30
1.40
.84
1.50
.20

The following group combinations showed no significant difference
with respect to the concepts listed.
Groups

Concepts

1-2

A,
B
C,
D,
ii,
A,

2-3
1-3
1-4
2-4
3-4

D, E, F
D,
E,
C,
B,

F
F
D, E
F
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TABLE X
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN CONNOTATIVE MEANINGS OF
METHODOLOGICAL CONCEPTS BY TOTAL TEACHING EXPERIENCE
AT Of * .05

Possible Comparisons:
Group 1 - Less than 5 years
Group 2 - 6-10 years
Group 3 - 11-20 years
Group 4 - 21-30 years
Group 5 - More than 30 years
Possible Combinations of Two Groups:
(")■ 10

Groups compared: (Less than 5 years) - (6-10 years)
Degrees of freedom: n^ + n 2 - 2 = 71
Critical ”t" values: -2.00 £ t £ 2.00
Computed Values of "t" by Scales
1
D

-1.86

2

3

-2.72

-1.83

4
-2.01

5

6

7

- .91

- .81

8
- .54

9
-1.83

10
- .52

- .38

Groups compared: (6-10 years) - (11-20 years)
Degrees of freedom: n2 + n3 - 2 = 77
Critical "t" values: -2.00 < t < 2.00
A
B
C

.41
- .64
1.62

1.29
1.68

.32

.08
1.28
.87

- .05
.00

1.08

- .57
.44
- .60

.70
.00

- .69

1.74
1.08

.70
2.18
.88

.20

2.00

1.22

-1.45
.36

.48
2.17

-2.00
-1.00

- .47
1.29

Groups compared: (Less
than 5 years) - (21-30 years)
Degrees of freedom:
n^ +
_ 2 = 59
Critical "t" values: -2.00 i t <2.00
A
F

-1.18
-1.48

- .96
- .83

- .00 - .55 -1.41
.10 -1.23 - .05

-1.32
-2.01

-1.20
-1.50

-1.70
- .20
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TABLE X (continued)

Groups compared: (Less than 5 years) - (Over 30 years)
Degrees of freedom: n^ + ns - 2 = 46
Critical "t" values: -2.02 < t < 2.02

Computed Values of "t" by Scales

A
B
C

3

2

1

.63
.77
2.21

.81
- .29
1.58

4
.65
.31
1.51

.51
-1.36
2.20

5

7

6

2.09
1.50
- .28

1.47
1.20

2.03

- .10
- .43
.56

8

1.28
2.46
1.16

9

10

1.02

1.02

2.02

1.40
1.25

2.15

Groups compared: (6-10 years) - (Over 30 years)
Degrees of freedom: n2 + n$- 2 = 37
Critical "t" values: -2.02 ^ t < 2.02
A
B
C
D
E

.95
1.18
1.23
-1.08
2.18

.52
- .83
1.58
-2.03
- .86

1.12

.66

-2.16
1.24
.97
2.18

- .05
1.12

- .96
.05

2.54
2.16
.27
- .63
-1 . 2 0

2.06
1.16
2.05
-1.13
.88

.32
- .33
»»90
-1.15
.10

1.30

.48
.95
.83

1,
.10
-1., 1 0
- .10

1.50
1.14
2.35
- .07
1.48

2.10

2.03

1.20
1.20

.

1 .20

,

1.20

.30

Groups compared: (11-20 years) - (Over 30 years)
Degrees of freedom: n^ + nj - 2 + 52
Critical "t" values: 2.02 <L t < 2.02
A
B
C

1.26
- .86
2.36

1.28

.58

.10

-1 . 2 2
2.15

1.62

.94
- .30
1.81

.81
2.19
- .10

2
1
1

.03
.04
.92

.73
1.00

2.00

2.86

1.32

1.12

2.08

.94

1.91

1.48

.43

Groups compared*. (21-30 years) - (Over 30 years)
Degrees of freedom: n4 + n$ - 2 = 25
Critical "t" values: -2.04 < t < 2.04
A

.70

Note:
Groups
1-2

2-3
1-3
1-4
2-4

.68

.93

1.03

2.17

1.73

.51

The following combinations showed no significance with respect to
the concepts listed:
Concepts
A, B, C,
D, E, F
B, C, D,
A, B, C,
A, B, C,

E, F
E
D, E, F
D, E, F

Groups
3-4
1-5
2-5
3-5
4-5

Concepts
A, B, C, D,
D, E, F
F
D, E, F
B, C, D, E,
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TABLE XI
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN CONNOTATIVE MEANINGS OF
METHODOLOGICAL CONCEPTS BY RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE
AT a = .05

Possible Comparisons:
Group 1 - Catholic
Group 2 - Jewish
Group 3 - Protestant
Group 4 - All Other
Possible Combinations of Two Groups:

6
Groups compared: Catholic - Protestant
Degrees of freedom: nj + n 3 - 2 = 119
Critical "t" values: -1.98 £ t < 1.98
Computed Values of "t" by Scales
10
E
F

- .89 -1.71
.71
.59

- .71
.88

- .43
.08

.00
2.50

-1.57
.69

-2.26
.00

- .41 -1.65
-1.00
1.05

- .02

-1.23

-2.02

-1.63

-1.74
.40
-1.46
-2.29
-2.55

-1.29
-1.44
- .79
- .69
-2.84

- .78
- .55
-1 . 2 2
-1 . 6 8
-3.25

- .71
.20

Groups compared: Catholic - All Other
Degrees of freedom: n^ + n^. - 2 = 43
Critical "t" values: -2.02 < t £2.02
F

-1.51

- .95

- .84

- .33

-1.27

2.07

Groups compared: Protestant - All Other
Degrees of freedom: n^ + n^ - 2 = 116
Critical "t" values: -1.98 £ t < 1.98
A
B
C
D
F

-1.90
- .10
-1.17
- .63
-2.79

-3.02
- .32
-1.89
- .42
-2.18

- .48
.84
- .88
- .15
-1.65

-1.47
-2.56
-2.06
-1.38
-1.38

-1 .99
- .20
- .60
- .84
-1.90

- .87
- .86
-1.98
-1.53
-2.32

-

1.21

- .79
-1.45
-1.40
-3.26

TABLE XI (continued)

Note:

Significant differences did not exist between groups in the
following categories.
Groups
1-2
2-3
1-3
1-4
2-4
3-4

Concepts
A,
A,
A,
A,
A,
E

B,
B,
B,
B,
B,

C, D, E, F
C, D, E, F
C, D
C, D, E
C, D, E, F
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TABLE XII
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN CONNOTATIVE MEANINGS OF
METHODOLOGICAL CONCEPTS BY GEOGRAPHICAL AREA
IN WHICH RESPONDENT WAS REARED AT a = ,05

Possible Comparisons:
Group 1 - East
Group 2 - Midwest
Group 3 - South
Group 4 - West
Group 5 - Foreign
Possible Combinations of Two Groups

(:)■»
Groups compared: East - West
Degrees of freedom: n. + n4 - 2 = 56
Critical "t" values: -2.00 < t <. 2.00
Computed Values of "t" by Scales

.30

.44

3

4

5

.75

.00

.63

6

7

10

3.21

2.08

2.65

.32

.82

-1.24
-2.37

-2.77
-3.09

.65 -1.94
-2.15 - .51

-1.30
.34

1.32
.73
- .06

1.42
.81
- .77

Groups compared: West - Midwest
Degrees of freedom: n4 + n2 - 2 = 74
Critical "t" values: -2.00 ^ t ^ 2.00
B
C

.03
.10
-1.50 -1.46

-1.05
.55

.50 - .56
- .74 -1.10

Groups compared: East - Midwest
Degrees of freedom: nj + n2 - 2 = 84
Critical "t" values: -2.00 £ t <2.00
B
D
E

.53
1.15
- .61

.74
1.05
2.03

.28
.82
-1.00

1.29
1.29
- .60

1.32
2.11
- .43

2.03
.52
1.00

2.30
1.23
.30

.29
1.21

.33

TABLE XII (continued)

Groups compared: East - South
Degrees of freedom:
+ n-j - 2 = 64
Critical "t" values: -2.00 < t £ 2,00

Computed Values of "t" by Scales
1

A
B
C
D
E

- .80
-1 . 0 0
- .31
- .80
- .45

2

-1.46
-2 . 1 2
-1.75
- .29
.10

3
-2.16
-1 . 2 0
-2.27
.58
- .30

4
-2 . 0 2
-2,56
- .81
- .01
-1 . 1 0

5
-1 . 6 6
-1.72
.92
-2.40
-1.47

6

7

-1.28
-1.93
-1.35
-1 . 0 0
- .68

-2.31
-2.04
- .78
- .63
- .38

.31
1.40
1.08
- .84

1.34
.82
1.47
- .58

1.37
.34
.94

2.42

.48
- .75

-1.40
1.29

9

8

-1.27
-1.93
-1.09
.00

- .18

-1 . 0 2
-1.75
- .18
-1 . 0 0
- .73

10

- .61
-1.08
-1.24
-1.39
-2 . 0 1

Groups compared: West - South
Degrees of freedom: n^ + nj - 2 = 54
Critical "t" values: -2 . 0 0 ^ t i 2 . 0 0
A
C
E
F

.45
1.02
.32
.59

1.42
1.79
1.10
.10

2.11

2.60
.31
.20

- .82
2.40
1.68
.10

-1.89
.53
1.42
2.19

.60
1.45

.36
- .33

.75
2.41
2.03
.70

.42
- .78
- .82

.20

- .28

- .6 6
- .55

1.88

- .41
- .26

- .62
- .26

.95
1.86

-

.12
.66

Groups compared: Midwest - South
Degrees of freedom: ^ + n, - 2 = 82
Critical "t" values: -2.00 < t < 2.00
A
D
E

.84
-2.03
1.08

2.00
- .75
,76

2.53
-1.50
1.25

2.13
-1.19
1.70

2.25
.38
2.02

.00

33

.20

Groups compared: East - Foreign Reared
+ n5 - 2 = 37
Degrees of freedom:
Critical "t" values: -2 . 0 2 < t < 2 . 0 2
C
E

- .93
-1.15

- .83
.00

.50
1.62

2.12
2.94

.90
- .20

.68

2.08
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TABLE XII (continued)

Groups compared: West - Foreign Reared
Degrees of freedom: n^ + ng - 2 = 27
Critical "t" values: -2.06 i t <2.06

Computed Values of "t" by Scales
1
c

E
F

- .38
.32
- .84

2

4

3

- .58
.71
-1.42

.84
1.62
-2.16

2.84
2.95
- .20

5

6

.51
- .10
-1.74

1.01
.42
-1.00

7

8

9

10

-1.05
2.17
-2.30

1.07
2.31
.00

- .08
.12
-1.05

.22
- .12
- .09

- .10
-2 . 1 0
- .30
- .04

-2.59
.05
-3.05
1.40

- .26
1.36
-1.58

-1.08
-1 . 1 0
- .05
- .43

- .28
1.49
-1 65

2.33
1.97
-1.04

Groups compared: Midwest - Foreign Reared
Degrees of freedom: n2 + ng - 2 = 55
Critical "t" values: -2.02 i t i 2.02
B
C
D
E

1.18
-1.56
-1.09
1.82

- .96
-1.55
-1 . 1 2
1.14

.80
- .12
- .09
2.35

1.36
2.26
-1 . 2 1
3.48

- .72
.64
.69
- .68

- .12
- .36
- .54
.12

.12

Groups compared: South - Foreign Reared
Degrees of freedom: n^ + n$ - 2 = 35
Critical "t" values: -2.04 < t <2.04
B
E
F

.69
.89
-1.16

Note:

-1.58

.20

.22

.20

-1.46
-2.15

-2.24

-1.48

.22

- .18
-1 . 0 2
.15

-1 . 0 2
-1.14
.62

-1.46
-1.34
- .33

The following groups showed no significant difference relative
to the concepts listed below.

Groups

Concepts

Groups

Concepts

1-2

A,
B,
F
A,
A,

3-4
1-5
2-5
3-5
4-5

B,
A,
A,
A,
A,

2-3
1-3
1-4
2-4

.00

- .17
- .85

C, F
C, F
B, C, D, E
D, E, F

D
B, D,
F
C, D
B, D
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TABLE XIII
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN CONNOTATIVE MEANINGS OF
METHODOLOGICAL CONCEPTS BY CITY SIZE WHERE
RESPONDENT WAS REARED AT a * .05

Possible Comparisons:
Group 1 - Less than 25,000
Group 2 - 25,001 - 100,000
Group 3 - 100,000 - 500,000
Group 4 - 500,001 - 1,000,000
Group 5 - Greater than 1,000,000
Possible Combinations of Two Groups:

Groups compared: (Less than 25,000) - (25,001 - 100,000)
Degrees of freedom: n^ + ^ - 2 = 58
Critical "t" values: -2.00 ^ t < 2.00
Computed Values of "t" by Scales
1

B
D
E

2.70
.36
1.66

2

2.56
.46
.50

3
1.45
.50
1.60

4
1.37
.50
.71

5
.35
1.25
2.39

6

.35
.15
.81

7
1.27
-2.90
- .58

8

1.13
1.50
- .24

9

10

.71
- .50
- .15

1.55
- .44

2.15
1.36

1.00
- .35

.00

Groups compared: (25,001 - 100,000) - (100,001 - 500,000)
Degrees of freedom: n2 + nj - 2 » 50
Critical "t" values: -2.02 S t 1 2.02
D
E

1.50
.90
- .30 - .35

-1.10
2.08

.24
1.18

1.08
.77

.00
1.12

.27
.40

1.52
.08

Groups compared: (Less than 25,000) - (100,001 - 500,000)
Degrees of freedom: nj + nj - 2 = 84
Critical "t" values: -2.00 ^ t < 2.00
E
F

-1.40 -1.25
- .10 - .24

.50
1.56

-1.82 -2.13
.00 - .72

-2.30
- .53

- .03
-2.92

- .25
-1.24

-1.64
.13
-1.37 -1.32
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TABLE XIII (continued)

Groups compared: (Less than 25,000) - (Greater than 1,000,000)
Degrees of freedom:
+ n5 - 2 = 83
Critical Mt" values: -2.00 < t < 2.00

Computed Values of "t" by Scales
1
A
E

-2.02
- .75

2

3

4

-1.98 -2.44
-2.24 - . 6 6

-2.33
- .35

5

6

-1.54
-1.40

7

8

-2.15
-1.97

-1.28
.00

9
-1.06
-1.42

10
-1.29 - .95
-1.57 -1.28

Groups compared: (25,001 - 100,000) - (Greater than 1,000,000)
Degrees of freedom: n 2 + 115 - 2 = 49
Critical "t" values: -2.02 £ t £ 2.02
F

-1.77

-1.45

-1.77

- .21

-1.36

-1.15

-1.95

-2.06

-1.78

-1.83

Groups compared:(100,001 - 500,000)
- (Greater than 1,000,000)
Degrees of freedom: nj + ng - 2 = 45
Critical "t" values: -2.02 ^ t ^ 2.02
C
F

- .62
-1.17

Note:

-1.34
-1.87

-1.52
.42

-1.60 - .92
- .05 -1.13

-1.18
-2.61

-2.18
-1.55

-2.12
- .S6

- .78 -1.33
-1.32 -1.66

No significant differences were revealed among the following
groups with respect to the concepts listed.
Groups

Concepts

1-2

A,
A,
A,
A,
A,
A,
B,
A,
A,
A,

2-3
1-3
1-4
2-4
3-4
1-5
2-5
3-5
4-5

c,

F

c,
c,
c,
c,
c,

F
D
D,
D,
D,
c, D, F
B, c, D,
B, D, E
B, c, D,
B,
B,
B,
B,
B,

E, F
E, F
E, F
E
E, F
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TABLE XIV
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN CONNOTATIVE MEANINGS OF
METHODOLOGICAL CONCEPTS BY PARENT’S OCCUPATION
AT a * .05

Possible Comparisons:
Group 1 - Blue-collar
Group 2 - White-collar
Group 3 - Professional
Group 4 - All others
Possible Combinations of Two Groups:

Groups compared: Blue-collar - White-collar
Degrees of freedom: n^ + ^ - 2 * 8 8
Critical "t" values: -2.00 £ t £2.00
Computed Values of "t" by Scales
1
F

.20

2
.28

3
.83

4

5
.54

6

1.62

7

8

10

9
1.28

.54

1.48
1.13
.30
.30
- .50 -2.00 - .58 - .13

.20
- .13

.56

1.48

2.09

Groups compared: White-collar - Professional
Degrees of freedom: n 2 + nj - 2 = 89
Critical "t" values: -2.00 < t < 2.00
B
F

2.35
.12

1.00
-3.55

2.41 1.60
- .57 - .40

.59
- .62

Groups compared: Blue-collar - Professional
Degrees of freedom: n, + n 3 - 2 = 81
Critical "t" values: -2.00 £ t < 2.00
F

- .35

- .55

- .79

- .90

'-1.08

-1.18

-2.13

-1.18

-1.47

-1.54

- ,30

- .55

- .26

- .95

- .85

Groups compared: Blue-collar - Others
Degrees of freedom: n^ + n* - 2 = 55
Critical ”t” values: -2.00 £ t < 2.00
F

-2.02

-2.02

-1.08

- .56

- .84
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TABLE XIV (continued)

Groups compared: White-collar - Others
Degrees of freedom: n~ + n. - 2 = 63
Critical "t" values: -2.00 < t £ 2.00

Computed Values of "t" by Scales
1
F

-1.32

2

3

-1.47

-2.43

4
-2.11

5

6

7

-1.57

-1.26

8

9

10

-2.12

- .69

- .39

- .53

2.13

.75

1.29

1.51

Groups compared: Professional - Others
Degrees of freedom: n, + n - 2 = 56
Critical "t" values: -2.00 i t < 2.00
F

1.07

Note:

2.88

2.55

1.89

1.61

2.03

No significant differences were exposed relative to the following
groups and concepts.
Groups

Concepts

1-2
2-3
1-3
1-4
2-4
3-4

A,
A,
A,
A,
A,
A,

B,
C,
B,
B,
B,
B,

C,
D,
C,
C,
C,
C,

D,
E
D,
D,
D,
D,

E
E
E
E
E
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TABLE XV
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN CONNOTATIVE MEANINGS OF
METHODOLOGICAL CONCEPTS BY PRESENT RESIDENCE
AT a s .05

Possible Combinations:
Group 1 - East
Group 2 - Midwest
Group 3 - South
Group 4 - West
Possible Combinations of Two Groups:

(:)■•
Groups compared: East - West
Degrees of freedom: n. + n4 - 2 = 69
Critical "t" values: -2.00 £ t
2.00
Computed Values of "t" by Scales
1

B
C
D
E
F

2

1.35

.99
1.38

2.00

1.00

1.40

.33

.68

.00

.00

3

4

5

.03
1.65

2.42
.47

1.24

.00

.53
2.25

.86

1.00

1.01

1.54
.87

2.79
.00

6

1.75
.47
.77
1.59
.87

7

8

.08
1.14
2.81
.63

.74
.32
.73

1.21

.00

.66

9
1.27
1.49

10

.43
1.79

.63
.94
.36
.47
1.46

1.77
.57

- .56
.47

1.74
.80
1.32

1.77
2.70

.00

Groups compared: East - Midwest
Degrees of freedom:
+ n2 - 2 = 6 6
Critical "t" values: -2.00 i t < 2.00
B
C

- .39
1.14

.00
2.05

.00
1.67

2.11
1.28

1.83
.00

1.16
.37

.00

.00

.76

.46

2.14
3.23
.46

1.34
2.90

Groups compared: Midwest - South
Degrees of freedom: n 2 + n, - 2 = 77
Critical "t" values: -2.00 < t < 2.00
A
B
E

2.00
.80
1.27

2.18
1.90
1.35

2.00
.57
.10

1.77
1.17
1.74

1.83
1.16
2.37

2.84
2.00
2.22

.20

2.20
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TABLE XV (continued)

Groups compared: East - South
Degrees of freedom: nj + n3 - 2 = 70
Critical "t" values: -2.00 £ t ^ 2.00

Computed Values of "t" by Scales
2

1

A
B
C
D
E
F

1.96
.42
2.65
.41
.84
1.11

1.75
1.64
3.51
- .53
- .04
1.84

4

3
2.29
.39
1.94
- .26
-1 . 2 0
1.94

2.47
-3.29
.67
2.37
1.92
2.58

5

6

2.82
1.53

2.65
2.83
2.38
- .06
.83
2.31

7

.88

3.08
4.69
.70

.86

1.00

-1 . 0 0
1.24

.73
2.55

8

1.88

2.26
1.39
.65
.04
-2 . 0 2

9

10

1.95
2.23
1.32
1.58
1.52
3.17

.80
2.38
.82
2.09
2.07

1.56
.76
2.19
1.28

1.56
1.47
1.47
.44

1.22

Groups compared: West - South
Degrees of freedom:
+ n3 - 2 = 77
Critical "t" values: -2.00 £ t <.2.00
B
C
E
F

.45
1.00

Note:

.48
.77

.59
1.34
1.24
1.32

.40
1.55
.57

1.81

1.87

2.00

1.00

1.74

2.21

1.22

.01

1.44
1.05
2.38
2.08

.04

2.66

2.78
2.35
1.64

2.07
1.30
1.16
2.01

No significant differences were noted with respect to the following
groups and concepts.

Groups

Concepts

1-2

A,
C,
A,
A
A,
A,

2-3
1-3
1-4
2-4
3-4

D, E, F
D, F
B , C , D, E, F
B, C, D, E, F
B, D
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